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INSPIRATIONAL WORDS 
 
“Wherever you go, whatever you do; family always comes first.”  
Sundramurthi Rungan 
 
“Each time a man stands up for an ideal or acts to improve the lot of others, or strikes 
out against injustice, he sends forth a tiny ripple of hope, and crossing each other from 
a million different centres of energy and daring, those ripples build a current that can 
sweep down the mightiest walls of oppression and resistance.” 
Robert Francis Kennedy 
 
“Engaging with communities and contributing towards community development is 
not only the right thing to do, it also makes good business sense.” 
Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources of Australia 
 
“There is a great correlation between education and affluence. Yes, education must be 
needs driven and must respond to the economic drivers at play. And yes, education 
does not address our immediate problem of limited capital, coupled with social 
dysfunctionality borne of the migrant labour system and rapid industrialization. 
Indeed, a program of education followed resolutely within a culture where non-
achievement is not actively encouraged may seem tyrannical and even inappropriate. 
But nothing comes of nothing. One must see the future and invest in it in order to 
continue to be relevant.”    Kgosi Leruo Tshekedi Molotlegi 
 
“Only when the last tree has died and the last river been poisoned and the last fish 
been caught will we realise we cannot eat money”   Cree Indian Proverb 
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ABSTRACT 
 
At the commencement of this research, South Africa(SA) had been twelve years into 
democracy and two years after the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development 
Act (MPRDA) and Broad-Based Socio-Economic Empowerment Charter for the 
South African Mining Industry (Mining Charter) became effective. As a result, the 
mining industry is undergoing a transformation to redress the imbalances of the past 
and to enable greater participation of Historically Disadvantaged Persons in the 
industry. 
 
While the issues affecting Indigenous Peoples (IPs) may have become clouded by 
Black Economic Empowerment and transformation, IPs have begun to assert their 
rights. This is particularly so with regard to the exploitation of the minerals on their 
land to enable them effectively use and develop such minerals to secure their own 
development. This research, accordingly, seeks to answer the fundamental question of 
whether IPs in SA could exploit minerals and play a meaningful role in their own 
socio-economic development. 
 
The three parties (mining companies, IPs and government) to a mining transaction of 
would need to work together to ensure that IPs are able to effectively benefit from 
such mineral exploitation. Although IPs are in a significantly weaker position as 
compared to governments and companies, it does not obviate the responsibility of IPs 
to be proactive in their own development.   
 
In considering an appropriate definition of IPs in SA, the legal development of the 
segregation of IPs from mining to loss of land, various case studies and toolkits, 
fundamental strategic (“DRESTALL”) and general principles lead to appropriate 
strategies being developed that can be used for IPs to effectively use and develop their 
mineral rights. However, in adopting the relevant strategies, it should be noted that a 
long-term vision must be adopted by IPs. 
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NB: All information is up-to-date as at 31
st
 March 2012, unless otherwise provided. 
Chapter One 
OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND 
 
1.1. Introduction and Historical Context 
South Africa (SA) had been vilified internationally due to its policy of Apartheid, 
where the White race received the most privileges while the Black races (African, 
Coloured and Indian) were subjugated. Upon attaining democracy, SA began to be 
described as a “Rainbow Nation” where the redressing of past wrongs has become 
paramount. In this regard, the South African (S African) mining industryhas been 
impacted by the resulting social change to the extent that it is; for example,even 
facing criticism from children’s rights advocates, who claim that mining in 
Mapungubwe can affect “the rights of future generations to cultural identity, the 
protection of African culture and respect for the natural environment” (Mathews; 
2010). 
 
However, it is the rights of Indigenous Peoples (IPs)to effectively use and develop the 
mineral resources that occur on their land that has become the most pressing issue for 
mining companies. This issue was highlighted in the country when the Richtersveld 
Community applied for their lands to be returned under the Restitution of Land Rights 
Act (1994).
1
 
 
In the opinion of the writer, and confirmed in Chapter 8, mining involves the 
interaction between the mining company and IPs, with the involvement of 
government. These three parties, working together, can ensure development of IPs 
affected by a mining operation. However, IPs, being part of the discriminated, have 
not had the benefit of proper education, continuous development of mining experience 
or access to such knowledge. IPs would therefore have to develop such knowledge 
and experience, while simultaneously, developing a mechanism to ensure their 
economic development. 
 
                                                 
1
The case of the Richtersveld Community will be dealt with in greater detail in Chapter 7 below 
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It is further the opinion of the writer that, regardless of past discrimination, IPs can 
benefit from the exploitation of the minerals on their land and can develop themselves 
from the proceeds of such exploitation of the minerals, provided the IPs assume the 
responsibility for their development and implement the necessary programmes to 
achieve same. This study is aimed at developing the strategies that IPs could use, 
within relevant scenarios, to derive the necessary benefits (and development) from the 
exploitation of minerals on their land. 
 
While, in terms of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA) 
(2002), mineral rights belong to all South Africans and the right to mine would belong 
to the mineral rights holder who has been awarded such rights (see chapter 4); it does 
not mean that IPs are excluded from benefitting from the exploitation of minerals that 
occur on their land. In fact, Section 10 of the MPRDA (2002) provides for the 
Regional Manager to consult with “interested and affected parties”, which would 
include IPs.  
 
In light of the afore-going, for purposes of this research, “effective use and 
development” would entail IPs deriving the maximum benefit from the exploitation of 
the minerals and using the proceeds of such benefits to ensure their own development 
and also the development of the area in which they live. The benefits obtained and the 
development engaged in should be such that the IPs no longer would be dependent on 
mining; or should be able to develop themselves further or be engaged in different 
economic activities when the mining operations have ceased. To do this would entail 
IPs using the proceeds received (company contributions to the IPs directly or proceeds 
obtained by IPs as a result of the company’s local procurement policies) to ensure 
their development. While it is common cause that IPs have been severely prejudiced 
economically and educationally due to the discriminatory practices of the previous 
government, it does not mean that IPs should sit back and not play a role in their 
development.   
 
1.2. Development of South African (S African) Law 
In considering who would be IPs in SA, to the Azanian Research Project (nd, Pg 4), 
reported that SA was occupied by the Khoikhoi (Hottentots) and the San, collectively 
referred to as the “Khoisan”. The first “European” to arrive at the Cape was Vasco De 
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Gama (a Portuguese) who merely erected a monument on the place of his arrival but 
there was no attempt to colonise the Cape on behalf of Portugal. The first people to 
actually colonise the Cape were the Dutch via the Dutch East India Company (DEIC). 
The DEIC’s agent, van Riebeeck, established a post at the Cape in 1652 for Dutch 
ships to rest as they travelled between the Netherlands and the spice countries of the 
East(Azanian Research Project, nd, p. 5). Thereafter, the English colonised the Cape 
in 1806.
2
 This prompted the Dutch settlers to move inland to avoid the British rule in 
what became known as the “Great Trek”.  
 
In addition to assuming complete control of the land, the Dutch introduced their 
system of law (Roman-Dutch Law) and thereafter the English introduced their system 
of law (English Law) to the region. This lead Hahlo and Khan (1960, p 21) to 
conclude: “By the end of the nineteenth century Roman-Dutch law was still the basic 
common law of the Cape, but it had become overlaid with a substantial blanket of 
English law”. 
 
As a result, with the Union of SA, Roman-Dutch Law became the Common Law of 
SA, with English Law influence. As such, the laws of the colonising powers 
predominated. The question arises: Did these laws eradicate any other law that might 
have existed prior to colonisation? 
 
1.3. Customary Law 
In answering the above question, one would need to consider the words of Bekker 
(1989, p. 11) who stated that: 
“During the existence of the pre-colonial sovereign Black ‘states’ customary 
law was an established system of immemorial rules which had evolved from 
the way of life and natural wants of the people, the general context of which 
was a matter of common knowledge, coupled with precedents applying to 
special cases, which were retained in the memories of the chief and his 
counsellors, their sons and their sons’ sons, until forgotten, or until they 
                                                 
2
The first British occupation of the Cape was from 1795 to 1803 where it held the Cape on behalf of 
the Prince of Orange, the exiled ruler of the Netherlands (Hahlo and Khan, 1960, p. 4).  Britain re-
occupied the Cape in 1806 and in 1814 the Cape was formally ceded to Britain (Hahlo and Khan, 1960, 
p. 5) 
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became part of the immemorial rules. It is a system of law of ancient origin. . 
.” 
 
He could only be referring to a customary system of law which Bennett (2004, p. 2) 
describes as an oral form of law. The Government Commission on Native Laws and 
Customs (1883, p 14) explained customary laws as follows: 
“Although an ‘unwritten law,’ its principles and practice were widely 
understood, being mainly founded upon customary precedents, embodying the 
decision of chiefs and councils of bye-gone days, handed down by oral 
tradition and treasured in the memories of the people. This law took 
congnizance of certain crimes and offences; it enforced certain civil rights and 
obligations; it provided for the validity of polygamic marriages; and it secured 
succession of property and inheritance, according to simple and well-defined 
rules.” 
 
According to Bennett (2004, p 4), oral law could only be expounded by senior males 
at council meetings or trials. Further, though oral, it had a structured framework in the 
form of anecdotes, myths and proverbs (Bennett, 2004, p 4). Also, objects, places and 
topographical features provided a “constant mnemonic for oral cultures” in that right 
to land, for example, was marked by streams, hills, gullies and even the location of 
ancestors’ graves (Bennett, 2004, p. 4). 
 
It would seem that the Roman-Dutch and English laws replaced this customary law. 
Bekker (1989, p. 1) reported that: 
“All subjects of the Government of the [Cape] Colony were subject to the law 
of the Colony; customary law . . . received no recognition whatever. 
Consequently, civil suits between Blacks domiciled within the proclaimed 
borders of the Colony were dealt with according to the law of the Colony, as if 
the parties were Europeans” 
 
However, this did not mean that customary law was completely ignored by the courts 
of the Cape Colony as Bekker (1989, p. 2) concluded: 
“The courts of the Colony, therefore, never recognized or applied customary 
law as a system of law, but were always prepared to enforce any agreement 
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whatever, if the terms thereof were not prohibited by law nor contrary to 
morality, public policy, or equity”. 
 
This can be illustrated by the roles accorded to tribal chiefs. Bennett (2004, p.102) 
reported that there were three tiers of authority: chief, wardhead and family head. The 
chief was the head of the hierarchy but in some instances the chief dominated to such 
an extent that the chief was regarded as a king by the colonial powers. In those cases 
where the chief’s control was weaker or where the “polity” was not regarded as being 
large enough, the ruler was described as being a “paramount chief”. Headmen or 
Wardheads were next and were usually senior members of the leading families; 
“Wardheads reported directly to the chief, and, in concert with him, they formed a 
ruling council” (Bennett, 2004, p. 103). Then came the “patriarchal heads of council” 
and were referred to as “kraalheads” (Bennett, 2004, p. 102 – 103). 
 
Bennett (2004, p. 107) indicated that this system of indirect rule during colonialism 
resulted in chiefs being the main providers of law and order for their subjects but were 
legally subordinate to the settler governments. This resulted in some African leaders 
becoming “functionaries of the colonial administration” (Bennett, 2004, p. 107). 
 
It is interesting that the subsequent Apartheid government did in fact recognise 
customary laws; though there seems to have been an ulterior motive in such 
recognition. According to Bennett (2004, p. 21): 
“In South Africa, customary law played a significant role in the government’s 
defence against the charge that apartheid was entrenching white domination. 
Recognition of customary law could be held out as proof of the government’s 
respect for the country’s diverse cultural traditions, which, in turn, showed that 
it was doing no more than giving the various African nations in South Africa 
their right to self-determination”. 
 
These circumstances were changed by the current Constitution(1996) which considers 
the issue of traditional leadership in Section 211(1). This Section recognises the 
institution, status and role of traditional leadership and allows for the continued 
functioning of any traditional authority that observes a system of customary law. 
However, Section 211(1) further indicates that this traditional authority is subject to 
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the Bill of Rights that is enshrined in the Constitution(1996). Further, courts are 
enabled to apply customary law “subject to Constitution and any legislation that 
specifically deals with customary law”(Section 211(3), Constitution, 1996). This is 
enhanced by Section 212(1) which allows for the creation of legislation to “provide 
for a role for traditional leadership as an institution at local level on matters affecting 
local communities”(Constitution, 1996).  
 
In addition, Section 9(3) (Constitution, 1996) provides a list of grounds on which the 
State cannot discriminate. Of this list, those that could apply to IPs are: “race . . . 
ethnic or social origin, colour . . . belief, culture, language and birth” (Constitution, 
1996). Section 9(4) extends this prohibition to private citizens as well thereby 
ensuring that neither the State nor any individual can discriminate against any 
person(s).  
 
Further, the Constitution (1996), in Section 30, allows people the right to “use the 
language and to participate in the cultural life of their choice” so long as it is not 
“inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights”. Section 30 is bolstered by 
Section 31(1) which provides:  
“Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be 
denied the right, with other members of the community –  
(a) to enjoy their culture, practise their religion and use their language; and 
(b) to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associations 
and other organs of civil society”(Constitution, 1996). 
 
As with Section 30, Section 31(1) is also limited; in that Section 31(2) provides that 
the above rights cannot be “exercised in a manner inconsistent with any provision of 
the Bill of Rights”(Constitution, 1996).In this way, the Constitution(1996) signifies a 
major change in attitude towards the recognition of customary law; in that, customary 
law is recognised and protected, to the extent that it is not inconsistent with the rights 
enshrined in the Bill of Rights.  
 
1.4. Other Race Groups 
Indians were first introduced into SA by the Dutch as slaves and thereafter by the 
English as Indentured Labourers and Free Indians (SAHistoryOnline (a)). However, 
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though Indians were subjugated from the time of their arrival, the fact remains that 
they were “imported” (for lack of a better word) into the country and cannot be 
regarded as being indigenous to SA.  
 
Similarly, Chinese were also “imported” into the country as indentured mine 
labourers (Chinese Forum, nd) and in terms of the case of Chinese Association of 
South Africa and Others vs The Mininster of Labour and others (2008), the court 
ordered that the Chinese were to be included in the definition of “Black” for the 
purposes of Black Economic Empowerment. However, being in a similar position to 
that of the Indians, the Chinese cannot be considered as IPs for the purposes of this 
research.  
 
While the position of the Indian and Chinese races is clear, it is far more problematic 
as regards the “Coloured” race. The Azanian Research Project reported that during the 
Dutch occupation, “Khoisan women were taken as house slaves and there were 
numerous sexual liasons. The forced and voluntary mating served as the basis for the 
mixed-race (“coloured”) population”(Azanian Research Project, p. 5). 
 
However, Venter (1974, p. 15) reported that there was “evidence of sexual contact 
between early travellers who passed around the Cape and local tribes people even 
before [Venter’s emphasis] van Riebeeck landed”. Having said that, Venter (1974, p. 
15) stated that:  
“though these additions of extraneous blood could hardly have any marked 
influence on the racial patterns which were to evolve later, it is noteworthy 
that contact did take place. Academically speaking, therefore, the history of 
the Coloured people as we know them today goes back to the years before 
1652”. 
 
However, Botha (nd), as quoted by Venter (1974, p. 14) stated: “The Coloured people 
of the Cape form an anthropologically distinct population group whose relatively 
recent origins include Eastern and European elements”. In this regard, for the 
purposes of this research, it cannot be conclusively stated whether the “Coloured” 
race can be completely disregarded as an IP of SA. It would accordingly be up to the 
“Coloured” person(s) concerned to prove their IP status.  
 26 
1.5. The Policy of Apartheid 
Apartheid can be regarded as an extension of colonialism as it,inter alia, involved the 
subjugation of IPs by a “foreign” race. Apartheid was characterised by, inter alia, the 
restriction of movement of the black races, job reservation in favour of the white race, 
restriction of ownership of land for certain categories of the black race and forced 
removal of black races to “approved ” areas. The African race suffered the greatest 
prejudices, followed by the Indian, Chinese and Coloured races; while the White race 
enjoyed the greatest privilege. As Makhanya (2007) stated:  
“Race defined everything about us: who we befriended, worked with, fought 
with, danced with and slept with. It defined the places we lived in, the 
education we imparted and received, and the professional paths we were able 
to take. Most importantly, it defined how human one was: those of a certain 
race were deemed less human than others and were therefore accorded the 
status and rights of a sub-species. Race was the basis on which good living 
was bequeathed on some and immense suffering was inflicted on others”.  
 
In addition, Bowles (nd), as quoted by Van Rensburg (1962, p. 35), described SA’s 
policy of racial segregation as follows: 
“In South Africa, racial prejudice was ‘sanctified by religion and philosophy,   
formalized by law and institutionalized in the mores of the nation”. 
 
However, Van Rensburg (1962, p. 98) had a very interesting view of Apartheid: 
“Apartheid is said to have ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ aspects. Negative 
apartheid means securing, entrenching and guaranteeing White supremacy; 
positive apartheid is supposed to mean the political and economic 
development of the African reserves. Apartheid as a political theory was 
conceived by men of integrity with roots deep in the history of their people, 
men and women who were fully aware of the traditional conflict between their 
own people and the Black people and anxious to avoid clashes in the future. 
To do this, it seemed necessary to avoid economic competition between the 
races and contact between them, yet impossible to keep every black man 
permanently a servant. The result was a philosophy of ‘separate development’ 
of each group ‘along its own lines’, which was not without its elements of 
justice”. 
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Needless to say, the “negative” aspects far outweighed the “positive” aspects of 
Apartheid. The greatest expression of this was the defining and segregation of the 
various groups that populated SA by the various Group Areas Acts; for example, 
Section 2(1) of the Group Areas Act (1950) created three basic groups; namely, White 
(who in appearance is “generally accepted as a white person” but excludes those who 
appear to be white but is generally “accepted as a coloured person” or a member of 
any other group); Native (who is “generally accepted as a member of an aboriginal 
race or tribe of Africa” but excludes coloureds); and Coloured (who is “not a member 
of the white group or of the native group”).  
 
This practice of segregation resulted in SA being internationally vilified for a number 
of years. The United Nations (UN), being the face of the international community, 
became the forum in which the international condemnation of Apartheid was voiced. 
For example, India complained about SA’s treatment of “people of Indian origin” in 
1946 at the first session of the General Assembly (UN Department of Public 
Information, 1994, p. 10). 
 
However, the first General Assembly resolution regarding Apartheid was adopted in 
1952 which established a three member UN Commission on the Racial Situation in 
the Union of South Africa (UN Department of Public Information, 1994, p. 8). This 
Commission declared Apartheid to be contrary to the Charter of the UN and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and stated that that the UN “had a duty to 
give moral support to the oppressed people and . . . to assist South Africa in solving 
the problem” (UN Department of Public Information, 1994, p. 12). With increasing 
pressure on SA to renounce Apartheid policies, SA withdrew as member of the UN 
Educational and Scientific Organisation in 1955, the Food and Agricultural 
Organisation in 1963 and the International Labour Organisation in 1964 (UN 
Department of Public Information, 1994, p. 8). 
 
After the Sharpville massacre in 1960, the Security Council adopted Resolution 
134(1960) which, inter alia, “recognized that the situation in South Africa had led to 
international friction and, if continued, might endanger international peace and 
security” (UN Department of Public Information, 1994, p. 14). The General Assembly 
tried to bring resolutions against Apartheid but failed to get them passed but 
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succeeded in adopting Resolution 1761(XVIII) in 1962 which called on member States 
for diplomatic and economic sanctions against SA to force the S African government 
to abandon Apartheid policies. Such measures were: “to break off diplomatic relations 
with the Government of South Africa, or refrain from establishing such relations; to 
close their ports to all vessels flying the South African flag; to enact legislation 
prohibiting their ships from entering South African ports; to boycott all South African 
goods and refrain from exporting goods, including all arms and ammunition, to South 
Africa; and to refuse landing passage facilities to all aircraft belonging to the 
Government and to companies registered under the laws of the Republic of South 
Africa” (UN Department of Public Information, 1994, p. 15 - 17). 
 
The General Assembly’s call for economic sanctions was echoed by the Security 
Council when it adopted Resolution 569 (1985) which called for economic measures 
against SA (UN Department of Public Information, 1994, p 40). The opposition of the 
UN to Apartheid culminated in Resolution 3324 E (XXIX) of the General Assembly 
which recommended that SA be totally excluded from participation in all 
organisations and conferences that were held under the UN umbrella so long as it 
continued to practice Apartheid, which resulted in SA being excluded from all organs 
of the UN by 1975 (UN Department of Public Information, 1994, p. 48).Although the 
democratic process began in 1990 with the release of Mandela from prison, it was 
only on the 8
th
 October 1993 in General Assembly Resolution A/RES/48/1 that the UN 
member States agreed for all sanctions against SA to be lifted (UN Department of 
Public Information, 1994, p. 480).  
 
In SA, the struggle against Apartheid was cemented when the Freedom Charter 
(1955) was adopted on 26
th
 June 1955. The principles enunciated therein have been 
included in the various instruments and institutions upon the attainment of democracy. 
 
1.6. The New SA 
Upon the demise of Apartheid, there had been a rejuvenation of pride by S Africans, 
fuelled largely by the personality and efforts of Mandela. This national pride seemed 
to inculcate faith in the newly established democratic institutions which lead to the 
coinage of the term “New SA” to illustrate this new national pride and faith in the 
country.  
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A number of instruments were introduced which included, inter alia, the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa Act (1996), Employment Equity Act (1998), the Broad-
Based Black Economic Empowerment Act (2003) and, more specific to the mining 
industry, the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act(MPRDA) (2002), 
which was supported by the Broad-Based Socio Economic Empowerment Charter for 
the Mining Industry (2002) (Mining Charter). As a result, Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) and Transformation initiatives came to the fore, especially for 
the mining industry. 
 
In this New SA, with all the legislative improvements and the commitment of the 
government to protect all S Africans, can it really be argued that IPs need extra 
protection? In answering this question, one cannot ignore Anaya’s (2004, p. 218) 
assertion that:  
“Indigenous peoples remain vulnerable even in states that have taken concrete 
steps towards compliance with contemporary international standards 
concerning their rights”. 
 
As such, vigilance is needed to ensure that in implementing BEE and Transformation 
initiatives, the rights of IPs are not disregarded. An important development is that IPs, 
internationally, are more socially aware than before. As was stated by Guerra (nd, p. 
2) with regard to Peru: 
“. . . ‘social awareness’ is . . . the increasing understanding by local 
communities and other interest groups, of their interests, needs, views, role 
and capacities with respect to mineral development projects, and their demand 
for an active role in the decision making process. This process involves: (a) 
understanding of impacts caused by mineral developments they may host; and 
(b) understanding of their bargaining power with regard to other 
stakeholders”.  
 
Indications are that the IPs in SA also have this increased social awareness. Mining 
companies should use this increased social awareness of IPs to better inform IPs of 
the company’s intended actions and predicted outcomes as regards the relevant 
mineral resource. Being open with IPs from the beginning builds trust which would 
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assist both parties during the tougher negotiations later in the relationship. As Guerra 
(nd, p. 29) concludes: 
“Reasonable and good relations with local communities since the early stages 
of the project, can potentially reduce the source of conflict, and the reasons for 
delays in project development and exploitation, facilitates permitting, and may 
have an impact on certain costs (such as. costs of insurance).”  
 
It would seem that mining companies are now more accepting in considering IPs 
concerns than before. As Guerra (nd, p. 8) further states: 
“Although business is improving shareholders value, mining companies are 
nowadays expected to operate in such a manner that mineral wealth when 
developed, sustains human well-being by contributing to social and economic 
infrastructure, that in turn will be capable of sustaining benefits after mining 
depletion. Thus, ‘trade-offs’ or concessions between corporate aspirations and 
raised expectations amongst external stakeholders will have to occur.” 
 
In addition, Guerra (nd, p. 17) points out that it is also important to deal with IPs for 
two reasons: 
“First, they can affect resources accessibility. Except for State-owned land, 
local communities who hold the land, can effectively limit the access to it. 
Second, they hold cultural and social values that they may want to preserve. If 
not respected, it can lead to opposition and increase the risks of future 
conflicts.” 
 
This view was shared by the then Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan, who, in 
the Foreword to the Conflict-Sensitive Business Practice Guidance for Extractive 
Industries, stated: 
“Enlightened self-interest should steer business towards playing an active role 
in promoting transparency and accountability in managing the extraction and 
sale of natural resources. Increasingly, a company’s reputation depends not 
only on what product or service it provides, but also on how it does so. By 
adopting a pro-active approach, companies can reduce operational risks, 
promote stability, and improve relations with the communities, in which they 
operate. Indeed, a company’s ‘bottom-line’ can no longer be separated from 
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peace, development and other goals of the United Nations”(International Alert 
(a), 2005). 
 
1.7. Methodology 
At the outset it should be noted that there is no hypothesis to which this research 
relates. However, the research seeks to answer the fundamental question of whether 
IPs in SA could exploit the minerals on their land to ensure their development. In this 
regard, it should be noted that during colonialism and Apartheid, legislation had been 
the instrument of subjugation and discrimination. As a result, an intensive study of the 
legislations at the various periods of S African history was conducted, to determine 
the impact of the relevant legislation on the IPs, in particular, that legislation that had 
a bearing on mining and IPs’ right to mining. Democracy heralded an extensive 
review of the legislation and a consideration thereof is included. 
 
In addition, while a literature and legislative review would have placed the need for IP 
development in context, as opposed to the other discriminated races in SA, two case 
studies involving IPs in SA are considered. While these two uniquely S African case 
studies indicate different circumstances and outcomes, a case study of the Swazi 
nation is also undertaken to consider the dichotomy between traditional leadership of 
a constitutional monarchy and the legislative imperative of a constitutional 
democracy. 
 
In this regard it should be noted that no fieldwork had been conducted herein, save for 
personal interviews being conducted with the relevant persons. 
 
1.8. Structure of Thesis 
In light of the above, this research would be set out as follows: 
 
Chapter Two, would explore the various definitions of indigenous peoples and 
develop an appropriate definition for IPs in SA. In addition, their treatment and 
protection in the international arena would also be examined with due consideration 
of all relevant international instruments.  
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Chapter Three, would consider the legislations in SA prior to the attainment of 
democracy and would comprise three parts divided into the various appropriate 
periods. Each period would look at the various stages in SA’s history and how IPs 
were affected during the different eras.   
 
Chapter Four would explore the legal instruments that exist in the New SA; that is, 
during democracy, and how these instruments benefit IPs and promotes their rights, 
especially with regard to mineral rights. 
 
Colonising powers usually regarded the colonised lands as being terra nullius (land 
that was abandoned) and then assumed complete control thereof, although IPs regard 
land as being of central importance to their culture and practices. Chapter Five would 
be considering the issue of land and the dispossession of IPs of their land. In this 
regard, the provisions of the Restitution of Land Rights Act (1994), and related 
legislation, would be considered. 
 
Chapter Six would explore the concept of Sustainable Development and its 
applicability and development in the mining industry. It would also explore the 
impact of this principle to IPs, affected by mining in SA. 
 
Chapter Seven would consider three case studies involving three different IPs in the 
Southern African Development Community; namely, the Royal Bafokeng Nation, the 
Richtersveld Community and the Swazi nation.  
 
Chapter 8 would consider various international toolkits and develop strategic 
principles to assist in the development of relevant strategies. 
 
Chapter 9 would consider new strategies that would be of assistance to IPs and their 
development from exploitation of their mineral rights. 
 
Chapter 10 would encompass the Conclusion and would recommend the most 
appropriate courses of action for government, mining companies and IPs. 
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Chapter Two 
DEFINING INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (IPs) 
 
2.1. Introduction 
As per Chapter One, the races that would qualify for IP status for the purposes of this 
research, are the African and the “Coloured” races. In looking at the African race, it 
should be remembered that this race comprises various tribes. In this regard, when 
commenting on the Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development (MMSD) draft 
report, the Chamber of Mines of SA (the Chamber) (nd, p. 3) stated as follows as 
regards tribes in SA: 
“In Africa, most tribal groups would consider it more dignifying if all their 
needs were addressed by laws applicable to all citizens. The sensitivities are 
such that special provisions would be regarded negatively. This principle is 
applied in South Africa, with the result that there is no need to extend special 
rights to groups merely by virtue of their indigenous status. Where indigenous 
peoples have an equal right to access to the political process of the State, 
which exercises sovereignty over them, it is the function of the political 
process ultimately to properly address the implications of mining for 
indigenous peoples, local people and the country as a whole”. 
 
Whether the Chamber is correct or not is not an easy question to answer. However, it 
is not true that there is no need to “extend special rights to groups merely by virtue of 
their indigenous status”. In fact, once a particular group of people have met the 
criteria to qualify as an IP then they should be able to claim the benefits that that 
status entitles them to. As such, the Chamber cannot expect that IPs be denied that 
which they are entitled to once they have met the necessary requirements, regardless 
of their tribal affiliations. To do otherwise would definitely lead to a greater injustice 
being meted out to IPs than an outright refusal of their rights.  
 
Therefore, the determining of the relevant criteria for qualifying as IPs would depend 
on an appropriate definition. However, in defining IPs in SA, one needs to consider 
the international definition of IPs. In this regard, it should be noted that defining IPs 
on the international arena is by no means an easy task, primarily due to the initial 
actions of colonisers that impact on IPs’ abilitiesto assert their rights. For example, 
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Anaya (2004, p 17) reported that Pope Alexander VI purported to grant the Spanish 
rulers all territories discovered by their envoys that were not already under the 
jurisdiction of Christian rulers. Anaya (2004, p.17) reported further that Spanish rulers 
regarded this action of Pope Alexander as granting the Spanish legal title over the 
newly discovered Americas and that they even went so far as to attempt converting 
the “Indians” to Christianity. 
 
It has been stated that there were three reasons for Spanish colonisation, namely: 
“The foremost aim of Spanish colonization was to spread Christianity. This 
was attested by the last will and testament of Queen Isabella, by the Catholic 
spirit of the laws of the Indies, by the apostolic labors (sic) and achievements 
of missionaries and by the actual result of Spain’s more than 300 years of 
colonial work. 
The second aim of the Spanish colonizers was economic wealth. This aim rose 
from the keen struggle among European nations to control the right spice trade 
in the orient. Magellan and other navigators blazed their ways across the 
pacific to secure spices and oriental wares for the Spanish crown. 
The third aim of Spanish colonization was political grandeur. by [sic] 
acquiring the Philippines, Spain emerged as a mighty empire whose frontier 
comprised both hemisphere[sic]” (Geocities.com, nd, p. 1). 
 
It seemed that the English had similar objectives in colonising; namely, the “planting” 
of Christianity, expansion of commerce and to transfer geographic knowledge and law 
(Tomlins, nd, p. 319 – 323). In this regard, a common practice of colonising countries 
was using international law to deprive IPs of their rights. Anaya (2004, p. 29) 
commented:  
“By deeming indigenous peoples incapable of enjoying sovereign status or 
rights in international law, international law was thus able to govern the 
patterns of colonization and ultimately to legitimate the colonial order, with 
diminished or no consequences arising from the presence of aboriginal 
peoples”. 
 
With these developments, in attaining a definition of IPs in SA, this chapter would 
consider the various issues impacting IPs internationally and locally. 
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2.2. The Right to Self-determination 
The Right to Self-determination formed the basis in many conflicts against 
colonialism and the fight for independence. Anaya (2004, p. 98) was of the opinion 
that the “concept of self-determination derives from philosophical affirmation of the 
human drive to translate aspiration into reality, coupled with postulates of inherent 
human equality”. 
 
Looking at the historical struggle of the liberation movements and their supporters in 
SA, it can be seen that their basic opposition to Apartheid was based on their Right to 
Self-determination. It is also true that IPs seeking to enforce their rights would also be 
looking at enforcing their Rights to Self-determination. This is supported by Anaya 
(2004, p. 104), who stated: 
“self-determination entails a universe of human rights precepts extending from 
core values of freedom and equality and applying in favor [sic] of human 
beings in relation to the institutions of government under which they live. In 
essence, self-determination comprises a standard of governmental legitimacy 
within the modern human rights frame”. 
 
Internationally, it is recognised that IPs have used the Right to Self-determination to 
ensure the protection of their rights, as Anaya (2004, p. 97) said: 
Indigenous peoples have repeatedly articulated their demands in terms of self-
determination, and, in turn, self-determination precepts have fuelled the 
international movement in favor [sic] of those demands”. 
 
By using this concept of Self-determination to assert their rights, IPs signal their 
opposition to being discriminated against. According to Anaya (2004, p. 98): 
“Self-determination gives rise to remedies that tear at the legacies of empire, 
discrimination, suppression of democratic participation, and cultural 
suffocation.” 
 
This is recognised in a number of international instruments, which deal with the 
recognition of IPs. The most recent instrument is the UN Declaration On The Rights 
Of Indigenous Peoples (UNIP Declaration) (2007). In terms of Article 3 of the UNIP 
Declaration (2007), specific reference is made to the Right to Self-determination: 
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“Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that 
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development”. 
 
However, the nature of the Right to Self-determination permeates the entire document 
with many articles entrenching the various features associated with this right, such as 
Articles 4, 6, 7, 9, etcetera (UNIP Declaration, 2007). It does seem as though the 
provisions are in response to acts of prejudice already suffered by IPs the world over 
and the protections are geared to the eradication of such practices. Due to the 
influence of the Constitution (1996), the effectiveness of the UNIP Declaration (2007) 
on the IPs in SA is a moot point at this stage. 
 
While the international developments may be important in understanding the issue of 
IPs and the reason for their protection, the effect of these developments would only be 
gauged by the passage of time. However, these developments cannot be used to shape 
IP policy in SA to the detriment of the local population. At the same time, the unique 
situation in SA should not be used as an excuse to completely ignore international 
developments – that would be even more harmful and unforgivable. It is submitted 
that international developments should be monitored and any useful developments 
should be incorporated into the S African milieu. 
 
2.3. Defining IPs on the International Arena 
In exploring the definitions of IPs on the international arena it should be noted that 
these definitions would not necessarily apply to IPs in SA. As per the Chamber (nd, p. 
2):  
“The implications of mining for indigenous groups cannot be dealt with 
effectively at a global level because of the diverse nature and needs of 
indigenous groups. . . A better approach would be to recommend that each 
national mining jurisdiction develop a mechanism for dealing with the 
implications of mining for indigenous peoples and any other affected local 
communities and cultural groups”. 
 
While a unique approach in SA would better suit S African IPs than a global approach 
that would not account properly for them, this would also be true of other IPs in other 
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parts of the world. Each IP in each part of the world would have unique circumstances 
that would have to be accounted for. However, while a mining company with 
operations in one country may not want to be bound by international standards for 
treatment of IPs, a company with operations in many countries would be bound by 
different rules for the treatment of IPs in various countries. Perhaps the Chamber 
sought to prevent a company from being forced to implement global standards in a 
country that has no or little protection for their IPs. Then again, it could also be that 
the Chamber wanted to prevent newly expanding S African companies from being 
forced to implement global standards for treatment of IPs in new areas of operation.  
Whatever the reason for the comments of the Chamber; there has been major 
developments in defining IPs internationally, as evidenced by the plethora of 
definitions available. 
 
According to Brownlie (1992, p. 55): 
“The term ‘indigenous’ as a synonym for ‘native’, meaning one born in a 
particular land or region. . .” 
 
According to Date-Bah (1998, p. 391): 
“Indigenous peoples, nations, or communities are culturally distinctive groups 
that find themselves engulfed by settler societies born of the forces of empire 
and conquest. . . They are indigenous because their ancestral roots are 
imbedded in the lands in which they live, or would like to live, much more 
deeply than the roots of more powerful sectors of society living on the same 
lands in close proximity. Furthermore, they are peoples to the extent that they 
comprise distinctive communities with a continuity of existence and identity 
that links them to communities, tribes or nations of their ancestral past”. 
 
In addition, one would also have to consider the definitions as contained in the 
international instruments and organisations, such as the World Bank, International 
Labour Organisation and the UN. 
 
2.3.1. The World Bank 
The World Bank Group has been involved in many projects that are beneficial to the 
poor of the world. In its dealings with the world’s poor it goes without saying that the 
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World Bank does deal with IPs. In fact, it has established Operational Directives (OD) 
that World Bank staff must follow in their dealings with IPs. Initially, OD 4.2 (1991) 
dealt with IPs and the interaction of World Bank staff with them; but has subsequently 
been replaced by OP 4.10 and Bank Procedure (BP) BP 4.10 (Box, OP 4.10, 2005, p. 
1). 
 
BP 4.10 (2005) deals with the internal procedures that the World Bank staff would 
have to follow when dealing with IPs, while OP 4.10 (2005) deals with the World 
Bank policy on IPs. OP 4.10 (2005) does recognise that there is no “universally 
accepted definition” of IPs. However, in terms of Article 3 of OP 4.10 (2005) it states 
that no such definition would be provided. Then again, it seems that a definition of 
sorts is provided for in Article 4: 
“4. For the purposes of this policy, the term ‘Indigenous Peoples’ is used in a 
generic sense to refer to a distinct, vulnerable, social and cultural group 
possessing the following characteristics in varying degrees: 
(a) Self-identification as members of a distinct indigenous cultural group and 
recognition of this identity by others; 
(b) collective attachment to geographically distinct habitats or ancestral 
territories in the project area and to the natural resources in these habitats 
and territories; 
(c) customary cultural, economic, social, or political institutions that are 
separate from those of the dominant society and culture; and 
(d) an indigenous language, often different from the official language of the 
country or region” (OP 4.10, 2005). 
 
It seems as if this “definition” presupposes that IPs are weaker or a minority in the 
country they reside. If one considers Article 4(c), and bearing in mind that SA is 
dominated by the African race, IPs may find themselves sharing many cultural and 
customary practices with the dominant race. It goes without saying that due to the 
African race comprising many tribes and cultural groups it is not possible for one 
group obtaining total dominance over another – not in the present democratic order.  
 
Further, in terms of Article 4(d) (OP 4.10, 2005), in a country with eleven (11) 
official languages, a tribe or group cannot be excluded simply due to their language 
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being recognised as an official language. As such, the “definition” provided by Article 
4 of OP 4.10 (2005) is not conducive to SA. 
 
2.3.2. The International Labour Organisation 
Another organisation that has concerned itself with the plight of IPs is the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO). Thus far, the ILO has adopted two (2) 
Conventions dealing with this matter. MacKay (nd, p. 57) reports that the first 
Convention concerned the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal 
and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries 107 of 1957 (Convention 
107). MacKay (nd, p. 66) further reports that this Convention was replaced by 
Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries 169 
of 1989 (Convention 169). Mackay (nd, p 8) indicates that though Convention 
107(1957) has been replaced, it still remains appropriate as there are many countries 
that have ratified it but have not ratified the later Convention 169 (1989).  
 
While Convention 169 (1989) is supposed to provide greater protection of IPs it has 
been criticised by many IPs due to “its lack of self-determination language; weak 
provisions on lands, territories, resources and relocation; lack of consent standard; and 
the absence of meaningful indigenous participation in the revision process” (MacKay, 
nd, p. 10). While Convention 107(1957) provided a definition of IPs, this definition 
was revised by Convention 169(1989) (MacKay, nd, p. 66). Brevitas causa only the 
second definition would be considered. 
 
According to Article 1 of Convention 169 (1989): 
 “1. This Convention applies to: 
(a) tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and 
economic conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national 
community, and whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own 
customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations; 
(b) peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on 
account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the 
country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the 
time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present state 
 40 
boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of 
their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions; 
(c) Self-identification as indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as a 
fundamental criterion for determining the groups to which the provisions 
of this Convention apply. . .” (MacKay, nd, p. 67). 
 
It can be seen that this definition would be more applicable to SA or any other African 
country than the World Bank “definition”. It is interesting that Convention 169 (1989) 
makes reference to “tribes”. This implicitly recognises that there would be groups of 
people that form part of the majority but who are different from the majority and so 
deserving of special protection, as is the case in SA. 
 
However, in SA, while Section 9(3) and Section 9(4) of the Constitution (1996) 
prohibits discrimination on, inter alia, race, ethnic or social origin, religion, culture, 
belief, language and birth; it does further go on to recognise, inter alia, the Section 15 
freedom of religion, belief and opinion; the Section 30 right to language and culture; 
the Section 31 rights of cultural, religious and linguistic communities, and the Chapter 
12 recognition of traditional leadership (Constitution, 1996). So while the 
Constitution (1996) provides for the recognition of Article 1 of Convention 
169(1989), if any custom or tradition is contrary to the Constitution (1996) then that 
custom or tradition is invalid.  
 
2.3.3. The UN Effort 
The UN considered the issue of IPs within its Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC), which established a Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination 
and Protection of Minorities, which in turn established the Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations (WGIP) (Pritchard, 1998, p. 40). In discussing the WGIP, 
Pritchard (1998, p. 42) reports that although the issue of a definition of IPs was raised 
at the WGIP’s first session, by 1997 no such definition had materialised. However, 
the Rapporteur to the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities (Martinez Cobo) provided the following definition: 
“Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a 
historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that 
developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors 
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of the societies now prevailing in those territories. . . They form at present 
non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and 
transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic 
identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance 
with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems” 
(Pritchard, 1998, p. 43). 
 
Pritchard (1998, p. 43) quoted the Rapporteur who defined an Indigenous Person as: 
“one who belongs to these Indigenous populations through self-identification 
as Indigenous (group consciousness) and is recognised and accepted by these 
populations as one of its members (acceptance by the group)”. 
 
While the latter definition of “Indigenous Person” could well be extended to an 
“indigenous person” in SA, it is difficult to reconcile the former definition to IPs as it 
is simply inadequate for the purposes of S African IPs – the definition by the 
Rapporteur provides for IPs who are in the minority. Brownlie (1992, p. 60) 
responded to the definition by Cobo as follows: 
“First, the approach places much emphasis on antecedence, and the general 
result is that, apart from the factor of priority of settlement, there is little or 
nothing to distinguish an indigenous people from any other ethnic group. 
Secondly, a particular characteristic of certain types of traditional aboriginal 
culture is its vulnerability in the face of economic individualism and 
entrepreneurial pressure. . . Yet the Martinez Cobo definition makes no 
reference to the factor of vulnerability. Thirdly, this definition, as applied in 
United Nations’ practice, has laid emphasis on the criterion that indigenous 
peoples form non-dominant sectors of society. This criterion of non-
dominance is not very apt, as it is not a necessary condition of indigenous 
peoples”. 
 
Brownlie (1992, p. 60) was of the opinion that the issue of equality should be stressed 
instead of the issue of non-dominance by stating: 
“The emphasis on dominance/non-dominance is unhelpful and inimical to the 
application of legal principles to establish equity.” 
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While this may be true, it is not that easy to ignore. Dominance or non-dominance 
would have to be considered in certain circumstances. SA is unique in that that the 
people that were prejudiced by colonialism, and thereafter Apartheid, are in the 
majority – numerically. Should the majority attempt to impose their culture and 
identity onto the other races then there could well be a clash of ideologies where the 
majority itself would become the violator of the minority rights of the minority 
groups? 
 
From the above, some of the ideologies employed by IPs internationally to enforce 
their rights, such as the protection of minority rights, may not apply to IPs in SA. This 
raises an important question: Could there be an IP within an IP in SA, with the 
smaller group needing to be protected from the bigger group?  While this is another 
difficult question to answer, it is likely that this in fact would be the case. In this 
event, the democratic structures, as envisaged by the Constitution (1996), would have 
an important role to play in ensuring that government does not become the oppressor 
of the very people they seek to empower. 
 
On 13
th
 September 2007 the UNIP Declaration (2007) was adopted by the UN 
General Assembly (UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, nd.). Unfortunately, 
this Declaration does not provide a definition for IPs and in looking at the text it 
seems that this document also presupposes that IPs are the minority group in a 
country. 
 
One of the reasons, according to the African Union, for the African States not 
favouring the Declaration was the lack of definition of IPs (African Union, 2007). It 
was stated that the “lack of a definition of the notion of indigenous populations in the 
draft UN Declaration is considered as likely to create a major juridical problems for 
the implementation of the Declaration” (African Union, 2007, p. 3). 
 
However, the Advisory Opinion goes on to state that the African Commission on 
Human Rights expressed the view that: 
“a definition is not necessary or useful as there as there is no universally 
agreed definition of the term and no single definition can capture the 
characteristics of indigenous populations. Rather, it is much more relevant and 
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constructive to try to bring out the main characteristics allowing the 
identification of the indigenous populations and communities in Africa” 
(African Union, 2007, p. 3). 
 
While it is indeed true that there is no universally agreed definition for IPs, it does not 
mean that a definition should be avoided. A definition is critical if one has to look at 
who the Declaration and other protective legislations are aimed at. It is pointless 
having instruments offering blanket protection when there is a dichotomy of “weak” 
and “strong” peoples. If IPs, generally accepted to be “weaker” as compared to other 
citizens, are not offered protection then their subjugation continues.  
 
While the African Union Advisory Opinion advocates that the “major characteristics 
which allow the identification of Africa’s Indigenous Communities is the favoured 
approach adopted”, (African Union, 2007, p. 3) much to its discredit, the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights argued that: 
“in Africa, the term indigenous populations does not mean ‘first inhabitants’ in 
reference to aboriginality as opposed to non-African communities or those 
having come from elsewhere. This peculiarity distinguishes Africa from the 
other Continents where native communities have been almost annihilated by 
non-native populations. Therefore, the ACHPR considers that any African can 
legitimately consider himself/herself as indigene to the Continent” (African 
Union, 2007, p. 4). 
 
In a diverse and democratic country like SA, making IP status dependent on race is 
inherently dangerous. As pointed out in Chapter 2, the African and Coloured races 
could be regarded as IPs. If one follows the ACHPR suggestion then “Coloureds” are 
precluded from claiming such IP status. 
 
2.4. Features Of and Defining IPs in SA 
With all this divergence, there are some common features that arise. Anaya (2004, p. 
4) suggested the following features of IPs: 
“In the contemporary world, indigenous peoples characteristically exist under 
conditions of severe disadvantage relative to others within the states 
constructed around them. Historical phenomena grounded on racially 
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discriminatory attitudes are not just blemishes of the past but rather translate 
into current inequities. Indigenous peoples have been deprived of vast 
landholdings and access to life sustaining resources, and they have suffered 
historical forces that have actively suppressed their political and cultural 
institutions. As a result, indigenous peoples have been crippled economically 
and socially, their cohesiveness as communities has been damaged or 
threatened, and the integrity of their cultures has been undermined. In both 
industrial and less-developed countries in which indigenous people live, the 
indigenous sectors almost invariably are on the lowest rung of the socio 
economic ladder, and they exist at the margins of power”. 
 
These features seem to be echoed by the UN Working Group for IPs which provided 
the following features of the concept of “indigenous”: 
“a) priority in time with respect [to] the occupation and use of a specific 
territory; 
b) the voluntary perpetuation of cultural distinctiveness, which may include 
aspects of language, social organisation, religion and spiritual values, modes 
of production, laws and institutions; 
c) self-identification, as well as recognition by other groups, or by State 
authorities, as a distinct collectivity; 
d) and an experience of subjugation, exclusion or discrimination, whether or 
not these conditions persist” (Caruso, et al, nd, p. 10). 
 
While these features would need to be included in any possible definition of IPs to do 
justice to them, the definition cannot be so loaded that it would become meaningless 
to the people that matter the most. Perhaps direction can be obtained from S African 
legislation.  
 
While the MPRDA (2002) does not define IPs, as per Section 1, the MPRDA (2002) 
provides a definition of “community” as: 
“community means a coherent, social group of persons with interests or rights 
in a particular area of land which the members have or exercise communally 
in terms of an agreement, custom or law”. 
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It would appear that this is in reference to IPs but it is too wide to actually be 
considered as a definitive definition. While the IPs may be able to use this definition 
to claim a benefit under the MPRDA (2002), this definition does not preclude any 
other community from also claiming a benefit. Section 1 of the MPRDA (2002) does 
however go to great length to define the new category of persons, Historically 
Disadvantaged Persons (HDPs) comprising people who have been previously 
discriminated against. HDPs are provided with extra protection and benefits to enable 
them to participate more effectively in the mining industry. While HDPs also include 
IPs, it does not exclusively cater for them – it is aimed at protecting all peoples who 
have been discriminated against.
3
 
 
However, while the MPRDA (2002) is a progressive piece of legislation and has set 
the tone for government’s transformation agenda, it cannot be expected to cover all 
issues. Other legislation may yield a better protection for IPs.  
 
Section 1 of the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act (1991) defines a community as 
being: 
“a group of persons of which its members have or wish to have their rights to 
or in a particular piece of land determined by shared rules” 
 
Interestingly, Section 1 of the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act (1991) also 
defines a tribe, which it describes as including: 
 “(a) any community living and existing like a tribe; or 
 (b) any part of a tribe living and existing as a separate entity”. 
 
Section 1 of the Restitution of Land Rights Act (1994) also refers to “communities” 
but defines it as: 
“any group of persons whose rights in land are derived from shared rules 
determining access to land held in common by such group, and includes part 
of any such group”   
 
                                                 
3
See: Rungan, S.V, et al (2005, p. 735)  
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A variation thereof is Section 1 of the Communal Property Associations Act (1996) 
which defines a community as: 
“a group of persons, which wishes to have its rights to or in particular property 
determined by shared rules under a written constitution and which wishes or is 
required to form an association . . .” 
 
This definition is similar to the definition provided in Section 1 of the Interim 
Protection of Informal Land Rights Act (1996) which states that a community means: 
“any group or portion of a group of persons whose rights to land are derived 
from shared rules determining access to land held in common by such group”. 
 
This definition is then assumed into the Communal Land Rights Act (2004), which, in 
Section 1, provides that a community is: 
“a group of persons whose rights to land are derived from shared rules 
determining access to land held in common by such group”. 
 
The Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act (1996) also, in Section 1, 
provides a definition of sorts for a tribe which is described as including: 
 “(a) any community living and existing like a tribe; and 
 (b) any part of a tribe living and existing as a separate entity” 
 
From these definitions, there seems to be confusion as regards the exact nature and 
difference between a community and a tribe. While IPs would easily fit into either 
description, a proper definition of IPs would erase any similar confusion. Whatever 
the reason for not effectively defining an IP, Parliament has come close to it by 
recognising the role played by traditional leaders by the promulgation of the 
Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act (2003). In fact, it is admitted 
in the Preamble to the Act that “the South African indigenous peoples consist of a 
diversity of cultural communities” (Traditional Leadership and Governance 
Framework Act, 2003). Sadly, this is the last time that the Act refers to IPs. The Act, 
however, in Section 2(1), makes reference to “traditional communities” whom it 
considers to be as follows: 
 “A community may be recognised as a traditional community if it –  
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(a) is subject to a system of traditional leadership in terms of that 
community’s customs; and 
(b) observes a system of customary law” (Traditional Leadership and 
Governance Framework Act, 2003). 
 
The Act goes further in Section 2(2) and allows a provincial Premier to declare a 
community to be a traditional community (Traditional Leadership and Governance 
Framework Act, 2003). However, the traditional communities are placed under an 
obligation in Section 2(3) to “transform and adapt customary law and customs 
relevant to the application of this Act so as to comply with the relevant principles 
contained in the Bill of Rights in the Constitution. . .” (Traditional Leadership and 
Governance Framework Act, 2003). This Sub-section effectively establishes the 
supremacy of the Constitution (1996) over the customs and traditions of the 
traditional communities. 
 
The use of “indigenous people” in the preamble and not in the Act itself is worth 
noting. The reason for this discrepancy is uncertain; and the writer does not want to 
hazard an opinion save to say that there could be the possibility of political reasoning 
behind the exclusion in the main text. 
 
In addition, it seems that once a community is vested with the status of “traditional 
community” it is not permanent as this recognition can be withdrawn as per Section 7 
(Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act, 2003). This provision is 
certainly unfortunate as once a community has been vested with the status of 
“traditional community” then they should, as a matter of course, retain that status. IP 
status should not be of a temporary nature. 
 
From the above, one would assume that with the principle of non-discrimination 
enunciated in the Constitution (1996) and by the wide definitions provided in the 
various legislations, that IPs cannot be singled out for special protection. However, 
Section 14(1) of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination 
Act (2000) provides: 
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“It is not unfair discrimination to take measures designed to protect or advance 
persons or categories of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination or the 
members of such groups or categories of persons”. 
 
From the above it can be surmised that while there is a lot of possible avenues for IPs 
to assert their rights, the actual protection for them is non-existent. At the same time, a 
definition would not be able to encapsulate all the unique features of IPs but could go 
a long way in identifying the basic features of being an IP. 
 
In this regard, an appropriate definition of IPs in SA for the purposes of mineral rights 
would be: 
A group of people who have a common heritage, that share a distinct 
language and religion and who practice the same customs and traditions. 
They have a close connection to the land on which they live and have been 
prevented from practicing their customs and traditions and from enjoying a 
free and undisturbed use of their land by colonialism or any other foreign 
interference. 
 
While this definition does not purport to exclude any particular race, it is clear that 
Whites are excluded by virtue of their race and Indians and Chinese by virtue of their 
late arrival in SA. The “Coloureds”, on the one hand, would be excluded if their 
ancestry reveals an arrival in SA after Colonialism. On the other hand, where their 
ancestry predates colonialism, then such “Coloured” persons cannot be excluded. At 
the same time, the definition does not guarantee that a member of the “African” race 
would be able to claim a benefit as IP – if their tribe or community was not in SA at 
the time of Colonisation then they cannot qualify as an IP. From this definition, it can 
also be concluded that all IPs could qualify as HDPs but not all HDPs would be IPs. 
 
2.5. Conclusion 
Defining IPs on the international arena is not an easy task, making the ascertaining of 
a definition of IPs in SA also difficult. Due to the level of controversy involved, 
definitions seem to be aimed at providing recognition to particular people at a 
particular time for a particular purpose – depending on the organisation concerned or 
the constraints sought to be alleviated by the various writers. 
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Recognition of IPs is heavily influenced by the Right to Self-determination of the 
people concerned – where there is an identifiable Right to Self-determination then 
international recognition of IPs (or that particular group) is assured. This has resulted 
in numerous definitions that would either enable or hinder IPs in obtaining necessary 
protections or benefits. As such, a conclusive definition for IPs in SA is preferred that 
would enable IPs to identify themselves and seek a recognition of their rights in the 
exploitation of mineral resources in SA. 
 
The proposed definition of IPs in SA is as follows: 
A group of people who have a common heritage, that share a distinct 
language and religion and who practice the same customs and traditions. 
They have a close connection to the land on which they live and have been 
prevented from practicing their customs and traditions and from enjoying a 
free and undisturbed use of their land by colonialism or any other foreign 
interference. 
 
In the next chapter, the legislation in SA, prior to democracy would be considered.  
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Chapter Three 
LEGISLATION IN SOUTH AFRICA (SA) PRIOR TO DEMOCRACY  
 
3.1. Introduction 
In the last Chapter, a definition of IPs in SA was proposed. This Chapter would 
consider the legislation that impacted on IPs prior to democracy. While it would not 
be possible to study all legislation in detail, an attempt would be made to consider the 
development of the various discriminatory practices that were aided by legislation. 
From this exercise, lessons can be learned to enable the formulation of Strategies to 
assist IPs in exercising their mineral rights and thereby promoting their development. 
It should be noted that, while as many relevant legislations would be considered 
herein, legislations relating to land issues are considered in Chapter 5 below.   
 
S African history can be distinguished into two clear periods: prior to democracy and 
after democracy, with the current Chapter relating to legislation prior to democracy 
and the following one (Chapter four) relating to legislation during democracy. 
Further, this Chapter would be divided into two parts: Part One would consider 
regulation prior to Colonisation and Part Two would consider legislation that 
impacted IPs during Colonisation and Apartheid.  
 
3.2. PART ONE (Before Colonisation) 
According to Keppel-Jones (nd, p. 11 – 23), when van Riebeeck arrived at the Cape 
there were IPs (Hottentots) present on the land. From Chapter One, it can be 
appreciated that customary law played a vital role in their lives which, from Chapter 
One, due to a lack of documentation, makes it difficult to ascertain the extent and the 
nature thereof. It is apparent though that the customary laws that had existed at the 
Cape were superseded by Roman-Dutch Law upon the arrival of the Dutch. 
 
3.3. PART TWO (During Colonisation) 
Van Riebeeck was the agent of the first colonisers of the Cape – the Dutch (Keppel-
Jones, nd, p. 12 – 13). However, as the Dutch were not the only colonisers of SA this 
portion is divided into: the period of Dutch occupation, the period of English 
occupation, the period of the Union of SA and, finally, Apartheid. 
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Section A 
Dutch Occupation (1652 to 1806)               
The Vereenigde Landsche Ge-Oktroyeerde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC), 
commonly known as the DEIC, had been granted a Dutch government charter which 
empowered it “to colonise whichever territory it desired and enslaving the indigenous 
peoples according to market requirements and VOC political imperatives” 
(SAHistoryOnline(b), nd, p. 1). 
 
In stating the nature of the DEIC’s presence at the Cape, Keppel-Jones (nd, p. 18) 
stated: 
“What was peculiar about its position at the Cape was that it was not merely 
the only buyer and the only seller: it was also the government, executive, 
legislature and judicature. It was the judge in its own case”.  
 
The directors of the DEIC (called the Heerin Sewentien), appointed van Riebeeck as 
Merchant and Commander of the Cape and entrusted him with the administration of 
the Cape (Thom, 1952, p. XXVI). He was thus responsible for making the laws at the 
Cape, during which time the IPs assimilated with the colonisers.  
 
Davenish (nd, p. 35) reported that: 
“Initially the indigenous Khoikhoi . . . and San . . . people who became 
assimilated into the settler community were subject to the laws of the Cape 
settlement. In the eighteenth century all indigenous persons residing within the 
boundaries of settlement were under the jurisdiction of the Cape government 
which directed that Hottentot servants should receive wages and redress for 
ill-treatment, and the Cape courts even judged cases in which Khoikhoi had 
injured one another.” 
 
However, once the Dutch decided to form a colony this changed as illustrated by 
Dooling (1992, p. 290) who stated: 
“The Khoikhoi, the Company [DEIC] had insisted since the founding of the 
refreshment station were legally free and were not to be enslaved. In the 
course of eighteenth century, however, the Khoi were largely reduced to a 
landless and propertyless workforce – to a position ‘which can best be 
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described as that of bondsmen’. There is every indication that the settlers went 
to great lengths to permanently immobilise the Khoi – from withholding 
wages, livestock and children to fostering monogamous relationships.” 
 
In addition, there seems to have been a distinction made between “Natives” and 
“Hottentots” (Cape of Good Hope (Colony) Legislative Council, nd, Appendix 1). 
The reason for this is unclear except that, possibly, the “Natives” were held in lower 
esteem than Hottentots. For example, there were proclamations and placaats that 
prohibited trade with the “Natives” (Cape of Good Hope (Colony) Legislative 
Council, nd, Appendix 1) while there were numerous proclamations that the 
“Hottentots” should not be harmed or inconvenienced and providing for preferential 
trade with them (Cape of Good Hope (Colony) Legislative Council, nd, Appendix 1).  
 
However, at the same time, many of the proclamations seem to indicate a level of 
mistrust of the Hottentots by the authorities at the Cape ;for example, landdrosts and 
magistrates were authorised “to arm, assemble, and take the field against wild 
bushmen, whenever it shall appear right and proper” (Cape of Good Hope (Colony) 
Legislative Council, nd, Appendix 1). 
 
This period marked the proliferation of Roman-Dutch law and the increased 
subjugation of IPs at the Cape. 
 
Section B 
English Occupation (1806 to 1910)  
This period was actually the second time the British occupied the Cape with the first 
occupation being between 1795 and 1803 (Davenish, nd, p. 51). The second, more 
enduring, occupation started on 18
th
 January 1806 when the Dutch Commander at the 
Cape consented to an “honourable capitulation” to the British (Cape of Good Hope 
(Colony) Legislative Council, nd, p. 37). Initially, the British retained the status quo at 
the Cape with Roman-Dutch Law as the Common Law; which in time incorporated 
more English Law principles (Davenish, nd, p. 53). For instance, while the Roman-
Dutch Law did not provide for mining, on 6
th
 August 1813, Lieutenant-General Sir 
Cradock signed a proclamation dealing with “Conversion Of Loan Places To 
Perpetual Quitrent” which, in Article 4, provided: 
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Government reserves no other rights but those on mines of precious stones, 
gold, or silver; as also the right of making and repairing public roads, and 
raising materials for that purpose on the premises: other mines of iron, lead, 
copper, tin, coals, slate, or limestone, are to belong to the proprietor” (Cape of 
Good Hope (Colony) Legislative Council, nd, p. 47). 
 
This was the first piece of legislation dealing with minerals in SA and reserved the 
mineral rights for precious stones, gold and silver to the State, as per English law.  
 
B.1. Ordinances 
Initially, laws were Ordinances as the Cape was regarded as a province of the United 
Kingdom (UK). Acts were subsequently passed when a Parliament was constituted at 
the Cape in terms of Ordinance No 2 of 3
rd
 April 1852 (Cape of Good Hope (Colony) 
Legislative Council, nd, p. 950). 
 
A few Ordinances stand out to the writer:  
1)  In terms of Ordinance 4 of 1825, it seems that the “Natives” were being 
referred to as “Kaffirs” (Cape of Good Hope (Colony) Legislative Council, nd, 
p. 82). 
2) Ordinance 23 of 1826 – “Ordinance for facilitating the Commerce with the 
“Kaffirs” and other Nations living beyond the Boundaries of the Colony, and 
for consolidating the several Proclamations relating thereto” (Cape of Good 
Hope (Colony) Legislative Council, nd, p. 93). 
3) Ordinance 49 of 1828 – Ordinance for the Admission into the Colony, under 
certain restrictions, of Persons belonging to the Tribes beyond the Frontier 
thereof, and for regulating the manner of their Employment as free Labourers 
in the service of the Colonists (Cape of Good Hope (Colony) Legislative 
Council, nd, p. 128). 
4) Ordinance 50 of 1828 – Ordinance “gave Hottentots, Bushmen and free 
Coloured persons full civil rights including the right to buy and own land on 
the same terms as Europeans” (Hahlo and Khan, 1968, p. 577). 
 
These Ordinances indicated that the “Natives” living outside of the Colony were 
regarded as foreigners and had restricted movement into and out of the Colony. 
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However, in 1833 the Slavery Abolition Act of 1833 became law in the UK which 
abolished slavery throughout the British Empire. By this time the Dutch settlers, not 
happy with the British administration at the Cape, embarked on the Great Trek inland. 
Davenish (nd, p. 59) stated that they were “disturbed by the grant of equal civil rights 
to Coloured people, by the slave emancipation and its consequences, they were fearful 
of Anglicization and resentful of an alien government that dealt with the endemic 
instability on the eastern frontier and vacillation and a lack of firmness.” The Great 
Trek lead to the creation of Natal, Transvaal and Orange Free State (Hahlo and Khan, 
1968, p. 577 and Edwards, 1996, p. 84 – 87). Natal was later annexed by the British 
resulting in two British colonies and two Dutch republics, where the laws of the 
respective colonisers applied. 
 
B.2. Acts 
With the introduction of a Parliament, the promulgation of laws became more 
formalised. Brevitas causa, laws would be discussed under appropriate headings.   
 
B.2.1. The Carrying of Passes 
The Natives (Pass Law) Act (1867) carried Ordinance 49 of 1828 further in that it 
prevented all “Native” Foreigners from entering the Colony without a pass. In terms 
of Section 3 of this Act, if a “Native” Foreigner entered or was in the Colony without 
a pass, he would have been liable to “imprisonment for any period not exceeding one 
month, with or without hard labour, and with or without spare diet, or to a fine not 
exceeding one pound sterling, and, in default of payment thereof, to such 
imprisonment, with or without hard labour, and with or without spare diet”(Natives 
(Pass Law) Act, 1867). So the consequences for not having a pass were quite strict. 
However, Section 8 goes further, in that, the “Native” Foreigner was also required to 
furnish the pass when requested and if he could not or refused to produce the pass, he 
was to be arrested and taken to the Resident Magistrate (Natives (Pass Law) Act, 
1867). 
 
While the consequences for not carrying a pass were strict, a false arrest relating to 
such a transgression was not so strict by comparison. This is evidenced in Section 12 
which provided: 
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“Any person who shall, under colour of this Act, wrongfully and maliciously and 
without probable cause, arrest, or cause to be arrested, any person, shall be liable 
to pay a fine not exceeding one pound sterling, and to pay to the arrested person 
such amount as and for damages, as the Magistrate before whom such arrested 
person is brought for trial shall award”(Natives (Pass Law) Act, 1867). 
 
The fact that an IP without a pass had committed a more serious offence than an 
officer (most probably white) who had made a false arrest indicates that the rights of 
IPs were secondary to the rights of the colonisers. On the other hand, the Government 
Commission on Native Laws and Customs (1883) did not favour “Natives” having a 
pass when entering the Colony and recommended that the Natives (Pass Law) Act 
(1867) be repealed. They stated: 
“. . . this Pass Law should be repealed, and the natives encouraged to seek 
employment in the Colony without the irritation and inconvenience and loss of 
time entailed by what is known as the Pass system” (Government Commission 
on Native Laws and Customs, 1883, p. 50). 
 
In the same breath, however, they added: 
“The Commission, however, does not lose sight of the fact that many of the 
natives themselves consider ‘passes’ a protection to them when travelling in 
the Colony. To meet this we suggest that protection papers or pass-tickets 
might still be issued, on application . . . to all who may wish for them and who 
may be legitimately engaged in travelling from one place to another – 
provided that none be given to persons convicted of serious offences, or of 
known bad character. . .” (Government Commission on Native Laws and 
Customs, 1883, p. 51). 
 
While it is uncertain as to the kind of protection a pass could offer and while the 
Commission did not favour the Natives (Pass Law) Act (1867), it seems that they did 
in fact, to an extent, favour the system that the Act propagated; that is, they preferred 
“protection papers or pass-tickets” being offered to those who applied therefor. 
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B.2.2. Traditional Authority 
In 1853, Sir Cathcart, the then Governor of the Cape, advised that “Kaffirs” be 
recognised as British subjects and be “allowed to be governed as to their interior 
discipline, by their own chiefs, according to their existing laws, and retaining the 
usages to which they have been accustomed, until . . . the gradual work of civilization 
shall remove those bad practices which are most objectionable” (Government 
Commission on Native Laws and Customs, 1883, p. 16). 
 
While he supported the traditional authorities of IPs, Sir Cathcart seems to have 
favoured these authorities only to the point of having them evolve and/or be replaced 
by the “civilised” British system. His successor, Sir Grey, was not so patient. It was 
stated that, under the administration of Sir Grey, Chiefs were “permitted to continue 
to hear all cases brought before them by their people, but they were to be assisted in 
their deliberations and decisions by European Magistrates, who were to be placed 
with them. . .” (Government Commission on Native Laws and Customs, 1883, p. 17). 
 
This in turn resulted in the division of the Chiefs’ territories into districts headed by 
headmen who were answerable “for the good order of their kraals, for the detection of 
robberies, for the restoration of stolen property, for apprehension of thieves, the 
transmission of messages sent to them, and generally for the performance of all 
instructions relating to the maintenance of tranquillity” (Government Commission on 
Native Laws and Customs, 1883, p. 17). While these headmen were immediately 
responsible to their own Chiefs, they were ultimately responsible to the European 
Magistrates (Government Commission on Native Laws and Customs, 1883, p. 17). 
 
However, it seems that while great effort had been made to ensure that the tribes were 
converted to the British way of thinking, this did not succeed as the people took their 
cases “to their chiefs and influential headmen” (Government Commission on Native 
Laws and Customs, 1883, p. 18). Yet the Commission maintained that “. . . . the 
natives have not been subject to the capricious laws made by a chief, but to laws 
emanating from the national will, which laws have been administered by the Chief 
(Government Commission on Native Laws and Customs, 1883, p. 21). 
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Further, “Native” parental authority also, to an extent, vested in the Governor by the 
Introduction of Children of Natives Act (1857), where, in terms of Section 1, the prior 
permission of the Governor was required to bring a minor “Native” child into the 
Colony.  This Section also effectively placed the “Native” child under the 
guardianship of the Governor even though they were under the physical care of their 
parents. In terms of Section 5, these minor children, under the guardianship of the 
Governor, could be apprenticed with the permission of the Governor or he could place 
the child in an industrial school in the Colony (Introduction of Children of Natives 
Act, 1857). While this Act sought to prevent children from being used as servants, it 
can be seen that it eroded the parental rights of the “Native” parents and placed these 
rights in the hands of the Governor who could decide on their children’s education. 
 
In much the same way, the Native Succession Act (1864), in Section 2, provided that 
when a “Native” citizen of the Cape died, his property was to be administered and 
distributed as per the customs of his tribe. Section 3, thereafter provided that in the 
event of any dispute in this regard, the matter was to be referred to the Resident 
Magistrate of the district where the deceased resided who was to determine the 
dispute as per “Native” usages and customs (Native Succession Act, 1864). It is 
interesting that this law, in Section 5, allows the Governor to define and describe the 
customs and usages to be used in the administration and distribution of the deceased’s 
property; even though they might not have conformed to the actual “Native” customs 
and usages (Native Succession Act, 1864).  
 
B.2.3. “Native” Areas 
This period also saw the creation of separate residential areas for “Natives”. The 
Native Locations, Lands, and Commonage Act (1879) enabled the Governor, in 
Section 1, to subdivide land declared to be “Native” Locations into lots and to grant 
titles to it to separate individuals.  Thereafter, the Native Locations Act (1884) took 
the issue of Native Locations further by distinguishing between “Native” locations on 
private property in Sections 2 and 4 and “Native” locations on Crown land in Section 
7 which provided different levels of “protection”. 
 
 
 
 58 
In the period between 1652 to 1910 the following lessons can be learned: 
- The Dutch used the Dutch legal system to effectively subjugate and control the 
IPs; 
- The discriminatory practices of the Dutch were continued by the British; 
- There was an attempt to regulate every aspect of “Natives” lives from 
childhood, to the places they lived and the disposal of their property upon 
death; 
- The movements of IPs were restricted and controlled; 
- Education of minor IPs was controlled by the British, via the Governor; and 
- There were unsuccessful attempts to usurp the authority of the chiefs. 
 
Section C 
Union of South Africa (1910 to 1948) 
This period commenced with the unification of the two Dutch republics and the two 
British colonies after the success of the British in the Anglo-Boer Wars.Hahlo and 
Khan (1973, p. 150) stated: 
“Our original Constitution was the South Africa Act, 1909, an enactment of 
the British Parliament which united the four colonies of the Cape of Good 
Hope, Natal, the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony.” 
 
The Union of SA was thus as a result of an Act of the British Parliament and though 
this changed the political structure of SA, with a level of autonomy, the Union was 
still bound to the British Empire (Hahlo and Khan, 1973, p. 150). 
 
C.1. Defining “Natives” 
Section 10 of the Natives Land Act (1913) defined a “Native” as:  
“. . . any person, male or female, who is a member of an aboriginal race or 
tribe of Africa; and shall further include any company or other body of 
persons, corporate or incorporate, if the persons who have a controlling 
interest therein are natives”. 
 
This definition is interesting in that it extends the definition of “Natives” to persons 
from Africa and not to those in the Union. This could be due to the fact the British 
controlled countries to the north of the Union and did not want to exclude the IPs 
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from those countries. This definition had been further amended but the essence had 
been retained.
4
 
 
C.2. Carrying of Passes and “Native” Areas 
The carrying of passes still continued with the Governor-General having the authority, 
by the Native Administration Act (1927), which created and defined pass areas where, 
in terms of Section 28, the “Natives” had to carry passes and restricted the movement 
of “Natives” in certain areas. 
 
Further, the restriction of certain areas for “Natives” continued in this period with 
Acts such as the Natives (Urban Areas) Act (1923) which, in terms of Section 4, 
reserved certain urban areas for “Natives” to the exclusion of “non-Natives”. 
 
C.3. Traditional Authority 
There were further attempts to interfere with the traditional authority of IPs. The 
Native Administration Act (1927), in Section 1, gave the Governor-General authority 
over all “Natives” in that the “Governor-General shall be the supreme chief of all 
Natives in the Provinces of Natal, Transvaal and Orange Free State” (Native 
Administration Act, 1927). In addition, Section 2(7) gave the Governor-General the 
power to “recognise or appoint any person as a chief or headman in charge of a tribe 
or of a location, and . . . to make regulations prescribing the duties, powers and 
privileges of such chiefs or headmen. The Governor-General may depose any chief or 
headman so recognized or appointed” (Native Administration Act, 1927). 
 
This Sub-section basically usurped the authority of the tribal Chiefs as the paramount 
authority of the tribe thus making the Chief answerable to the Governor-General. 
Further, in terms of Section 20, it was now the Governor-General who conferred tribal 
authority onto the Chief, which he could revoke should he so deem (Native 
Administration Act, 1927). So it would seem that whereas custom previously 
determined the authority of the Chief, this was now replaced by the Chief receiving 
authority from the Governor-General, who could choose to ignore the traditional 
                                                 
4
 Native Definition Amendment Act (1916); Natives (Urban Areas) Act (1923); Natives Taxation And 
Development Act (1925); Native Service Contract Act (1932);Workmen’s Compensation Act (1934); 
Native (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act (1945); Silicosis Act (1946) 
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practices and appoint his preferred Chiefs or even replace non-preferred Chiefs with 
more preferable ones. 
 
While this Act limited the authority of the Chiefs, it also sought to undermine them in 
that the tribe was not to be responsible for the personal obligations of its chief; nor, in 
terms of Section 3, was the tribe nor their land bound “by any contract entered into or 
any liability incurred by a chief unless it has been approved by the Minister [of Native 
Affairs] after having been adopted by a majority of the adult male members of the 
tribe present at a public meeting convened for the purpose of considering such 
contract or liability” (Native Administration Act, 1927). 
 
The Native Administration Act (1927) also outlawed polygamy in that, as per Section 
22, a marriage officer, particularly a Christian priest, could not marry a “Native” 
couple unless he had obtained a declaration that the “Native” man had no customary 
wife.  
 
C.4. “Native” Affairs 
Laws seemed to have been enacted to give the impression that attempts were made to 
protect the rights of “Natives”; such as, Section 1 of the Native Affairs Act (1920) 
which gave the Governor-General the ability to establish a Native Affairs 
Commission. In terms of Section 2, this Native Affairs Commission’s functions and 
duties included “the consideration of any matter relating to the general conduct of the 
administration of native affairs, or to legislation in so far as it may affect the native 
population . . .” (Native Affairs Act, 1920). 
 
The Act, in Section 5, also empowered the Governor-General to establish local 
councils for “Native” areas with “Natives” as members, which, in terms of Section 6, 
were to provide for the basic amenities of “Natives” as local authorities would have 
(Native Affairs Act, 1920). 
 
By being members of these local councils, Section 7 enabled “Natives” to have a 
direct say in the administration of their affairs (Native Affairs Act, 1920). However, 
Section 8 restricted the local council’s area of operation to certain designated areas 
and any byelaw they sought to implement had to first be approved by the Governor-
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General, who had the authority to amend the byelaws and also to rescind existing 
byelaws (Native Affairs Act, 1920). 
 
In terms of Section 11, the Governor-General had been given the option to consult 
with the members of a particular community before establishing a local council and 
for the selection or election of the members (Native Affairs Act, 1920). Whether this 
in fact was done is unknown to the writer. 
 
While the Native Administration (Amendment) Act (1943) dealt with numerous issues, 
Section 5 contained an interesting provision on capacity: “The capacity of a Native to 
enter into any transaction or to enforce or defend his rights in any court of law shall . . 
. be determined as if he were a European” (Native Administration (Amendment) Act, 
1943). While this may seem that the “Natives” were being placed on a footing of 
equality with the Europeans, there was a contradiction in that the Section also 
provided for two exceptions: any right or obligation governed by “Native” law had to 
be determined according to “Native” law and a “Native” woman married in terms of 
customary law was regarded as a minor with her husband deemed to be her guardian 
(Native Administration (Amendment) Act, 1943). Given the fact that “Natives” would 
have engaged in practices familiar to them, including marriage as per their custom, 
the two exceptions would have been continuously applied.  
 
C.5. Labour 
While slavery had been abolished, the Native Service Contract Act (1932) created the 
labour tenant contract, which, in terms of Section 1, was defined as:  
“a contract whereby a native binds himself or binds his ward . . . to render any 
services of whatever nature as a consideration for permission granted to such 
native or any member of his family or of the kraal or household to which he 
belongs to occupy or use any land, by any person who has the right to grant 
such permission” (Native Service Contract Act, 1932). 
 
This contract, in terms of Section 5, could, inter alia, specify that the “Native” 
provide service “whenever called upon to do so” (Native Service Contract Act, 1932). 
However, this Section enabled the employer to terminate the contract if the “Native” 
was absent without permission for more than three months (Native Service Contract 
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Act, 1932). This Section further stated that if the land passed from the employer to 
another person, then the new owner stepped into the shoes of the employer; though he 
had a three month grace to terminate the contract (Native Service Contract Act, 1932).  
 
Sub-Sections (10) and (11) of Section 5, made it clear that where a “Native” was 
bound to render services relating to masters and servants, then the “Native” was 
bound as a servant to the person the service is owed to (Native Service Contract Act, 
1932). This is further exacerbated by the fact that where two or more “Natives” from 
the same kraal or household are bound to render service to one or more employers; a 
failure of any one “Native” to perform enabled the employer (s) to cancel the contract 
against the one “Native” or all the “Natives” (Native Service Contract Act, 1932). 
There was no similar provision should the employers not perform. This Act 
effectively reduced the “Natives” to a life of subservience and slavery and 
circumvented the Anti-slavery legislation.  
 
C.6. Mining 
The first piece of mining legislation of this period was Mines and Works Act (1911). 
The Headnote of the Act reveals that the basic premise of this law was to consolidate 
and amend the various mining laws in the country (Mines and Works Act, 1911). An 
important development was that in terms of Section 3, the Government Mining 
Engineer was made supervisor of all mines, works and machinery and also supervisor 
of all explosives and of any other officer appointed by the Governor-General (Mines 
and Works Act, 1911). 
 
The various roles of the different personalities were clearly indicated; from the 
Governor-General (Section 4), the mine manager (Section 5), the Minister of Mines 
(Section 5), the Government Mining Engineer (Section 7) and the inspectors of mines 
(Sections 10 – 13) (Mines and Works Act, 1911). In this regard, Section 4 of the Act 
provides a list of matters that the Governor-General can regulate (Mines and Works 
Act, 1911). Two of these matters bear special mention; in that, Section 4(l) provides 
that the Governor-General can pass regulations relating to the safety and health of 
mine workers and Section 4(n) provides for “the grant, cancellation, and suspension 
of certificates of competency” to the various personalities in a mining operation 
(Mines and Works Act, 1911).  
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The Act, also contained restrictions such as, Section 6 which provided for the 
restriction on working on Sundays, Christmas Day or Good Friday and Section 8 
which restricted juveniles and females from working in underground mines (Mines 
and Works Act, 1911). There were also restrictions, in Section 9, on the hours a 
person could work underground (Mines and Works Act, 1911).  
 
This Act was subsequently amended by the Mines and Works Act, 1911, Amendment 
Act (1926).The single amendment, as contained in Section 1, effectively prevented IPs 
from attaining articles of competencies in the mining industry. The amendment 
provided that certificates of competencies can only be granted to the following 
persons: 
 “(a) Europeans; 
(b) persons born in the Union and ordinarily resident in the in the Province of 
the Cape of Good Hope who are members of the class or race  known as ‘Cape 
Coloured’ or of the class or race known as ‘Cape Malays’; 
(c) persons born in the Union and ordinarily resident in the Union elsewhere 
than in the Province of the Cape of Good Hope who would if resident in that 
Province, be regarded as members of either of the classes or races known as 
‘Cape Coloured’ or ‘Cape Malays’; and 
(d) the people known as Mauritius Creoles or St Helena persons or their 
descendants born in the Union.” (Mines and Works Act, 1911, Amendment 
Act, 1926)  
 
In the period between 1910 – 1948, the following lessons can be learned: 
- The British made further inroads into the traditional authority of the Chiefs; 
- Legislation was couched in a manner that seemed to accord equal rights to 
“Natives” while the opposite was true; and 
- Mining legislation reflected discriminatory practices. 
 
Section D 
Legislation During Apartheid 
The NP came to power in 1948. While, from the above, it is apparent that there were 
discriminatory legislation in existence prior to this time, this practice became more 
prolific after 1948 (South African Government Info, nd, p. 10). Considering that IPs 
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were still being subject to the rule of a race foreign to Africa, Apartheid can be 
regarded as the most extreme case of Colonialism known. It was during this period 
that SA declared itself a Republic. 
 
D.1: Prior to Republic (1948 to 1960) 
D.1.1. Defining “Natives” 
There was a change in terminology in that the Land Settlement Amendment Act (1949) 
referred to a “non-European” and, in Section 1, defined such a person as:  
“a person who is not a white person and includes any non-European company” 
(Land Settlement Amendment Act, 1949).  
 
This changed a year later with the Population Registration Act (1950) which had the 
following definitions as per Section 1: 
a) “Native” – “a person who in fact is or is generally accepted as a member of 
any aboriginal race or tribe of Africa” 
b) “White” person – “a person who in appearance obviously is, or who is 
generally accepted as a white person, but does not include a person who, 
although in appearance obviously a white person, is generally accepted as a 
coloured person” (Population Registration Act, 1950). 
 
The Group Areas Act (1950) subsequently categorised people into racial groups, as 
per Section 2,: 
“(a) a white group, in which shall be included any person who in appearance, 
obviously is, or who is generally accepted as a white person, other than a 
person who although in appearance obviously a white person, is generally 
accepted as a coloured person, or who is . . . a member of any other group;  
(b) a native group, in which shall be included – 
(i) any person who in fact is, or is generally accepted as a member of an 
aboriginal race or tribe of Africa, other than a person who is . . . a 
member of the coloured group; and 
(ii) any woman to whichever race, tribe or class she may belong, between 
whom and a person who is . . . a member of a native group, there exists 
a marriage or who cohabits with such a person . . .” (Group Areas Act, 
1950). 
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In the writer’s opinion, this Act formalised the discrimination that characterised the 
Apartheid state and encapsulated the various discriminatory legislation that existed 
until this time. Legislation vacillated between the terminologies of “Native” and 
“Non-European”.5 Subsequently, there was a change to “Bantu” to refer to “Natives”. 
In the Bantu Investment Corporation Act (1959), for instance, in Section 1, a “Bantu” 
person was defined as: “a native as defined in . . . the Population Registration Act . . . 
and includes a Bantu company, a Bantu corporate body, a Bantu association and a 
Bantu partnership” (Bantu Investment Corporation Act, 1959). 
 
D.1.2. Carrying of Passes 
The Natives (Abolition of Passes And Co-ordination of Documents) Act (1952) gave 
the Minister of “Native” Affairs, in Section 2, the authority to issue a notice requiring 
“Natives” who had attained sixteen years of age to obtain a “reference book” (Natives 
(Abolition of Passes And Co-ordination of Documents) Act, 1952). While Section 
3(1) required “Natives” to have their fingerprints taken before they were issued with 
reference books, in terms of Section 3(4), if a “Native” could prove that he was a 
Chief, headman, carried a teacher’s certificate, a minister of religion, advocate, 
attorney, medical practitioner, dentist or a holder of a certificate of exemption; then 
his fingerprints were not taken but he had to give his signature and his “references 
book” would have a different coloured cover (Natives (Abolition of Passes And Co-
ordination of Documents) Act, 1952). This “privilege” was short-lived however as 
Section 3(5) required such persons to have their fingerprints taken, return his 
“reference book” and be then issued with the “normal” “reference book” when they 
ceased holding the respective professions (Natives (Abolition of Passes And Co-
ordination of Documents) Act, 1952). 
 
Section 5 provided that where a “Native” had turned sixteen and had not obtained his 
reference books then he could be taken to a “Native” commissioner for his 
fingerprints to be taken and for him to be issued with a “reference book” (Natives 
(Abolition of Passes And Co-ordination of Documents) Act, 1952). Sections 7 and 8 
                                                 
5
 See: Native Building Workers Act (1951); Native Services Levy Act (1952); Natives (Abolition of 
Passes And Co-ordination of Documents) Act (1952); Bantu Education Act (1953); Native Labour 
(Settlement of Disputes) Act (1953); Natives Resettlement Act (1954); Land Settlement Act (1956); 
Industrial Conciliation Act (1956); Pneumoconiosis Act (1956); Natives (Prohibition of Interdicts) Act 
(1956); Immorality Act (1957); Native Transport Services Act (1957)  
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provided that certain information could be recorded in the “reference book”, such as 
any exemption enjoyed and their employment (Natives (Abolition of Passes And Co-
ordination of Documents) Act, 1952). In terms of Section 10, any “Native” who is 
below sixteen and is not in the area of his birth then he would need to be in possession 
of a document that indicated consent for his absence from the place of his birth 
(Natives (Abolition of Passes And Co-ordination of Documents) Act, 1952). 
 
Not being in possession of the “reference book” meant that, in terms of Section 15, 
the “Native” was guilty of an offence and liable for conviction of fines or 
imprisonment (Natives (Abolition of Passes And Co-ordination of Documents) Act, 
1952). So while the Act stated that it was an “Abolition of Passes” Act, it is clear that 
it was not in fact abolishing Passes. 
 
D.1.3. “Native” Areas 
The Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act (1959)could be regarded as the 
forerunner of the creation of “Homelands”. The Headnote provides that the purpose of 
the Act is to “provide for the gradual development of self-governing Bantu national 
units and for direct consultation between the Government of the Union and the said 
national units in regard to matters affecting the interests of such national units . . .” 
(Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, 1959). 
 
On this premise the Preamble stated: 
“Whereas the Bantu peoples of the Union of South Africa do not constitute a 
homogenous people, but form separate national units on the basis of language 
and culture: 
And Whereas it is desirable for the welfare and progress of the said peoples to 
afford recognition of the various national units and to provide for their gradual 
development within their own areas of self-governing units on the basis of 
Bantu systems of government . . .  
And Whereas the development of self-government is stimulated by the grant 
to territorial authorities of control over the land in their areas, and it is 
therefore expedient to provide for the ultimate assignment to territorial 
authorities of certain rights and powers conferred on or assigned to the 
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Governor-General or the Minister or the Trustee . . . in terms of any law” 
(Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, 1959). 
 
While many objections can be raised to the assertions herein, for purposes of this 
research, it would suffice to say that this Act had laid the foundations for the 
Homeland system that was developed in the next period. 
 
D.1.4. “Native” Affairs 
Apartheid was characterised by the reservation of certain “high profile” jobs for the 
White race. This is illustrated by the Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act 
(1953) which, in Section 3, established a Central “Native” Labour Board (Native 
Labour (Settlement of Disputes) Act, 1953). However, the Section further provided 
that the chairman and members were restricted to “Europeans” (Native Labour 
(Settlement of Disputes) Act, 1953). Regional “Native” Labour Committees were also 
established in terms of Section 4; however, unlike the Central “Native” Labour Board, 
these committees were comprised of “Natives” (Native Labour (Settlement of 
Disputes) Act, 1953). So it would seem that while “Natives” had representation on the 
Regional Committees, the major decision-makers at Board level were “Europeans” 
who decided on issues affecting them. 
 
The Native Affairs Act (1959), as per Section 2, created the “Native” Affairs 
Commission whose functions, in terms of Section 3, included “the consideration of 
any matter relating to the general conduct of the administration of Native affairs, or to 
legislation in so far as it may affect the Native population (other than matters of 
departmental administration), and the submission to the Minister [of Bantu 
Administration and Development] of its recommendations on any such matter” 
(Native Affairs Act, 1959). 
 
The Act also provided, in Section 5, for the creation of local councils for “Native” 
areas which, in terms of Section 6, administered various issues such as construction 
and maintenance of roads and drains, water supply, sanitation, etcetera. The local 
councils, in terms of Section 7, had to also “advise the commission in regard to any 
matter in so far as it may affect the general interests of the Natives represented by 
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such council, and shall furnish its views upon any matter upon which the Minister or 
the commission may request its advice” (Native Affairs Act, 1959).  
 
The Act did not specify the race of the members of the Commission but did state, in 
Section 5, that all the members of the local council “shall be Natives, but the Minister 
may designate an officer in the public service to preside at the meetings of any such 
council and generally to act in an advisory capacity in regard to it” (Native Affairs 
Act, 1959). 
 
An interesting development was the creation of the Bantu Investment Corporation of 
South Africa Limited under Section 2 of the Bantu Investment Corporation Act (1959) 
which, in terms of Section 4, had as its main object: “to promote and encourage the 
economic development of Bantu persons in the Bantu areas” (Bantu Investment 
Corporation Act, 1959). 
 
A further development was the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act (1953). This 
Act, in Section 1, had only two definitions: 
a) Public premises – “includes any land, enclosure, building, structure, hall, 
room, office, or convenience to which the public has access, whether on the 
payment of an admission fee or not but does not include a public road or 
street” 
b) Public vehicle – “includes any train, tram, bus, vessel or aircraft used for the 
conveyance for reward or otherwise of members of the public” (Reservation of 
Separate Amenities Act, 1953). 
 
The Act, in Section 2, allowed for the separation of amenities for particular races and 
made it an offence for a violation of such reservation by fines or imprisonment 
(Reservation of Separate Amenities Act, 1953). Section 3 also allowed the provision 
of a separation of amenities even if there were no other or suitable provision for the 
other races (Reservation of Separate Amenities Act, 1953). However, in Section 4, 
foreigners and people with exemption certificates were exempted from any specially 
reserved amenities (Reservation of Separate Amenities Act, 1953). 
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D.1.5. Labour 
The Preamble to the Native Building Workers Act (1951) stated that the Act was to 
“provide for the training and registration of native building workers, for the regulation 
of their employment and conditions of employment” (Native Building Workers Act, 
1951).  
 
In terms of Sections 20 – 22, an employer was prohibited from underpaying his 
“Native” employees and was liable to conviction of an offence if he had underpaid his 
employees (Native Building Workers Act, 1951). However, Section 23 goes on to 
provide that the employee was unable to bring civil proceedings against his employer 
for underpayment but only recover the amount which the court directed should be 
paid to him (Native Building Workers Act, 1951). The Section did allow a “Native” 
employee to proceed civilly against his employer if he had a certificate from the 
Attorney-General of the province that the Attorney-General had declined to prosecute 
or that the employer had been acquitted of the charges (Native Building Workers Act, 
1951).   
 
The Act, in Section 25, also forbade the employer from victimizing the employee who 
had testified against him or had refused to sign a receipt that he had not been 
underpaid (Native Building Workers Act, 1951).  
 
It would thus seem that, while the Act provided a measure of protection, it did provide 
obstacles to the employment of “Natives” in certain areas. The Act was also not easily 
readable and the “Natives” would have needed legal opinion to even understand the 
basic protection that the Act offered. 
 
D.1.6. Mining 
The Mines and Works Act (1956) is very similar to the Mines and Works Act (1911) as 
amended. The most significant change though was a change in Section 12 which was 
in the wording for persons eligible for obtaining certificates of competencies: 
 “(i) Europeans; 
(ii) persons born in the Union and ordinarily resident therein, who are 
members of the class or race known as Cape Coloureds or of the class or race 
known as Cape Malays; and 
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(iii) the people known as Mauritius Creoles or St. Helena persons or their 
descendants born in the Union” (Mines and Works Act, 1956). 
 
Regulation 1 of the Regulations to this Act draws in this definition for a “Scheduled 
person” (Regulations to Mines and Works Act, 1956). 
 
The last mining legislation that had been promulgated by the Apartheid government 
was the Mining Rights Act (1991).While the Act required the issuing of a mining 
authorisation to mine in terms of Section 9; in looking at the definition of “Holder” in 
Section 1, it is clear that the Common Law position as enunciated by the maxim cuius 
est solum, eius est ad coelo usque ad inferos applied, which essentially provided that 
the owner of the land was also the owner of the minerals that occurred thereon or 
therein.An essential development was the introduction of the principle of 
rehabilitation in Section 38 and the submission of an Environmental Management 
Programme as per Section 39 (Mining Rights Act, 1991). 
 
D.1.7. South Africa (SA) and Namibia 
SA had been given a mandate over South West Africa (SWA) by the League of 
Nations but SA thereafter incurred the disapproval of the UN, the successor of the 
League of Nations, by extending Apartheid policies to SWA (Time, nd). This was 
done by virtue of the South-West Africa Native Affairs Administration Act (1954). 
 
The Preamble stated that this Act was to “provide for the transfer of the 
administration of native affairs and matters specially affecting natives from the 
Administrator of the territory of South-West Africa, acting under the direction and 
control of the Governor-General, to the Minister of Native Affairs, for the reservation 
or setting apart of land for the use and occupation of natives in that territory in 
substitution for any other land so reserved or set apart” (South-West Africa Native 
Affairs Administration Act, 1954). 
 
This ended when Namibia was granted independence by virtue of Recognition of the 
Independence of Namibia Act (1990) and the promulgation of the Application of 
Certain Laws to Namibia Abolition Act (1990) which abolished certain laws that were 
applicable to the then SWA.  
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In the period, between 1948 – 1960, the following lessons can be learned: 
- Decisions affecting “Natives” were taken by Whites to the extent that the 
bodies created to determine the standard of living of IPs were controlled by 
Whites; and 
- There was a limited recognition of worker rights for IPs 
 
D.2. The Republic of SA (1961 to 1994) 
This period begins with SA declaring independence from British rule in 1961 and 
ends in 1994 when democracy was attained when the first democratic elections were 
held. During this period, Apartheid became more entrenched. SA declared its 
independence by the enactment of the Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 
(1961) which, in Section 1, ended British rule as from 31
st
 May 1961. The State 
President, who replaced the Governor-General as the head of the Republic, in Section 
7, was vested, in Section 111, with the control and administration of Bantu affairs. 
 
The development of definitions of the various races continued with Acts such as the 
Urban Bantu Councils Act (1961) which defined “Bantu”, in Section 1, as having “the 
same meaning as ‘Native’”. While the previous period indicated a shift from the use 
of “Bantu” instead of “Native” it seems that in this period, the use of “Bantu” was 
more prolific.
6
 
 
The end of this period was marked by the election of Mandela as president in 1994. 
This change in SA’s history was reflected in the legislation, most notably 
Discriminatory Legislation Regarding Public Amenities Repeal Act (1990) where the 
various Acts, as per Section 1 and listed in Schedule 1, relating to separate amenities, 
as well as the Group Areas Act, were repealed (Discriminatory Legislation Regarding 
Public Amenities Repeal Act, 1990). The most significant change was the creation of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act (1993)
7
, which became known as 
                                                 
6
See also: Bantu Beer Act (1962); Pneumoconiosis Compensation Act (1962); Rural Coloured Areas 
Act (1963); Coloured Persons Education Act (1963); Bantu Laws Amendment Act (1964); Bantu 
Homelands Development Act (1965); Group Areas Act (1966); Aged Persons Act (1967); Promotion 
of Economic Development of Bantu Homelands Act (1968); Contributions In Respect Of Bantu Labour 
Act (1972); Bantu Laws Amendment Act (1974); Bantu Employees’ In-service Training Act (1976); 
Black Local Authorities Act (1982); Republic of South Africa Constitution Act (1983); Black 
Communities Act (1984) 
7
 See: Ebrahim (2000), for a detailed exposition of the negotiation process. 
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the Interim Constitution and signified a massive change from the previous regimes.
8
 
In addition to providing the basic principles for the drafting of the final constitution, 
as contained in Chapter 5, it also contained a Bill of Rights (in Chapter 3) and created 
the Constitutional Court as per Section 98 (Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa Act, 1993). 
 
D.2.1. Homelands 
This period saw the creation of the various “Homelands”; for example, the Transkei 
was created by the Transkei Constitution Act (1963) which, in Section 1, granted the 
Transkei “independence” from SA in that it was to be a “self-governing territory” 
(Transkei Constitution Act, 1963). 
 
While the Act did provide for the separation of the Transkei from the rest of SA, the 
Preamble made for interesting reading: 
“Whereas the policy of separate development envisages the gradual 
development of self-governing Bantu National Units in the traditional Bantu 
homelands: 
And Whereas the Bantu peoples of the Transkei have over a period of many 
years participated in local government, and have thus gained experience in 
exercising limited authority and have now reached a stage where they can 
assume additional duties and greater responsibilities: 
And Whereas the Transkeian Territorial Authority has requested that more 
comprehensive powers of self-government be entrusted to the Bantu of the 
Transkei in accordance with proposals submitted by them to the Government 
of the Republic of South Africa: 
And Whereas it is desirable to grant further powers of self-government to the 
Bantu of the Transkei on the basis of the principles proposed by them and with 
the firm intention to establish a well-organised government for that territory 
that –  
will maintain law and order and ensure justice to all; 
                                                 
8It is interesting that though the Constitution was regarded as being interim, according to the writer’s 
calculation it was amended approximately nine times. This is indeed curious as the allegations were 
that Apartheid constitutions were not true constitutions as they were frequently amended. 
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will promote the material and spiritual well-being of the Transkei and 
its peoples; 
will protect and develop their own culture; and 
will preserve the ideals of religion, civilization and democracy:” 
(Transkei Constitution Act, 1963) 
 
This Preamble, very like the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act (1959) created 
the impression that Transkei had been created as a response to the wishes of the IPs 
living therein. Provision was made for the economic development of these 
“Homelands” by the Bantu Homelands Development Act (1965) which provided, in 
Section 2, for the establishment of development corporations, for homelands, in 
Section 3, with the object, in Section 4, to “plan and to promote in all spheres the 
economic developments of the Bantu homeland in respect of which it has been 
established and the general welfare and advancement of such Bantu homeland and its 
population . . .” (Bantu Homelands Development Act, 1965). 
 
The Promotion of the Economic Development of Bantu Homelands Act (1968) 
provided for the continued existence of the Bantu Investment Corporation of South 
Africa Limited, in Section 2, with the objects, in Section 3, to “plan, finance, co-
ordinate, promote and carry out the development of the Bantu homelands and the 
Bantu population of such homelands in the fields of industry, commerce, finance, 
mining and other businesses” (Promotion of the Economic Development of Bantu 
Homelands Act, 1968). 
 
The status of the citizens of the “Homelands” was regulated by the Bantu Homelands 
Citizenship Act (1970) which provided, in Section 2(2), that where a “Bantu” person 
is not a citizen of a “self-governing Bantu territory” and is not a “prohibited 
immigrant” then he “shall . . . be a citizen of one or other territorial authority area” 
(Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act, 1970). However, Section 2(4) also provides that a 
citizen of a territorial area “shall not be regarded as an alien of the Republic and shall, 
by virtue of his citizenship of a territory forming part of the Republic, remain for all 
purposes a citizen of the Republic and shall be accorded full protection according to 
international law by the Republic” (Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act, 1970). 
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Section 2(4) is contradictory in that it regards the Bantu as a S African citizen but also 
regarded him as a foreigner to whom international law applied and not the laws of the 
Republic (Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act, 1970). 
 
Further “Homelands” were created, such as the Status of Bophuthatswana Act (1977) 
declared Bophuthatswana, in Section 1, to be “a sovereign and independent state and 
shall cease to be a part of the Republic of South Africa”; while the Status of Ciskei 
Act (1981) declared, in Section 1(1), Ciskei to be a “sovereign and independent state 
and shall cease to be a part of the Republic of South Africa” and went further, in 
Section 1(2) on to state that the “Republic of South Africa shall cease to exercise any 
authority over the said territory” (Status of Ciskei Act, 1981).  
 
The citizens of these homelands effectively lost their status as citizens of SA. Their 
citizenship was restored by the Restoration of South African Citizenship Act (1986) 
which restored the S African citizenship of the citizens of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, 
Venda and Ciskei in Sections 2 – 5 (Restoration of South African Citizenship Act, 
1986). 
 
D.2.2. “Native” Affairs 
The Urban Bantu Councils Act (1961) provided, in Section 2, for the creation of 
urban “Bantu” councils (Urban Bantu Councils Act, 1961) with, inter alia in Section 
4, the same functions of a “Native” advisory board. These urban “Bantu” councils, as 
per Section 3, consisted of a minimum of six Bantu members but no maximum was 
prescribed. It also provided, in Section 7(1), for the establishment of a Community 
Guard to preserve the safety of the inhabitants, maintenance of law and order and the 
prevention of crime in a particular area. In some areas, the urban Bantu council, as per 
Section 9, replaced the “Native” advisory board. 
 
The Bantu Laws Amendment Act (1973) allowed the Minister of Bantu Affairs, in 
Section 1(a) to evict “any tribe, portion of a tribe, Bantu community or Bantu . . . 
from any place to any other place or to any district or province within the Republic” 
(Bantu Laws Amendment Act, 1973). The Sub-section further provides that the 
evictions could be done without notice as the Minister could order the “withdrawals” 
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“whenever he deems it expedient in the general public interest without prior notice to 
any person concerned” (Bantu Laws Amendment Act, 1973). 
 
The Black Communities Act (1984) established Development Boards, in Section 3, 
with the purpose, in Section 16, to “promote the viability, development and autonomy 
of Black communities and certain of their institutions, to promote the welfare of those 
communities and of Black persons, to take steps to prevent the economic and social 
decline of those communities and persons and, if necessary, to take steps to 
rehabilitate those communities and persons” (Black Communities Act, 1984). 
 
In the period between 1961 – 1994 the following lessons can be learned: 
- The creation of homelands was escalated with IPs being “repatriated” to these 
homelands if so desired; and 
- While there were remedies available to IPs, the ability to enforce them were so 
cumbersome and complicated that the remedies would have amounted to a 
remedy on paper only and not enforceable in reality. 
 
3.4. Conclusion 
History would not judge SA well as regards the treatment of IPs prior to the 
attainment of democracy. While the colonial authorities did not treat IPs properly, the 
worst criticisms can be levelled at the Apartheid regime which actively sought to 
severely restrict the rights and liberties of IPs, among others. From the indicated 
lessons of the various periods, the subjugation of IPs steadily increased and the 
legislation that purported to grant equal rights to them either had the opposite effect or 
the remedies were so cumbersome to implement that they were effectively 
meaningless. It would appear that the law was such that it was geared to render IPs so 
helpless and weakened that they were not effectively recover therefrom. These lessons 
indicate that the proposed strategies would have to be robust enough to effectively 
eradicate such helplessness and weakness. 
 
The lessons from the various periods, discussed herein, indicate that the subjugation 
of IPs was systematically and widely implemented. In a similar vein, the strategies 
that IPs implement should be systematic and wide-ranging. It should be developed 
with a long-term vision being borne in mind. 
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Seeing that the law had been THE instrument in subjugating IPs, a drastic change in 
the law was required to enable the protection of IPs. Whether the law has risen to the 
challenge would be considered in Chapter 4, though the Interim Constitution(1993) 
leads one to conclude that the law was in the process of rising to the challenge. 
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Chapter Four 
LEGISLATION IN POST-INDEPENDENCE SOUTH AFRICA (SA) 
 
4.1. Introduction  
In the last Chapter the legislation that affected IPs prior to democracy was considered 
and lessons during the various legislative periods were gleaned therefrom. This 
Chapter would consider the legislative period DURING DEMOCRACY.  
 
While the Interim Constitution (1993)heralded a new democratic order, it was 
cemented by the Constitution of the Republic of SA Act (1996) (Constitution) which 
was also referred to as the “Final Constitution” as it, inter alia, finalised all the rights 
available to the citizens of SA. However, to date, the Constitution (1996) has been 
amended approximately 16 times, with an eighteenth amendment Bill under 
consideration.
9
 
 
An important aspect of the Constitution (1996) is Chapter 2, the Bill of Rights, 
containing, for example, Section 30 which deals with the Right to Language and 
Culture which is enhanced by Section 31(1) which provides: 
“Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be 
denied the right, with other members of that community 
a. To enjoy their culture, practise their religion and use their language; and 
b. To form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic associations 
and other organs of civil society” (Constitution, 1996). 
 
In addition, Section 31(2) makes it clear that these cultural rights may not be 
inconsistent with the provisions of the Bill of Rights (Constitution, 1996). While great 
store has been set by the Bill of Rights in the Constitution, in the case of Thiagraj 
Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal) (1998) which dealt with the right 
to life, Madala J said the following:  
“The Constitution is forward-looking and guarantees to every citizen 
fundamental rights in such a manner that the ordinary person-in-the street, 
who is aware of these guarantees, immediately claims them without further 
                                                 
9
As at 20
th
 January 2012 
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ado – and assumes that every right so guaranteed is available to him or her on 
demand. Some rights in the Constitution are the ideal and something to be 
strived for. They amount to a promise, in some cases, and an indication of 
what a democratic society aiming to salvage lost dignity, freedom and equality 
should embark upon. They are values which the Constitution seeks to provide, 
nurture and protect for a future South Africa. However, the guarantees of the 
Constitution are not absolute but may be limited in one way or another” 
(Thiagraj Soobramoney v Minister of Health (Kwazulu-Natal), 1998, p. 24). 
 
It would thus seem that the rights enshrined in the Constitution (1996) cannot be held 
to be absolute; though it can still be used by IPs to seek recognition and enforcement 
of their rights. In this regard, it should be noted that the Constitution (1996) and the 
Freedom Charter (1955) seem to espouse similar ideals with the Constitution (1996) 
providing for the principles enunciated in the Freedom Charter (1955). Having the 
force of law, it is on a par above the Freedom Charter (1955) and represents a law that 
had the broadest possible consensus and the force of judicial pronouncements in its 
favour.
10
. As such, it is the belief of the writer that the Freedom Charter (1955) no 
longer applies in SA, its ideals are now espoused in the Constitution(1996) to which 
all S Africans have to adhere.
11
 
 
As with the previous Chapter, the various applicable legislations would be considered 
under appropriate headings.  
 
4.2. Equality 
A central feature of many of the laws enacted post 1994 was that they provided for 
equal treatment of all people, in accordance with Section 9(1) of the Constitution 
(1996), which provides that everyone is “equal before the law and has the right to 
equal protection and benefit of the law” (Constitution, 1996). Numerous bodies had 
been established by the Constitution (1996), in Chapter 9, for the purposes of 
promoting and protecting the Right to Equality which include the Public Protector, the 
South African Human Rights Commission, the Commission for the Promotion and 
                                                 
10
 The process that lead to the finalisation of the Constitution is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 
Five below 
11
See: Rabinowitz (nd)  
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Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities and the 
Commission for Gender Equality. These bodies can be approached by IPs should they 
feel that their rights have been violated. 
 
4.2.1. Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 
From the name, this Act gives effect to the Right to Equality and attempts to prevent 
unfair discrimination. There is a distinction made between “discrimination” and 
“harassment” with “discrimination”, in terms of Section 1, being defined as being: 
“any act or omission, including a policy, law, rule, practice, condition or 
situation which directly or indirectly –  
(a) imposes burdens, obligations, and disadvantage on; or 
(b) withholds benefits, opportunities or advantages from, any person on one or 
more of the prohibited grounds” (Promotion of Equality and Prevention of 
Unfair Discrimination Act, 2000). 
 
On the other hand, Section 1, defines “Harassment” as being:  
“unwanted conduct which is persistent or serious and demeans, humiliates or 
creates a hostile or intimidating environment or is calculated to induce 
submission by actual or threatened adverse consequences and which is related 
to –  
(a) sex, gender or sexual orientation; or 
(b) a person’s membership or presumed membership of a group identified by 
one or more of the prohibited grounds or a characteristic associated with 
such group” (Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act, 2000). 
 
This distinction is vital as it would enable the victim to be able to identify the offence 
committed. “Harassment” is more personal in nature as it is directed against an 
individual, whereas “discrimination” is directed against a group of people. If an IP is 
being harassed then he/she would have a personal action against the perpetrator; 
whereas, in the case of discrimination, the IP would have access to the various 
government and non-governmental organs to ensure the protection of their rights. 
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In addition to complying with Section 9 of the Constitution (1996), Section 2 of the 
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (2000) has, inter 
alia, the objects of facilitating the eradication of unfair discrimination, hate speech 
and harassment, particularly on the grounds of race, gender and disability, providing 
for procedures for the determination of circumstances under which discrimination is 
unfair, providing remedies for victims of unfair discrimination, hate speech and 
harassment and persons whose right to equality has been infringed and setting out 
measures to advance persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. 
 
The Act, as per Section 6, is very clear that “neither the State nor any person may 
unfairly discriminate against any person”; on various grounds; such as Section 7(on 
race), Section 8 (on gender), Section 9 (on disability); Section 10 (on hate speech), 
Section 11 (on harassment), and Section 12 (on dissemination and publication of 
information that unfairly discriminates) (Promotion of Equality and Prevention of 
Unfair Discrimination Act, 2000). 
 
It is interesting to note that while Section 24(1) and Section 25 places the State under 
a duty and responsibility “to promote and achieve equality”; in terms of Sections 
24(2), 26 and 27, everybody else has a duty and responsibility to “promote equality” 
(Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act, 2000). 
 
With all these provisions, it could well be assumed that, should IPs wish to have their 
rights enforced, then they could infringe the rights of others. The Act seems to have 
considered this type of situation as, in Section 14, it provides that it “is not unfair 
discrimination to take measures designed to protect or advance persons or categories 
of persons disadvantaged by unfair discrimination or the members of such groups or 
categories of persons” (Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act, 2000). 
 
This Act has been clearly aimed at reversing past discrimination and IPs would be 
able to use this legislation should there be discrimination. However, IPs are not 
specifically defined in this Act and for it to apply there has to be an act of 
discrimination. As such, while this is a progressive piece of legislation, it would not 
prevent discrimination against IPs but merely remedy it. 
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4.2.2. Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 
There is the recognition of equality at the workplace by virtue of the Employment 
Equity Act (1998) which promotes equal opportunities in the workplace by, in terms 
of Section 5, providing for the elimination of “unfair discrimination in any 
employment policy or practice” and further, in Section 6(1), sets out grounds for 
which unfair discrimination is prohibited (Employment Equity Act, 1998). The Act, in 
Section 6(2), does state that: 
“It is not unfair discrimination to –  
(a) take affirmative action measures consistent with the purposes 
of this Act; or 
(b) distinguish, exclude or prefer any person on the basis of an 
inherent requirement of a job” (Employment Equity Act, 
1998). 
 
This Act recognises Affirmative Action (AA) and, in Section 15(1), defines it as 
“measures designed to ensure that suitably qualified people from designated groups 
have equal employment opportunities and are equitably represented in all 
occupational categories and levels in the workforce of a designated employer” 
(Employment Equity Act, 1998). 
 
Ramphele (2008) indicated that many people equate employment equity with AA and 
distinguished between them as follows: 
“Employment equity is a public good from both a justice and an enlightened 
self-interest point of view. It is a goal we all need to attain in the medium to 
long term, given our history. Affirmative action is the means we need to 
employ to achieve our goal of employment equity” (Ramphele, 2008). 
 
She further stated: 
“Affirmative actions need to focus on appropriate corrective measures to 
promote equal opportunities for the skills development, recruitment, 
appointment and promotion of those previously excluded to ensure their 
broader participation in the economy” (Ramphele, 2008). 
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From these comments, the issue can be simplified as follows: AA is part of 
employment equity but employment equity is not a part of AA. As such, the AA 
policies would be implemented to benefit a particular group of people to ensure their 
equal participation in the economy. However, this Act does not make any particular 
reference to IPs – it is aimed at creating equality as far as racial demographics are 
concerned. Having said that, the Act is important as a mining operation can provide 
job opportunities for IPs and the IPs can make use of this law should they feel that 
their rights to equality are being side-lined.  
 
Equality legislations, such as those considered above, ensure that IPs interests would 
be considered and that it might be possible for AA policies to be created in their 
favour as well.  
 
4.3. Traditional Leadership 
The recognition of rights is not limited to peoples’ rights but has been extended to 
include traditional leadership as well. The Constitution (1996) has recognised 
traditional leadership in Section 211 and provides for a role for traditional leaders in 
Section 212 (Constitution, 1996).  
 
4.3.1. National House of Traditional Leaders Act 10 of 1997 
While Parliament does have the final say in instituting laws, it would do so by taking 
due cognisance of the rights of IPs. This would be via the National House of 
Traditional Leaders which could advise Parliament on such issues affecting IPs.  
 
Section 2(1) of the National House of Traditional Leaders Act (1997) established the 
National House of Traditional Leaders (National House) with Section 7 providing for 
functions and duties. However, this Act was subsequently repealed by the National 
House of Traditional Leaders Act (2009) with the National House of Traditional 
Leaders (House) being established in terms of Section 2(1). The powers and duties of 
this House is contained in Section 11(1), which states: 
 “The powers and duties of the House are –  
(a) to cooperate [sic]with the provincial houses of traditional leaders, to 
promote- 
 83 
(i) the role of traditional leadership within a democratic constitutional 
dispensation; 
(ii) nation building; 
(iii)peace, stability and cohesiveness of communities; 
(iv) the preservation of the moral fibre and regeneration of society; 
(v) the preservation of the culture and traditions of communities; 
(vi) socio-economic development and service delivery; 
(vii) the social well-being and welfare of communities; and 
(viii) the transformation and adaptation of customary law and custom so 
as to comply with the provisions of the Bill of Rights in the 
Constitution, in particular by- 
(aa) preventing unfair discrimination; 
(bb) promoting equality; and  
(cc) seeking to progressively advance gender representation in the 
succession to traditional leadership positions; and  
(b) to enhance co-operation between the House and the various provincial 
houses with the view to addressing matters of common interest” (National 
House of Traditional Leaders Act, 2009). 
 
The functions are contained in Section 11(2), which provides: 
 “The House- 
(a) must consider Parliamentary Bills referred to it by the Secretary to 
Parliament in terms of Section 8 of the Framework Act; 
(b) may advise the national government and make recommendations relating 
to any of the following- 
(i) Matters relating to policy and legislation regarding traditional 
leadership; 
(ii) the role of traditional leaders 
(iii)customary law; and 
(iv) the customs of communities observing a system of customary law; 
(c) may investigate and make available information on traditional leadership, 
traditional communities, customary law and customs; 
(d) must, at the request of a member of the National Cabinet, advise him or 
her in connection with any matter referred to in this section; 
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(e) must be consulted on national government development programmes that 
affect traditional communities; 
(f) must complement and support the work of government at national level; 
(g) must form cooperative (sic) relations and partnerships with government at 
national level in development and service delivery; 
(h) may participate in international and national programmes geared towards 
the development of rural communities; 
(i) may participate in national initiatives meant to monitor, review and 
evaluate government programmes in rural communities; and 
(j) must perform tasks as may be determined by a member of the national 
Cabinet or as may be provided for in national legislation” (National House 
of Traditional Leaders Act, 2009). 
 
In addition to the above, the Act also provides for responsibilities of the House in 
Section 13, the relationship between the House and kings and queens in Section 14, 
the relationship between the House and provincial houses in Section 15, the 
accountability of the House in Section 17 and the rules, orders and committees of the 
House in Section 20 (National House of Traditional Leaders Act, 2009). This new Act 
is much more in-depth than the previous Act and allows for greater participation of 
traditional leaders in the governance of SA. 
 
4.3.2. Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003 
This Act emphasises the importance that the post 1994 government has attached to 
traditional leadership. While there have been great strides in recognising “traditional 
communities” (IPs), the Act, in Section 2(3), does place a positive duty on IPs in that 
the IPs:  
“must transform and adapt customary law and customs relevant to the 
application of this Act so as to comply with the relevant principles contained 
in the Bill of Rights in the Constitution, in particular by – 
(a) preventing unfair discrimination; 
(b) promoting equality; and 
(c) seeking to progressively advance gender representation in the succession 
to traditional leadership positions” (Traditional Leadership and 
Governance Framework Act (2003).  
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It is interesting that, in terms of Section 2A, kingships and queenships are recognised 
with Section 2B recognising principal traditional communities (Traditional 
Leadership and Governance Framework Act, 2003). In addition, it also provides for 
the recognition and establishment of traditional councils in Section 3, kingship and 
queenship councils in Section 3A and principal traditional councils in Section 3B. The 
functions of traditional councils are contained in Section 4, with that of kingship and 
queenship councils in Section 4A, traditional sub-councils in Section 4B and principal 
traditional councils in section 4C (Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework 
Act, 2003).  
 
Unfortunately, Section 7 provides for the withdrawal of the recognition of traditional 
community status on application by certain members of the community concerned 
(Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act, 2003). It is the belief of the 
writer that the awarding of IP status should not be taken lightly and once awarded 
then such decision should not be reversed. It goes against the recognition of the 
weakened status of IPs. If there is concern as to whether a certain community is an IP 
or not, then such status should not be awarded in the first place. 
 
4.3.3. Traditional Courts Bill 
A new development is the Traditional Courts Bill which has the objects to: 
“(a) affirm the values of a traditional justice system, based on restorative 
justice and reconciliation and to align them with the Constitution; 
(b) affirm the role of the institution of traditional leadership in –  
(i) promoting social cohesion, co-existence and peace and harmony in 
traditional communities; 
(ii) enhancing access to justice by providing a speedier, less formal and 
less expensive resolution of disputes; and 
(iii) promoting and preserving traditions, customs and cultural 
practices that promote nation-building, in line with constitutional 
values; 
(c) create a uniform legislative framework, regulating the role and functions of 
the institution of traditional leadership in the administration of justice, in 
accordance with constitutional imperatives and values; and 
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(d) enhance the effectiveness, efficiency and integrity of the traditional justice 
system” (Article 2, Traditional Courts Bill). 
 
From the above objects, it is clear that the Traditional Courts would have to comply 
with the constitutional principles. This is emphasised in Article 3 of the Bill which 
provides for guiding principles that should apply: 
“(a) The need to align the traditional justice system with the Constitution in 
order for the said system to embrace the values in the Constitution, including – 
(i) the right to human dignity; 
(ii) the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights 
and freedoms; and 
(iii) non-racialism and non-sexism; 
(b) the need to promote access to justice for all persons; 
(c) the promotion of restorative justice measures; 
(d) the enhancement of the quality of life of traditional communities through 
mediation; 
(e) the development of skills and capacity for persons applying this [proposed] 
Act in order to ensure the effective implementation thereof; and 
(f) the need to promote and preserve African values which are based on 
reconciliation and restorative justice”. 
 
While Article 5(1) of the Traditional Courts Bill enables the traditional courts to 
“hear and determine civil disputes arising out of customary law and custom”, Article 
5(2) makes it clear that these courts may not hear and determine: 
 “(a) any constitutional matter; 
(b) any question of nullity, divorce or separation arising out of a marriage . . . 
(c) any matter relating to the custody and guardianship of minor children; 
(d) any matter relating to the validity, effect or interpretation of a will; 
(e) any matter arising out of customary law and custom where the claim or the 
value of the property in dispute exceeds the amount determined by the 
Minister . . . 
(f) any matter arising out of customary law and custom relating to any 
category of property determined by the Minister . . .” (Traditional Courts Bill). 
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In addition to civil cases, Article 6 (Traditional Courts Bill) enables the traditional 
courts to deal with criminal cases as well. In dealing with civil and criminal cases, 
Article 7 provides that the nature of the traditional courts is to:  
“operate in accordance with a system of customary law and custom that seeks 
to – 
(a) prevent conflict; 
(b) maintain harmony; and 
(c) resolve disputes where they have occurred, in a manner that promotes 
restorative justice and reconciliation and in accordance with the norms and 
standards reflected in the Constitution” (Traditional Courts Bill). 
 
While it would seem that the Bill is securing the traditional practices of justice, 
Weeks (a) (2012, p. 31) stated that the Bill “assigns traditional leaders such extended 
authority over the 17-million people in their apartheid-established jurisdictions that, 
effectively, ordinary rural people will no longer be citizens of South Africa but rather 
subjects of former homelands”. In addition, Weeks (a) (2012, p. 31), after considering 
various provisions of the Bill and the impacts thereof on affected persons, concluded 
that “there is something very wrong with the Bill. A law like this could not possible 
stand up to constitutional scrutiny”.12 
 
4.3.4. Public Protector Act 23 of 1994 
The office of the Public Protector was established by Section 181 of the Constitution 
(1996) as an independent institution subject to the Constitution (1996) only and is 
regulated by the Public Protector Act (1994).In terms of Section 182 of the 
Constitution (1996), the Public Protector has the power: 
“(a) to investigate any conduct in state affairs, or in the public administration 
in any sphere of government, that is alleged or suspected to be improper or to 
result in any impropriety or prejudice;  
(b) to report on that conduct; and  
(c) to take appropriate remedial action”. 
 
                                                 
12
See also: Weeks (b) (2012) and De Vos (2012) 
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While the office of the Public Protector had been established to protect the public 
from improper, for lack of a better word, action by the State, the Public Protector 
would only respond to an act once initiated or completed and would not be able to 
prevent an act of the State that has not yet occurred. While the Public Protector may 
not be able to prevent a harmful act of the State, he/she could assist in ensuring that a 
prejudicial act of the State towards the IP is remedied.
13
 
 
It is interesting that while there are numerous attempts to ensure equality of the 
discriminated races, IPs would not necessarily enjoy the full protection of the law. 
The laws only provide for the recognition of their rights; IPs would therefore need to 
engage actively in the legal process to ensure a protection of their rights as 
demonstrated by the Richtersveld Community.
14
 
 
4.4. BEE and Transformation
15
 
While the administration of Mandela focussed on the recognition of rights such as 
equality and the reconciliation of the nation after its emergence from Apartheid; the 
Mbeki administration focussed on BEE and Transformation. Legislation that deals 
with these issues can be used by IPs to ensure that their rights are recognised fully and 
that they cannot be side-lined. This is particularly so seeing that the mining industry 
has embraced these principles in the Broad-Based Socio-Economic Empowerment 
Charter for the South African Mining Industry (2002). If IPs fail to use this 
opportunity to secure their future as partners in a mining operation, then they could 
find themselves overtaken by the process and thereby become unable to participate 
effectively in the industry. 
 
4.4.1. The Minerals and Mining Policy for South Africa 
While the Minerals and Mining Policy for South Africa (Mineral Policy) (1998) is not 
a law per se, it does form the basis for all mining legislation that has and is shaping 
the current milieu. The Mineral Policy (1998) covers all aspects of mining in SA and 
considers the views of interested parties and attempts to align them with the intention 
of the government. 
                                                 
13
The effectiveness of this office falls beyond the scope of this analysis 
14
See Chapter 7 
15
This is not going to be a discussion on the importance of BEE or its impact on the S African 
economy. For such exposition see: Davie (2009)  
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However, it is disappointing that the Mineral Policy (1998) does not effectively deal 
with issues affecting IPs. For example, in Article 1.3.1.2.vii, the policy makes the 
comment: 
“Provision has been made in the Constitution read with the Restitution of Land 
Rights Act, for relief to persons or communities who were dispossessed of 
rights in land under any racially discriminatory law after 19 June 1913. 
Mineral rights are rights in land and can therefore be subject to the Act” 
(Mineral Policy, 1998). 
 
From this comment, it would appear as if IPs’ claims to mineral rights is limited to the 
Restitution of Land Rights Act (1994), which is discussed in greater detail in the next 
Chapter. While the Restitution of Land Rights Act(1994) is important, and goes a long 
way in recognising IPs’ rights in land, coupling mineral rights to the Act restricts any 
other claim that IPs would have to mineral rights; such as obtaining Common Law 
ownership to land.  
 
The Mineral Policy (1998) further provides in Article 1.3.2.iv: 
 “Government will: 
(iv) address past racial inequalities by ensuring that those previously excluded 
from participating in the mining industry gain access to mineral resources or 
benefit from the exploitation thereof.” 
 
IPs appear to be considered in the Mineral Policy (1998) by virtue of this comment; 
however, it is too vague. As long as a person or group of people meet the criteria of 
“previously excluded from participating in the mining industry”, it would seem that 
they would qualify for benefitting from the exploitation of minerals on their land. If 
IPs are weaker (economically) or have not been made aware of their mineral rights; 
and a “previously excluded” person makes an application for the mining rights, then 
the IPs could lose out as there is no specific intent to protect them or their interests. 
 
Chapter 3 of the Mineral Policy (1998) does provide for people issues but deals with 
issues such as health and safety in Article 3.1, human resource development in Article 
3.2., housing and living conditions in Article 3.3. and migrant labour in Article 3.4. 
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While IPs could be included in any of these categories, there is no specific intent to 
protect IPs save if they have been directly employed at a particular operation.  
 
The Minerals Policy (1998) does provide a small measure of protection to IPs directly 
in Article 3.6.4.i. which states: 
“Government has an obligation to assist employers, employees, industry 
suppliers and mine-linked communities in anticipating and managing the 
consequences of large-scale losses.” 
 
Unfortunately, this is limited to job losses. In this regard, Article 3.6.4.(d) does 
provide for short-term assistance: 
“Communities which are severely affected by large-scale retrenchments will 
be supported to identify alternative areas of economic activity” (Mineral 
Policy, 1998). 
 
The closest the Mineral Policy (1998), as a document, comes to the protection of IPs 
and their interests, is a consideration in Article 6.3.3.2.(i) that: 
“A forum should be established where the views of communities affected by 
mining could be heard.” 
 
This view has been watered down significantly in Article 6.3.4. which provides that: 
 “A statutory board will be established that will advise the Minister of 
Minerals and Energy on mining and mineral matters that fall outside the Mine 
Health and Safety Act. It will provide a forum in which government 
departments, representative of the principal stakeholders, viz. business and 
labour, as well as other interested parties, can debate issues that bear upon 
existing or new policies. The board will inter alia be required by law to advise 
the Minister on whether, when and how to intervene in cases where a dispute 
arises in the granting of prospecting, mining and retention licences” (Mineral 
Policy, 1998). 
 
With such poor consideration of IPs in the Mineral Policy (1998) and with only one 
helpful suggestion being considered and then watered down, it would be an 
interesting exercise to see how the various mining legislations deal with IPs. 
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4.4.2. Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003  
This Act, in Section 1, defines “broad-based black economic empowerment” as: 
‘the economic empowerment of all black people including women, workers, 
youth, people with disabilities and people living in rural areas through diverse 
but integrated socio-economic strategies that include, but are not limited to –  
(a) increasing the number of black people that manage, own and 
control enterprises and productive assets; 
(b) facilitating ownership and management of enterprises and 
productive assets by communities, workers, cooperatives and 
other collective enterprises; 
(c) human resources and skills development; 
(d) achieving equitable representation in all occupational 
categories and levels in the workforce; 
(e) preferential procurement; and 
(f) investment in enterprises that are owned or managed by 
Black peoples” (Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Act, 2003). 
 
From this definition, it would seem that any empowerment initiative would include 
IPs as well. In addition, one of the stated objectives of this Act, in Section 2(c), is to 
facilitate broad-based black economic empowerment by “increasing the extent to 
which communities, workers, cooperatives and other collective enterprises own and 
manage existing and new enterprises and increasing their access to economic 
activities, infrastructure and skills training” (Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Act, 2003). A further object, in Section 2(f), is the “empowering rural 
and local communities by enabling access to economic activities, land, infrastructure, 
ownership and skills” (Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act, 2003). 
However, “broad-based” could well indicate that a group of IPs may be side-lined in 
favour of those groups that are bigger or larger than them. 
 
4.4.3. Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002  
The MPRDA (2002) marked a significant change in the mineral and petroleum rights 
regime of SA. At the outset, it is interesting to consider a few unique definitions to the 
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MPRDA (2002). The first definition that needs to be considered is “Broad-based 
economic empowerment” which, in Section 1, is defined as: 
 “a social or economic strategy, plan, principle, approach or act aimed at -  
(a) redressing the results of past or present discrimination based on race, gender or 
other disability of historically disadvantaged persons in the minerals and 
petroleum industry, related industry and in the value chain of such individuals, 
and  
(b) transforming such individuals so as to assist in, provide for, initiate or 
facilitate – 
(i) the ownership, participation in or the benefiting from existing or 
future mining, prospecting, exploration or production operations; 
(ii) the participation in or control of management of such operations; 
(iii) the development of management, scientific, engineering or other 
skills of historically disadvantaged persons; 
(iv) the involvement of or participation in the procurement chains of 
operations; 
(v) the ownership of and participation in the beneficiation of the 
proceeds of the operations or other upstream or downstream value 
chains in such industries; 
(vi) the socio-economic development of communities immediately 
hosting, affected by supplying labour to the operations; and  
(vii) the socio-economic development of all historically disadvantaged 
South Africans from the proceeds or activities of such operations” 
(MPRDA, 2002). 
 
The second definition is “Historically disadvantaged person” which, in Section 1, is 
defined as:  
“(a) any person, category of persons or community, disadvantaged by unfair 
discrimination before the Constitution took effect;  
(b) any association, a majority of whose members are persons contemplated in 
paragraph (a);  
(c) a juristic person other than an association, in which persons contemplated 
in paragraph (a) own and control a majority of the issued share capital or 
 93 
members’ interest, and are able to control the majority of the members’ vote” 
(MPRDA, 2008). 
 
While the former definition spells out, in detail, what constitutes broad-based 
economic empowerment, the latter created a new class of person in the S African 
legal system. This new class of persons are (or “were”, perhaps?) to be the 
beneficiaries of the broad-based economic empowerment objectives contained in the 
MPRDA (2002). These definitions highlight the basic premise of the MPRDA (2002) 
– to redress the imbalances of the past and transformation, as far as the mining 
industry is concerned. Further, such transformation is aimed at a specific class of 
people based on discrimination and not race. The impact and effect of transformation 
to date falls beyond the scope of this analysis. 
 
Chapter 2 (Sections 2 – 6) of the MPRDA (2002) consists of some fundamental 
principles that apply to the new minerals regime with Section 2 dealing with the 
objects of the MPRDA (2002). From this list of objects it can be seen that there is an 
intention to utilise the revenues from the natural resources of the country to boost the 
social and economic development of all S Africans as well as those living near mining 
operations. 
 
Prior to the enactment of the MPRDA (2002) the Common Law maxim of cuius est 
solum, eius est ad coelo usque ad inferos applied where the owner of the land was the 
owner of the minerals that occurred thereon or therein.
16
 Section 3 of the MPRDA 
(2002) changed this by transferring the mineral resources to the people of SA with the 
State acting as the Custodian thereof. While Chapter 5 would be considering this issue 
in greater detail, it should be noted that where IPs own their land, section 3 renders it 
such that IPs who own their land would no longer have the mineral rights over their 
land. As landowners though, they would be able to assert their views and have their 
opinions heard and be able to derive options for their development from the 
exploitation of the minerals on their land. While this was the most significant change, 
                                                 
16
See Chapter 5 for details hereof. 
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there were other changes as well; such as the introduction of various licence regimes 
to facilitate the State’s custodianship of the mineral resources.17 
 
While the MPRDA (2002) has been a significant change to the S African mining law 
regime, it has its detractors. Leon, a mining lawyer, is reported as stating that the 
MPRDA (2002) has lead to a significant decrease in mining activity in SA (Editorial, 
2008). This comment elicited a speedy response from the DMR countering that the 
figures quoted by Leon in the articles was an indication that the industry was not in 
decline when looking at the industry as a whole (Zikalala, 2008). However, Leon 
seems to be vindicated when it is reported by Radebe and Mabanga (2008) that 
“investors are shunning SA amid what they claim are excessive regulations and slow 
administrative processes”. 
 
With regard to these comments, the Fraser Institute statistics, which considers various 
issues such as policy potential trends, the mineral potential index, the investment 
attractiveness index, investment attractiveness trends, uncertainty concerning the 
administration, interpretation and enforcement of existing regulations, environmental 
regulations, etcetera, could be consulted. For purposes of this study, brevitas causa, 
only the Policy Potential Index which “serves as a report card on how attractive their 
policies are from the point of view of an exploration manager” (Fraser Institute, 
2003/2004, p. 5)would be considered. 
 
Starting with the 2003 Fraser Institute Annual Survey of Mining Companies, the 
Policy Potential Index indicated SA as being ranked 34 of 53 countries (Fraser 
Institute, 2003/2004, p. 8). In 2004, the Policy Potential Index rated SA 53 of 64 
countries (Fraser Institute, 2004/2005, p. 8). In 2005, the Policy Potential Index rated 
SA at 37 of 64 countries surveyed (Fraser Institute, 2005/2006, p. 8).  
 
In 2006, the Policy Potential Index rated SA at 53 out of 65 countries (Fraser Institute, 
2006/2007, p. 11). In 2007, the Policy Potential Index ranked SA at 50 out of 68 
countries (Fraser Institute, 2007/2008, p. 11).In 2008, the Policy Potential Index 
ranked South Africa 49 out of 79 countries (Fraser Institute, 2008/2009, p. 14).  
                                                 
17
Seeing that the MPRDA (2002) has been the subject of many commentaries, a discussion of the 
various provisions would not be undertaken herein, except where relevant. 
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In 2009, the Policy Potential Index ranked South Africa 61 out of 72 countries (Fraser 
Institute, 2009/2010, p. 11). In 2010, the Policy Potential Index ranked South Africa 
67 out of 79 countries (Fraser Institute, 2010/2011, p. 12).  
 
These statistics can be more easily depicted as per Table 1 below: 
 
Table 1: Policy Potential Indices of Fraser Institute (2003 – 2010) 
Year Policy Potential 
Index (PPI) 
Number of 
Countries Surveyed 
(CS) 
Percentage Rating 
(PPI/CS) (%) 
2003 34 53 64 
2004 53 64 82 
2005 37 64 58 
2006 53 65 81 
2007 50 68 73 
2008 49 79 62 
2009 61 72 84 
2010 67 79 84 
 
 
From Table 1, it can be seen that while the policy potential index in SA seems to be 
positive, it is fluctuating at extreme levels which does not bode well for investor 
confidence. This indicates that investors’ support for SA’s policy framework is 
vacillating with only 2009 and 2010 seeming to reach some degree of stability. Leon’s 
comment was made in 2008, when indications were that investors’ were not confident 
in SA’s policy framework.  
 
Returning to the MPRDA (2002), the most significant issue relating to IPs is Section 
104 which provides for a preferent prospecting or mining right for communities (IPs). 
This preferent right would place the IP in a more favourable position as opposed to 
other applicants for the relevant mining or prospecting right. However, in terms of 
Section 104(4), the preferent right would not apply where a mining right or 
prospecting right, etcetera has already been granted, with the result that a mining 
company that has lodged its application first may get approval well before the IP 
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concerned can even fulfil the Section 104(2) requirements. Further, if the mining 
company is aware of the IPs application and decides to wait to see the success or 
failure of the application, the mining operation would be held over while the IP is 
compiling the information. Either of these situations is undesirable as the former 
places obstacles in the IPs enforcing the preferent right while the second delays 
further investment while the IPs are attempting to enforce the preferent right.  
 
However, the 2007 World Investment Report, in Box VI.11., reflected positively on 
the preferent right as follows: 
“[Transnational Corporations] and other mining companies that form 
partnerships in the context of preferent rights are likely to benefit from 
security and continuity of tenure afforded by the rights granted. Because of the 
potential benefit for companies, communities have been advised to consider 
the credentials of different applicant mining companies before making a 
decision. Consideration may be given to a company’s technical competence 
for extracting a specific mineral, its financial strength and any history of its 
relationships with other communities. The decision may also be influenced by 
the company’s commitments to the social plan, labour plan and other 
requirements” (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2007, 
p. 176). 
 
With the apparent confusion as regards the preferent right, it is interesting to see 
whether this comment still holds true. The World Investment Report further stated: 
“Regardless of whether or not a community holds a preferent right, the law 
requires the involvement of communities in decisions that affect them, and the 
integration of their development plans with those of local municipalities. 
Community assistance includes any contribution to skills development, 
sharing of infrastructure, provision of social (government) services through 
social plans and provision of business opportunities to communities through 
procurement” (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2007, 
p. 176). 
 
While these comments seem to indicate a support for the preferent right provisions, 
the World Investment Report also stated: 
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“In situations where the presence of the corporation and its resources is many 
times larger than a government presence, the key is to facilitate and improve 
capacity for service delivery rather than to assume the responsibilities of the 
government” (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2007, 
p. 175 - 176). 
 
It is true that a mining company can never be expected to take on the role of the 
government in the providing of many social services. Looking at the unique nature of 
the S African history and the need for transformation, such a contention would assist 
neither companies nor communities. Companies would need to ensure that the IPs 
affected by their operations are not side-lined. While they cannot be expected to take 
over government duties, they cannot neglect IPs simply because it falls within the 
sphere of government responsibility.  
 
The MPRDA (2002) also has two Schedules, with Schedule I dealing with repealed or 
amended laws and Schedule II dealing with Transitional Arrangements. Schedule II, 
in Item 2, had the objects to: 
“(a) ensure that security of tenure is protected in respect of prospecting, 
exploration, mining and production operations which are being undertaken; 
(b) Give the holder of an old order right, and an OP 26 right an opportunity to 
comply with this Act; and 
(c) promote equitable access to the nation’s mineral and petroleum resources” 
(MPRDA, 2002). 
 
In pursuit of these objects, the Schedules provided for the continuation of the “old 
order rights” in the transition between the Mining Rights Act (1991) and the MPRDA 
(2002). The old order prospecting right, in terms of Item 6, continued until 2006, 
mining right, in terms of Item 7 to the end of 2009 and the continuation of the 
environmental management plan of the Mining Rights Act (1991) until the 
implementation of the MPRDA (2002) as per Item 10.  
 
Item 11 makes specific reference to IPs in that it allows for the continuation of all 
royalty payments to IPs. However, the Item also provided that the IPs had to provide 
the Minister with details of the “usage and disbursement of the consideration or 
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royalty” in Item 11(2) and in Item 11(5) IPs had until 2009 to “inform the Minister of 
their need to continue to receive such consideration or royalties and the reasons 
therefor . . .” with Item 11(7) indicating that the continuation of the receipt of royalty 
was subject to the Minister’s terms and conditions (MPRDA, 2002).  
 
It seems that IPs who did not report on their royalties received to the Minister would 
not be entitled to continued receipt thereof. It appears that only one community 
reported their royalty receipts but did not meet the terms and conditions of the 
Minister and so did not qualify for continued receipt of the royalties (Rocha, 2010). 
As such, no community royalties are recognised in SA. 
 
It should be noted that the MPRDA (2002) had been amended by the Mineral and 
Petroleum Resources Development Amendment Act (2008). However, due to various 
contradictory provisions, such as those relating to community issues, it seems that this 
amendment would not be made effective (Rocha, 2010). The DMR is working on 
another amendment and as such, any discussion on the Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Amendment Act (2008) is not warranted. 
 
4.4.4. The Social and Labour Plan 
While the MPRDA (2002) had an impact on the mining industry, its regulations had a 
significant impact. While the regulations, inter alia, covered issues such as the 
mineral and petroleum regulation  in Chapter 2, , environmental regulation in Part III, 
pollution control and waste management regulation in Part IV, it also dealt with the 
Social and Labour Plan (SLP) in Part II (Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Regulations, 2004). 
 
This SLP is significant as its objects, in Regulation 41, are to: 
“(a) promote employment and advance the social and economic welfare of all 
South Africans;  
(b) contribute to the transformation of the mining industry; and  
(c) ensure that holders of mining rights contribute towards the socio-economic 
development of the areas in which they are operating” (Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Regulations, 2004).  
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To emphasize the importance of the SLP, the Regulations state in Regulation 43, that 
the SLP is valid until a closure certificate has been issued, in Regulation 45 that an 
annual report on the compliance with the SLP must be submitted and in Regulation 44 
that the SLP cannot be amended without the consent of the Minister of Mineral 
Resources (Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Regulations, 2004).  
 
In terms of Regulation 46, the SLP is a detailed document that must provide for such 
issues as information of the mine, a human resources development programme (a 
social plan for the area of operation), processes pertaining to downscaling and 
retrenchment, financial provision to implement the SLP and an undertaking by the 
holder of the mining right to ensure compliance with the SLP and to make it known to 
employees (Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Regulations, 2004). 
 
The introduction of the SLP is significant for IPs in that the IPs would be able to 
access the SLP and see whether the company is complying thereto or not. It also 
enables the IPs to check whether the company is complying with legislation, such as 
the Employment Equity Act (1998). Should the IPs not see any compliance then they 
could report the matter to the DMR to ensure proper compliance. The mining right 
holder, in terms of Regulation 46(f) has to undertake to ensure compliance with the 
SLP and to inform their employees thereof (Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Regulations, 2004). This provision renders it unnecessary for the IPs 
concerned to depend on the normal legislative processes, such as the Promotion of 
Access to Information Act (2000) to get any information on the holder’s SLP.  
 
4.4.5. Broad-Based Socio-Economic Empowerment Charter for the South African 
Mining Industry 
The Broad-Based Socio-Economic Empowerment Charter for the South African 
Mining Industry (Mining Charter) was concluded in 2002 and provided, in Article 
4.2., for such issues as 40% Historically Disadvantaged South Africans (HDSAs) 
participation in management level of companies by 2009 and 10% women 
participation in the industry by 2009 and, in Article 4.7. for 26% Black ownership by 
2012.  
 
It has been concluded by virtue of Section 100(2) of the MPRDA (2002) which states: 
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“(2)(a) To ensure the attainment of Government's objectives of redressing 
historical, social and economic inequalities as stated in the Constitution, the 
Minister must within six months from the date on which this Act takes effect 
develop a broad-based socio-economic empowerment Charter that will set the 
framework, targets and time-table for effecting the entry of historically 
disadvantaged South Africans into the mining industry, and allow such South 
Africans to benefit from the exploitation of mining and mineral resources. 
(b) The Charter must set out, amongst others how the objects referred to in 
section2(c), (d), (e), U) and (i) can be achieved.” 
 
This is not unique to the mining industry as there are a few laws dealing with BEE 
and transformation; though the Mining Charter (2002) was the first of its kind in SA 
and so the mining industry has set the tone for transformation in the country. Further, 
the Mining Charter (2002) also provided for issues such as, inter alia migrant labour 
in Article 4.3., mine community and rural development in Article 4.4., housing and 
living conditions in Article 4.5. and beneficiation in Article 4.8.  
 
There have been assertions that many companies are not adhering to Transformation 
policies (Mthunzi, 2008). However, it would seem that the Mining Charter (2002) is 
ensuring that the mining companies do not fail in these responsibilities. In this regard, 
it is worth noting the following comment by Mthunzi: 
“An organisation that undermines transformation perpetuates societal 
inequality and economic injustice. The organisation’s espoused and practised 
values have to be congruent, otherwise there will be tension between the ideal 
and real behaviour within the organisation. Transformation should not be on 
the list of things to be done but in the culture and essence of running a 
business” (Mthunzi, 2008). 
 
As per Article 4.7.of the Mining Charter (2002) a review had been scheduled for 
2009. However, the review was only concluded in September 2010 and reflected inthe 
Amendment of the Broad-Based Socio-Economic Empowerment Charter For The 
South African Mining and Minerals Industry (Amended Mining Charter) (2010).  
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Prior to the publication of the Amended Mining Charter (2010), a Stakeholders’ 
Declaration on Strategy For The Sustainable Growth And Meaningful Transformation 
Of South Africa’s Mining Industry (2010) (Stakeholders’ Declaration) was signed by 
the various stakeholders in the mining industry. This Stakeholders’ Declaration 
(2010), in the Preamble, provided the principles that can be described as a 
“foundation for a strategy to position South Africa’s mining industry on a trajectory 
of sustainable growth and meaningful transformation”. The issues that have been 
agreed to by the stakeholders have become the basis for the Amended Mining Charter 
(2010). 
 
This amendment marked a significant change from the previous version of the Mining 
Charter (2002). Apart from a change in format, Vision, Mission and Preamble, the 
Amended Mining Charter (2010) provides for greater emphasis on Sustainable 
Development (SD) and has set the specific targets to be completed by 2014. However, 
while the previous version indicated a negotiated consensus, the Amended Mining 
Charter (2010) in Article 1 states that it is “a Government instrument designed to 
effect sustainable growth and meaningful transformation of the mining industry”. This 
change of status of the Mining Charter (2002) from a negotiated consensus to a 
document that has the connotation of being a regulatory instrument is emphasised by 
the fact that the previous version provided for the participation of all the stakeholders 
including government having specific responsibilities. The new version has removed 
all responsibilities for government and placed most of the responsibilities squarely on 
the shoulders of mining companies. While the newer version would undoubtedly 
place added pressure on non-compliant companies to comply with the Mining Charter 
(2002), this new version means that compliant companies, and companies in the 
process of complying, are placed on the back-foot; in that they would have to comply 
without any assistance of the DMR or any other government department.  
 
The Amended Mining Charter (2010) retains many of the provisions of the Mining 
Charter (2002) with significant changes; such as the stakeholders are still committed 
to 26% HDSA ownership by 2014, though the requirement for women participation 
has been removed as per Article 2.1. of the Amended Mining Charter (2010). Further, 
Beneficiation in Article 2.3., Employment Equity in Article 2.4., Human Resources 
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Development in Article 2.5. Mine Community Development in Article 2.6. and 
Housing and Living Conditions in Article 2.7. being much the same. 
 
New developments include Article 2.8. dealing with SD and Growth of the Mining 
Industry and Article 2.9, which deals with the reporting of compliance with the 
Amended Mining Charter (2010). A significant development is Article 3 which deals 
with non-Compliance with the Amended Mining Charter (2010) and provides for the 
loss of the relevant rights granted by the DMR should there be non-compliance. While 
the Mining Charter (2002) had no such sanction, Article 3 makes it clear that non-
compliance with render a mining company subject to the sanctions allowed by the 
MPRDA (2002). 
 
There has been concern that the Mining Charter (2002) may become superseded by 
the BEE Codes of the Department of Trade and Industry (Scholes, 2008). However, 
with the Amended Mining Charter (2010) being implemented, this is no longer an 
issue. It would seem that the MPRDA (2002) with the Mining Charter (2002) and 
Amended Mining Charter (2010) create a degree of rigidity in the legislative system. 
With the fluctuations in the minerals markets, a degree of flexibility in the legislations 
would be advisable, especially when attracting new investors.  
 
4.4.6. Diamonds Act 56 of 1986 
While this Act was enacted in 1986, it had been amended by virtue of two 
amendments in 2005.
18
 These amendments, as indicated in the Long Title, essentially 
provided for the local beneficiation of diamonds, the establishment of the S African 
Diamond and Precious Metals Regulator (the Regulator) and the establishment of the 
State Diamond Trader (SDT) (Diamonds Act, 1986). The Regulator was established 
in terms of Section 3, to regulate the exploitation and beneficiation of diamonds in SA 
and, in Sections 4 – 5, to, inter alia, ensure compliance with the Kimberly Process 
Certification Scheme (Diamonds Act, 1986). The Act, in Section 14, also provides for 
the establishment of the State Diamond Trader (SDT) to, in terms of Section 15, 
“promote equitable access to and local beneficiation of the Republic’s diamonds” 
(Diamonds Act, 1986).  
                                                 
18
Diamonds Amendment Act (2005) and Diamonds Second Amendment Act (2005) 
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While a list of functions have been provided for the SDT in Section 16, it is the 
additional functions in Section 59A that is most interesting in that the SDT can: 
“(a) acquire and supply unpolished diamonds to local diamond beneficiators; 
and 
(b) promote the diamond industry through the necessary research, support and 
development as deemed necessary from time to time” (Diamonds Act, 1986). 
 
While these are lofty ideals, there have been a few setbacks with concerns raised on 
the SDT’s future (Hill, 2008, p. 49). While the Director-General of the DMR at that 
time, Nogxina, has been quoted as describing the SDT as a “dream come true for the 
diamond cutters and polishers”, Hill concludes that the SDT “seems to have been 
more of a nightmare for all concerned” (Hill, 2008, p. 50). 
 
This Act could have proved extremely beneficial to IPs with diamonds on their land - 
in addition to mining there could have been additional benefits due to the 
requirements of local beneficiation. The apparent failure of the SDT prevents the IPs 
concerned from benefitting from the services the government, via the SDT, could 
have provided.
19
 
 
4.4.7. Precious Metals Act 37 of 2005 
This Act expands the objects of the S African Diamonds and Precious Metals 
Regulator by providing, in Section 2, as follows: 
“to –  
(a) ensure that the precious metal resources of the Republic are exploited and 
developed in the best interest of the people of South Africa; 
(b) promote equitable access to, and local beneficiation, of the Republic’s 
precious metals; 
(c) promote the sound development of precious metal enterprises in the 
Republic; and 
(d) advance the objectives of the broad-based socio-economic empowerment 
as prescribed” (Precious Metals Act, 2005). 
                                                 
19
At the time of publishing, there was insufficient information to determine if the Regulator was more 
successful than the SDT 
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In furthering these objectives, the Act, in Section 6(1), provides that the Regulator, in 
considering an application for any licence, permit or certificate “must have regard to 
the promotion of equitable access to and the orderly local beneficiation of precious 
metal” and also “must have regard to the requirements of the [Mining] Charter” 
(Precious Metals Act, 2005).The Act also requires, in Section 23(1), the promulgation 
of regulations that would provide for broad-based socio-economic empowerment 
(Precious Metals Act, 2005).  
 
While these are also lofty ideals, whether the Regulator has succeeded could not be 
properly assessed at the time of publication of the research, save to say that the lack of 
information in this regard makes it difficult for IPs to assess the importance of the 
Regulator in their proposed ventures. IPs could well find themselves in the position of 
any other applicant with no consideration for their weakened status. 
 
4.4.8. Mineral and Petroleum Resources Royalty Act 28 of 2008 
Coincidently, the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Royalty Act (2008) (Royalty Act) 
carries the same number as the MPRDA (2002) which forms the impetus for the 
charging of royalties in Section 3(2)(b). Essentially, Section 3(2)(b) provides for the 
Ministers of Minerals and Finance to consult to “determine and levy, any fee or 
consideration payable in terms of any relevant Act of Parliament” (MPRDA, 2002). 
 
Section 2 of the Royalty Act (2008) is specific that any person who “wins or recovers 
a mineral resource within the Republic must pay a royalty for the benefit of the 
National Revenue Fund in respect of the transfer of that mineral resource.” Basically, 
any person who is engaged in the extraction of a mineral or petroleum resource would 
have to pay a royalty; for mining, this would be the holders of a mining right or a 
mining permit. While this might raise a number of queries, it is happy stance to note 
that, in terms of Section 8, minerals obtained from exploration or prospecting 
operations are exempt from payment of royalty (Royalty Act, 2008). 
 
The royalty, in terms of Section 3, is charged on the gross sales for the year, the 
calculation of which has been more clearly set out in Section 6 (Royalty Act, 2008). 
The formula for the calculation is set out in Section 4 with Sections 5 and 6 describing 
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the Earnings Before Interest and Taxes and Gross Sales respectively (Royalty Act, 
2008). 
 
Other exemptions include rollover relief for disposals involving going concerns, in 
Section 9, transfers involving unincorporated persons, in Section 10, arms-length 
transactions, in Section 11, a general avoidance rule in Section 12, and so on; with the 
royalty rates defined in the Schedules (Royalty Act, 2008). 
 
As no community royalties are recognised, the only royalties a mining company is 
liable for is the royalties payable as per the Royalty Act (2008). What of projects 
relating to the social and welfare aspects of the area that were previously covered by 
the community royalties? As the Royalty Act (2008) and the MPRDA (2002) is silent 
on these issues, it would seem that the State should now have to fund such projects. 
 
However, by paying the royalties into the National Revenue Fund, as per Section 2 
(Royalty Act, 2008), the State then has the discretion to dispense the funds as it sees 
fit. This highlights another omission, the Royalty Act (2008) does not provide a 
dispensing mechanism in favour of the area where the mine operates or, at the least, 
how the revenues from the royalties would be dispensed. A clear and transparent 
dispensing formula would enable the IPs concerned to motivate for a larger 
contribution from royalties paid. 
 
Interestingly, it seems that an additional tax on the mining industry is being 
considered in the form of a Resource Rent Tax (Davie, 2011). While the consideration 
of such a tax falls beyond the scope of this research, it bears mentioning that the 
mining industry is being seen as a cash cow and this seems to be another attempt to 
draw as much funds from the industry as possible. 
 
4.4.9. Mineral and Petroleum Resources Royalty (Administration) Act 29 of 2008 
This Act, in terms of its long title, provides for the administration for the imposition 
of the royalty. It covers such issues as registration in Sections 2 - 3, payments of 
royalties in Section 5 - 7, maintenance of the required records in Section 8, 
assessments in Sections 9 - 12 and refunds in Section 13 (Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Royalty (Administration) Act, 2008). 
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4.5. Codes of Good Practice for the South African Minerals Industry 
The Codes of Good Practice for the South African Minerals Industry (2009) (the 
Codes) which was published in the Government Gazette on the 29
th
 April 2009, not 
long after the 22
nd
 April presidential elections. One could assume that the Codes 
(2009) have been implemented in much the same manner as the Mining Charter 
(2002), as Cohen (2009) stated: 
“You wouldn’t think it possible, but the Department of Minerals and Energy 
[as it then was] has done it again; a big legislative overreach has again has 
threatened the viability of SA’s core economic sector.” 
 
He further stated: 
“Instead, days after the election, [the DMR] published something called the 
Code of Good Practice for the SA Minerals Industry, amazingly without 
informing the chamber or anyone else it was doing so, even though it was in 
discussion with it was doing so, even though it was in discussion with the 
chamber at the time on the very topic” (Cohen, 2009). 
 
Cohen (2009) believed that the Codes (2009) was an attempt to harmonise the BEE 
Codes of the Department of Trade and Industry with the Mining Charter. However, 
the Codes (2009) itself provided a Purpose: 
“The purpose of this document is to set out administrative principles in order 
to facilitate the effective implementation of the minerals and mining 
legislation and enhance the implementation of the Broad-Based Socio-
Economic Charter applicable to the mining industry and to give effect to 
section 100 (1) (b) of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act, 
2002 by developing a Code of Good Practice for the minerals industry in the 
Republic” (The Codes, 2009, pp. 16). 
 
However, due to the controversy resulting therefrom, to the knowledge of the writer, 
it seems that the DMR has abandoned the Codes (2009) and it is no longer applicable. 
While severe criticism can be levelled against the DMR for its poor handling of the 
regulation of the mining industry, care needs to taken in assuming that this is its only 
function. In addition to enacting and implementing regulation, the DMR has to also 
monitor compliance therewith (Rocha, 2010). Assumptions by government and the 
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rest of the mining sector that the DMR is also responsible for creating an enabling 
environment for investment is mistaken. While the creation of an enabling investment 
environment is a government function, this should not be the sole responsibility of the 
DMR but should include other arms of government; such as the Department of Trade 
and Industry (DTI) (Rocha, 2010).  
 
This is certainly an interesting perspective as it requires all government departments 
to jointly take responsibility for both stimulating further investment in mining, 
regulating the industry and also protecting the rights of IPs. Failure in doing this 
ensures that government is failing in being an effective participant in the mining 
industry and could run the risk of serious accusations being levelled against it. This is 
clearly illustrated by Pilger in his assessment of the Australian government’s actions 
as regards the Aboriginal people in the Northern territories to obtain control of the 
minerals on their land (Pilger, 2008). However, such cross-departmental co-operation 
in SA has not been evident to the writer, especially between the DTI and the DMR. 
 
The best determinate of a government’s ability to act effectively is their governance. 
Unfortunately, the enactment of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development 
Amendment Act (2008) and the publication of the Codes (2009) and thereafter not 
implementing either, does not auger well for perceptions of the S African 
government’s governance abilities. In considering these matters, it is interesting to 
note the Worldwide Governance Indicators of the World Bank of the performance of 
the S African government from 1996 to 2010; which indicates a decline in the Voice 
and Accountability and Governance Effectiveness with Regulatory Quality remaining 
relatively unchanged and a slight improvement in Rule of Law (World Bank Institute, 
nd). With the non-implementation of the two above documents, it is interesting to 
note the positive results as regards the Regulatory Quality and Rule of Law. This 
could indicate that despite the enactment of the two documents and not implementing 
same is seen as being positive as the government has not implemented bad 
regulations. However, the main impact of governance, Government Effectiveness is 
seen in a negative light.  
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A graphic representation of Government Effectiveness is presented in Diagram 1 
below: 
 
Diagram 1: SA Government Governance Indicators for 2004 and 2010 
 
 
This general decline, as indicated in Diagram 1, shows that from 2004 to 2010 the S 
African government has rapidly declined in its rating in effective government and 
good governance and seems to be heading towards becoming an ineffective 
government with poor governance. This general decline was confirmed by Visser 
(2012) who reported that the Auditor-General “has criticised the S African 
government and public servants over the ‘dire’ situation that has seen the weakening 
of the pillars of governance protecting SA’s democracy”. With particular reference to 
the audit results of municipalities, Visser (2012) quoted the Auditor-General as 
stating: 
“The accountability for the results is not taken as seriously as it should be. Bad 
results are regarded as a norm and when people get a disclaimer or qualified 
reports, little happens to them to show that this is unacceptable. This is the 
culture that we need to be concerned about”. 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
While the legislation prior to democracy had sought to marginalise some races and 
made them subservient to one race, the legislation during democracy sought to reverse 
this state of affairs. In providing for equal treatment and the institutions that guarantee 
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and protect equality, it can be seen that every effort to comply with the Constitution 
(1996) is made. 
 
However, while BEE and transformation are important considerations, it is not 
without controversy (Rumney, 2008). President Motlanthe (nd.), as he then was, has 
been quoted by Rumney (2008) as stating as follows with regard to BEE: 
“Another weakness in the empowerment programme is that it has been 
focused on transfer rather than transformation. By ‘transfer’ I mean the ceding 
of existing assets to individuals in a manner that does not in any way alter the 
economic structure. By ‘transformation’, I mean the creation of new markets, 
new investments and new drivers of domestic demand in the economy.” 
 
However, in his new portfolio as Deputy President, Motlanthe has stated that BEE has 
failed due to only a few people benefitting (Jacks, 2010).
20
 On the other hand, one 
cannot deny that the Mining Charter (2002) and the subsequent Amended Mining 
Charter (2010) seeks to reverse same, along with the Codes (2009). In commenting on 
the current status of the Mining Charter (2002) and Codes (2009), Donnelly 
(2009/2010) stated: 
“The long term survival of the South African mining industry cannot happen 
without transformation, but its transformation will prove worthless if it cannot 
survive.” 
 
Only time will tell whether these words would prove to be true or not. However, the 
Mining Charter is strengthened by further legislative developments such as the SLP. 
While the legislation seeks to transform the mining industry, one wonders as regards 
its certainty. After all, the governance ability of the S African government is cause for 
serious concern and should be improved upon. Perhaps the Mineral Policy (1998) 
should be revisited to sketch the way forward, especially to ensure that all parties to a 
mining transaction become effective participants thereto.  
 
In addition, the Amended Mining Charter, by removing government responsibilities, 
has placed the transformation of the mining industry on the mining companies. This is 
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See also: Munshi, (2010) 
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unfortunate as it would appear that government is making the mining companies do 
that which government has to do. A mining company, in the opinion of the writer, 
cannot and should not step into the shoes of government, although it should be 
responsible for those who are impacted by its operation. 
 
In any event, these legislative developments do highlight a system that can be used by 
IPs to effectively develop themselves. In this regard, the strategies must take account 
of the current legislative system, but be flexible enough to ensure that it can be easily 
adapted to enable IPs to derive maximum benefit should the legislation be improved. 
On the other hand, the strategies must not be so flexible that it can be changed to the 
detriment of the IPs, even where the laws remain static or an amendment of laws fails 
to lead to an improvement in IPs’ circumstances. 
 
In light of the above, the next chapter would look into the issue of land and its 
importance to IPs. It would consider the empirical value of land and how land can be 
effectively utilised in any strategy seeking to benefit IPs.  
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Chapter Five 
LAND ISSUES 
 
5.1. Introduction 
While the previous Chapter considered some of the laws in a democratic SA, this 
Chapter explores the issue of land to IPs and some of the related legislations. Seeing 
that land is an important requirement for mining, access to and control of land is 
similarly an important requirement for IPs seeking to benefit from the exploitation of 
minerals. In addition, the importance of land to IPs is also highlighted by Render (nd, 
p. 1) who commented: 
“In fact, the definition of Indigenous is ‘native to a particular place’ – a place 
that is not just land, but their land. It is not only where an individual was born, 
but where a people was born. At the core of many Indigenous cultures is the 
understanding that the land where they live is a gift to them from the Creator. 
This connection to the land means that Indigenous peoples not only have 
rights to use and occupy the land but also have ancestral obligations to protect 
it and preserve their connection to it. This sense of responsibility, often 
referred to as stewardship, plays a large role in traditions and customary laws 
that guide the use of the land, including placing prohibitions on what can be 
done on the land and with its resources and how the land can be transferred to 
another”. 
 
It would seem that IPs and land are inextricably connected and that a severance of this 
connection would have an impact on their identity. From Chapter 1, prior to Dutch 
colonisation of the Cape, IPs were present in the Cape where, “three different Khoi 
clans used land around the Cape Peninsula to graze their herds of cattle and sheep. 
Land was shared and groups never spent more than a few months in one area” (Cape 
Connected (a), nd. p. 1).However, it has been claimed that by the time van Riebeeck 
left the Cape in 1662, he had “directed the first chapter of colonisation by violent 
conquest, both of the land and its people” (Cape Connected (b), nd. p. 2). 
 
From the above, while IPs exercised control over the land at the Cape, they had been 
deprived thereof by the action of the colonisers, who disregarded the traditional 
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attitudes of IPs to the land. The Government Commission on Native Laws and 
Customs (1883, p. 40) had the following observation as regards land tenure: 
“. . . according to native customs, the land occupied by a tribe is regarded 
theoretically as the property of the paramount Chief; in relation to the tribe he 
is a Trustee holding it for the people, who occupy and use it, in subordination 
to him, on communistic principles”. 
 
As such, the exploitation of minerals, to IPs, would appear to be giving off an 
important part of their culture and identity, for which they need to be compensated. In 
light hereof, it is easy to understand the comment by Zirker (2003), as quoted by 
Barry (2004, p 356), that land was an important tool for the Apartheid government: 
“In apartheid South Africa, land was the pillar of the apartheid structure. The 
apartheid government used land as a means of economically and socially 
suppressing the African majority. By depriving Africans of property rights the 
foundation was set for profound poverty and social instability. The deprivation 
of property rights set the stage for the profound adversity Africans endured 
under apartheid”. 
 
While the land is important for IPs, it had also become the instrument of subjugation 
for them. In this regard, the primary source of any attempt to effect any change in land 
ownership for IPs in SA would be the Constitution (1996). 
 
5.2. Constitutional Issues 
Section 25 of the Constitution (1996) deals with the right to property and provides, 
inter alia, as follows: 
- Section 25(1) – “No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law 
of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of 
property” 
- Section 25(5) – “the state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, 
within its available resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to 
gain access to land on an equitable basis” 
- Section 25(6) – which specifically deals with land: “A person or community 
whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of past racially 
discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of 
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Parliament, either to tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress” 
(Constitution, 1996). 
 
In light of the Apartheid government’s use of land as an instrument of suppression, 
Section 25 of the Constitution (1996) also requires Parliament to specifically enact 
legislation to cater for: 
- “A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a 
result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent 
provided by an Act of Parliament, either to restitution of that property or to 
equitable redress” – Section 25(7). 
- “No provision of this section may impede the state from taking legislative and 
other measures to achieve land, water and related reform, in order to redress 
the results of past racial discrimination, provided that any departure from the 
provisions of this section is in accordance with provision of S 36(1) 
[limitations of rights clause]” - Section 25(8) (Constitution, 1996). 
 
From these provisions, it can be seen that an attempt has been made to ensure 
Constitutional protection of the right to land while not excluding people who had been 
previously unlawfully deprived thereof. However, Ntsebeza (2007) was of the opinion 
that entrenching property rights in the Constitution “is a major obstacle to the 
achievement of even the limited objectives of the land reform programme”. 
 
Ntsebeza (2007) continued his attack on the Constitutional protection of land: 
“In South Africa, it is impossible to satisfy equally both the need to protect 
property rights and to ensure equitable distribution of land. . . The fact that the 
Constitution allows for the expropriation of land does not alter this position. 
The recognition of property rights creates favourable conditions for property 
holders and their allies to contest expropriation in court. Under these 
circumstances, it is not surprising that the state is reluctant to use 
expropriation as a tool.” 
 
Although Ntsebeza (2007) may have felt that the right to property may have impeded 
the land reform process, which is discussed below, it does not mean that the 
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constitutional protection of property rights is wrong. James (2007), in response to 
Ntsebeza (2007) stated: 
“If land reform has been a ‘failure’, then what has it . . . actually done in the 
South African countryside? It has raised expectations without fulfilling them, 
breeding cynicism. But some have taken it upon themselves to negotiate 
informal land deals . . . and in the short term, at least, they have been able to 
secure some rights of ownership or usufruct. In the process they are 
developing a more canny sense of how it is that politicians and state officials 
can and should be held to account for their promises”. 
 
It should be stated that land is important to both IPs and the recognised land holders 
and both deserve a protection of their respective rights. Recognition of the 
Constitutional protection of land, at the outset, renders a meaningful discussion of the 
issues around land and its ownership. Existing owners are guaranteed that their 
concerns would be addressed and the IPs would be secure in the knowledge that their 
land was obtained properly and would not be subject to further claims. As such, it 
should be noted that one cannot expect the Constitution (1996) to apply selectively to 
one group of people at the expense of another. However, for IPs to claim 
constitutional protection of their land rights they would need to demonstrate a valid 
claim to that land. 
 
5.3. IP’s Land and Colonialism 
Previously, colonial powers considered conquered lands as being terra nullius – land 
that has been abandoned. According to Anaya (2004, p. 30): 
Under this fiction, discovery was employed to uphold colonial claims to 
indigenous lands and to bypass any claim to possession by the natives in the 
‘discovered’ lands. In order to acquire indigenous lands, a colonizing state 
need not pretend conquest where war had not been waged, nor rely on the 
rules of war where it had. Instead, the positivist doctrine of effective 
occupation of territory and recognition of such occupation by the ‘Family of 
Nations’ provided the legal mechanism for consolidating territorial 
sovereignty over indigenous lands by the colonizing states. An indigenous 
community’s right to govern itself in its lands, as well as any right not to be 
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conquered except in a ‘just war’, was simply considered outside the 
competency of international law”. 
 
The International Court of Justice, in the Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara stated 
as follows with regard to terra nullius: 
“The expression ‘terra nullius’ was a legal term of art employed in connection 
with ‘occupation’ as one of the accepted legal methods of acquiring 
sovereignty over territory. ‘Occupation’ being legally an original means of 
peaceably acquiring sovereignty over territory otherwise than by cession or 
succession, it is a cardinal condition of a valid ‘occupation’ that the territory 
should be terra nullius – a territory belonging to no-one – at the time of the act 
alleged to constitute the ‘occupation’. . . In the view of the Court, therefore, a 
determination that Western Sahara was a ‘terra nullius’ at the time of 
colonization by Spain would be possible only if it were established that at the 
time the territory belonged to no-one in the sense that it was then open to 
acquisition through the legal process of ‘occupation’” (Western Sahara 
Advisory Opinion, 1975, p. 31). 
 
Subsequently, the Australian High Court in Mabo vs Queensland (1992) stated as 
follows: 
“When British colonists went to other inhabited parts of the world . . . and 
settled there under the protection of the forces of the Crown, so that the Crown 
acquired sovereignty recognized by the European family of nations under the 
enlarged notion of terra nullius, it is necessary for the common law to 
prescribe a doctrine relating to the law to be applied in such colonies, for 
sovereignty imports supreme internal legal authority. . . . The view was taken 
that, when sovereignty of a territory could be acquired under the enlarged 
notion of terra nullius, for the purposes of the municipal law that territory 
(though inhabited) could be treated as a ‘desert uninhabited’ country. The 
hypothesis being that there was no local law already in existence in the 
territory . . . the law of England became the law of the territory” (Mabo vs 
Queensland, 1992, p. 17). 
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The Australian High Court further held: 
“Ex hypothesi, the indigenous inhabitants of a settled colony had no 
recognised sovereign, else the territory could have been acquired only by 
conquest or cession. The indigenous people of a settled colony was thus taken 
to be without laws, without a sovereign and primitive in their social 
organization” (Mabovs Queensland, 1992, p. 17). 
 
While Perkins (nd, p. 4) was of the opinion that this doctrine was employed in SA, he 
considered the doctrine of terra nullius to be: 
“culturally arrogant in that it presupposes that land which is not developed or 
used as a European would use it is undeveloped or unpopulated”.21 
 
From the above, it is clear that the doctrine assumed that as there appeared to be no 
visible form of law there was none, thereby ensuring that the law of the colonising 
power took precedence. The laws of the IPs were side-lined as being “uncivilised” 
and with it their claims to the land. Phillip (nd), as quoted by Bank (1997, p. 263), 
stated that:  
“‘the poor natives . . . were deprived of their country’ and reduced from ‘a 
state of independence . . . to the miseries of slavery’.” 
 
It is apparent that the IPs of the Cape were treated in much the same way as IPs in any 
other colonised country. Bank (1997, p. 269) noted that, at the Cape, the “concept of 
‘ownership rights’ was defined according to the exclusive and individualistic precepts 
of European and Roman-Dutch law as ‘the exclusive, discretionary control that a 
person exercises over the external things of this world, without anybody else having 
claims thereto’. The fragmented, nomadic nature of Khoikhoi society and the alleged 
absence of any indigenous notions of property provided the substance for a legal 
variant of the Myth of the Vacant Land”.  
 
It seems that the English continued this discriminatory practice when they came to 
power, (Bank, 1997, p. 274 – 279) which continued during Apartheid. Unfortunately, 
it is still not quite settled as evidenced when the Deputy Minister of Agriculture 
                                                 
21
See also: Bennett and Powell (1999, p. 449) 
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(Mulder of the Freedom Front Plus) stated that “black people had no claim to 40% of 
South Africa” (Marks, 2012). Marks (2012) concluded that it was “shaming that the 
minister and much of his audience should be so ignorant of South Africa’s struggle 
over land”. While the doctrine of terra nullius was applied in SA, the effect of it has 
not been effectively eradicated. 
 
5.4. Doctrine of Native Title 
Related to the doctrine of terra nullius is the doctrine of Native Title which has also 
been referred to as the doctrine of “Aboriginal Title”. Essentially, as per the Supreme 
Court of Appeals (SCA) in Richtersveld Community and Others vs Alexkor Ltd and 
Another (2003, p. 121) this doctrine operates on the precept that the “antecedent rights 
and interests in land held by indigenous habitants survive the colonisers’ acquisition 
of sovereignty and dominium”. 
 
Reilly (2000, p. 513) indicated that the basis of the doctrine lies “in traditional 
connections to the land”. This seems to be supported by Bennett and Powel (1999, p. 
449) who stated: 
“Aboriginal title (or native title as it is called) is a right to land, one vesting in 
a community that occupied the land at the time of colonisation. Once such a 
title has been established, the claimants may vindicate their land or, if it had 
been expropriated without adequate reimbursement, claim compensation.”  
 
De Villiers (2003, p. 61), on the other hand, described it much more simply as: 
“the right of a community to land based on the maintenance of their traditional 
laws and customs since the time of colonial occupation.” 
 
The first time the doctrine was effectively considered in S African courts was in 
Richtersveld Community and Others vs Alexkor Ltd and Another (2001) where 
Gildenhuys AJ, in the Land Claims Court (LCC) shied away from making a decision 
on its applicability in SA: 
“A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a 
result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled under the 
Constitution, and to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, to restitution 
of that property or to equitable redress. That right forms part of the Bill of 
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Rights. Any court may develop the common law to give effect to the right, to 
the extent that legislation has not already given effect to it. In this case, the 
right to restitution has been given effect to by the Restitution Act. It is no 
longer permissible for this Court to develop the common law to give further or 
better effect to it. 
“On the above analysis, I find that this court has not been given the power to 
develop the common law so as to include the realisation of aboriginal title 
under the so-called doctrine of aboriginal title” (Richtersveld Community and 
Others vs Alexkor Ltd and Another, 2001, p. 1320). 
 
While the learned judge did not feel that the LCC had the jurisdiction to consider the 
doctrine of aboriginal title, he stated that the higher courts did have the jurisdiction to 
consider the applicability of the doctrine. However, on appeal to the SCA, Vivier, 
ADP, after considering the various issues on Native Title, concluded that: 
“In view of my conclusion that a customary law interest . . . has been 
established in the present case, it is not necessary to pursue the matter any 
further and it becomes unnecessary to decide whether our common law should 
be developed to recognise aboriginal rights” (Richtersveld Community and 
Others vs Alexkor Ltd and Another, 2003, p. 123). 
 
As in the LCC, the SCA shied away from effectively recognising the doctrine in S 
African law, as did the Constitutional Court (CC) later. While this is a triumph for 
advocates of the recognition of customary law and customary rights – it would appear 
that there is a lacuna in the law. Once the Restitution of Land Rights Act (1994) 
eventually ceases operation and when there is no customary law remedy available to 
an IP, the courts would in all probability be then faced with the option of introducing 
the doctrine or not – an unnecessary delay has now resulted and the debate on the 
recognition of the doctrine has been prolonged.  
 
In criticising the SCA and CC for not affectively recognising the doctrine of native 
title, Mostert and Fitzpatrick (2005, p. 11) stated: 
“. . . neither the SCA’s description of the Richtersveld community’s interest in 
the land as a ‘customary law interest’ akin to common law ownership, nor the 
CC’s ruling that their rights constituted ownership under indigenous law as 
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part of the ‘amalgam’ of South African law, does much to constitute 
indigenous people and their title to land in terms other than those of national 
sovereignty. National sovereignty . . . still encompasses and pointedly 
subordinates claims to land in terms of indigenous laws. The CC’s acceptance 
of the colonial sovereign’s intervention and the SCA’s reliance upon 
aboriginal title precedent in foreign law to define the customary law interest in 
South African law even strengthens the idea that that some kind of 
questionable prerogative power of the state exists against which exclusivity 
and effectiveness of holding territory must be assessed. For those outside or on 
the margins of the sovereign’s law, this is a lost battle.” 
 
Barry (2004, p. 375) had foreseen problems with the doctrine in particular for land 
restitution claims: 
“. . . the doctrine of aboriginal title has been developed in former British 
colonies that were settler societies, countries where aboriginal peoples today 
comprise a minority of the population. Title claims are made against 
governments that are still dominated by the descendants of the original 
settlers, governments that at least serve as a reasonable stand-in for the 
colonial government. A plausible claim can be made that benefits derived 
from the wrongful acquisition of land have passed on to these descendants. In 
the Richtersveld case, the current government was forced to play the part of 
proxy for the racist apartheid government. The government was put in a 
position of defending, or at least explaining away the conduct of the 
colonising powers and of the apartheid regime.” 
 
While it falls beyond the scope of this study to determine whether Barry (2004) has 
been proved right or wrong, it should be noted that if the doctrine is accepted into S 
African law, IPs who had missed the deadlines as per the Restitution of Land Rights 
Act(1994) (discussed below) would not be precluded from claiming restitution of their 
rights to their traditional lands. De Villiers (2003, p. 61) stated: 
“For dispossessed people in South Africa the recognition of native title may 
provide a remedy in instances where they do not qualify for restitution under 
the Restitution Act”. 
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It is interesting to note that while the courts have shied away from pronouncing on the 
applicability of the Doctrine of Native Title in SA, they have not completely rejected 
it or its applicability in SA. It could consider other jurisdictions such as Australia. 
According to Neate (2008), Australia had promulgated a Native Title Act in 1993, 
which created the National Native Title Tribunal which processes claims of Native 
Title.  
 
However, it seems that the doctrine may not be so easy to apply. De Villiers (2003, p. 
61) stated: 
“In order to have the existence of native title determined, a community has to 
show that they are descendants of the people who occupied the land at the time 
of colonisation and that a traditional physical and spiritual connection to 
country is still maintained by adherence to traditional law and custom, even in 
an adapted or modernised form.” 
 
After considering the international development of the doctrine, Bennett and Powel 
(1999, p. 484), on the other hand, concluded that the doctrine already applies in SA. 
The effect of this, according to the authors, is stated as follows: 
“If it is accepted that the state (or one of its organs) does not own a particular 
tract of land that it happens to control, then it will follow that the state may be 
obliged to return the land to the aboriginal titleholder or, possibly even more 
important, account for its past management” (Bennett and Powel, 1999, p. 
485). 
 
Whether the doctrine should apply in SA or not is not a concern of this assessment, 
save to say that should the courts accept the doctrine as being part of S African law, 
then IPs would be able to make use of it to assert their rights to the land without 
having to meet the obligations of the Restitution of Land Rights Act (1994). 
 
5.5. Security of Tenure 
One of the central issues regarding mining is the issue of security of tenure, which, at 
Common Law, vests in the owner of the land or by the person appointed by the 
landowner. Bastida (2001) felt that there is a narrow and wide view of the security of 
tenure. In the narrow sense: 
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“security or a guarantee of mineral tenure has been defined as a reasonable 
legal entitlement for extraction rights after successful completion of the 
exploration phase” (Bastida, 2001, p. 35). 
 
In a wider sense: 
“the term comprise not only the transition between discovery and mining, but 
are expanded to all the phases of the regulation of mining, from acquisition of 
prospecting or exploration through development, to the entire duration of the 
productive life of a mine” (Bastida, 2001, p. 37). 
 
Bastida (2001, p. 37) explained the wider view as follows: 
“Consistent with such a broader interpretation of security of tenure, the World 
Bank in its mining policy guidelines for Latin America has stated that a 
regime of secured tenure ensure that a mineral right, once granted, cannot be 
suspended or revoked except on specified grounds which are clearly set out by 
law, and provides reasonable assurances guaranteeing the continuity of 
operations over the life of the project. An aspect encompassing the continuity 
of operations is related to the ability to transfer the title to any eligible third 
party, and to mortgage the title to raise finance. Those aspects are included 
under the ‘modern concept of security of tenure’, that also encapsulates 
guarantees against expropriation”. 
 
While it is clear that Bastida’s (2001) approach favours those who are investing in a 
mining operation; this definition can be extended to IPs as well. An investor would, 
inter alia, invest in a mining operation, or any aspect thereof, if that investment would 
be protected. In fact, Bastida (2001, p. 43) has stated that security of tenure “is a key 
factor in a legal regime intending to attract private investment. The concept has 
tended to cover a wide spectrum of uncertainties facing those wishing to carry out 
mining projects profitably”.  
 
By affording IPs security of tenure, this grants them freedom from government 
interference and the ability to decide on the exploitation of the mineral resources 
themselves. Whether dealing with IPs or governments, investors would demand 
security of tenure. Unfortunately, IPs would only be able to grant security of tenure if 
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they themselves possess it. Therefore government cannot simply recognise the rights 
of IPs but must pro-actively grant the IPs all the rights that the recognition 
encompasses. With the ability to determine the exploitation of their resources on their 
own terms, this would serve as a recognition of this right to security of tenure.  
 
In this regard Van Rensburg (1962, p. 65) gave an interesting point to consider: 
“There was rarely any idea of personal tenure among the Bantu, and they 
neither understood nor conceded the Boer theory of owning land simply by 
virtue of possession. Indeed, even when Bantu chiefs signed a treaty with 
individual Boers or with Boer leaders, ceding land to them, they never 
regarded the land as having passed from them to the exclusive and permanent 
use and possession of the Boers. They intended to do no more than give the 
Boers the same rights over the land as individual tribesmen had. Of course, 
when the tribesmen came to exercise the rights they imagined they retained 
over the lands occupied by the Boers, the Boers, mistaking their motives, 
resisted the aggression and were in turn attacked by the tribesmen”. 
 
So it would seem that, if Van Rensburg (1962) is to be believed, the IPs did not give 
complete security of tenure to the Boers. The subsequent action of the Government 
via the Native Land Act (1913) seems to attest to this. This Act was the first 
legislation employed to actively deprive IPs of their lands. It therefore seems 
appropriate that the Restitution of Land Rights Act (1994) uses the Native Land Act 
(1913) as the starting point in determining Land Restitution. 
 
Apart from the land being so important to IPs, land also has important implications 
for mining. The benefit of constitutional protection of property rights is that it 
guarantees the right of control over the property especially for the mining industry. As 
Cawood (2004, p. 126) has stated:  
“A property right gives better security of tenure to mine developers than any 
other legal right, such as agreements, authorisations and licences. Because of 
the scale of investment for deep mine development, it is important for 
investors to ensure that security of tenure is guaranteed”. 
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In this regard, Dale (1979, p. 3), in his comparison of various mining laws in different 
jurisdictions, referred to the Roman Law maxim of cuius est solum, eius est ad coelo 
usque ad inferos; that is, the “principle of ownership of land extended up to the 
heavens and down to the depths”. According to Dale (1979, p. 43), this principle was 
also subject to the influence of the royalty and nobility in that there was a “reservation 
of certain minerals to the Crown, but also reservation of the right to mine in certain 
types of feudal land”. 
 
As far as SA was concerned, Dale (1979, p. 73) has reported that, at the time of his 
research, SA had: 
“(a) recognised the ability to separate mineral right holding from the 
ownership of the land itself, and further splitting of rights to different classes 
or types of minerals; 
(b) recognised the further separation of the right to mine from the mineral 
right holding, whether such right to mine be held by the State or by a private 
person, and has in so doing carefully trodden a via media between the interests 
of the State in the mineral wealth country on the one hand, and the interests of 
private ownership and enterprise on the other, granting to private enterprise 
the opportunity of obtaining rights to prospect and mine from the State, and 
thus avoiding the actual nationalisation of the mining industry as such; 
(c) been cautious to avoid disputes between the interests of the miner and the 
surface owner by the common law preference of the mining use of the land; by 
providing proclamation of areas for public digging; by legislating into 
existence special permits, grants and licences, without which activities may 
not be carried out on certain classes of land; and generally by seeking to 
counter-balance the inherently opposed rights of the miner and the surface 
owner”. 
 
In the case of Rocher v Registrar of Deeds (1911, p. 315) Mason J stated: 
“As I understand our law, the owner of the surface of the land is the owner of 
the whole of the land and of all minerals in it; he is the owner of what is above 
and what is below. . . I think it is perfectly clear that the owner of the surface 
is the owner of all the minerals underneath it”. 
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While, as per Chapter 4, the cuius est solum, eius est ad coelo usque ad inferos 
principle no longer applies for mining rights, it does not completely eradicate the need 
for mining companies to seek security of tenure to enable them to effectively engage 
in mining operations. IPs that can prove that they have security of tenure over the land 
would be in a much stronger position when negotiating with a mining company . 
 
Legislation granting security of tenure would now be considered.  
 
5.5.1. Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act 112 of 1991 
This Act was passed by the Apartheid administration prior to the first democratic 
elections and provides for the recognition of IP’s land rights. The Act, in Sections 2 – 
3, deals with conversion of land in certain townships in that the holders of certain 
pieces of land in townships were made owners of the land (Upgrading of Land Tenure 
Rights Act, 1991). In Section 19(1), recognition of the rights of IPs to their lands 
occurred by tribes being given the capacity to take ownership of land and to alienate 
or dispose of it (Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act, 1991). Further, in terms of 
Section 20, a tribe which has control over tribal land could request the Minister of 
Land Affairs to transfer the ownership of the land to the tribe who would then arrange 
for same (Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act, 1991). If the Minister transfers the 
ownership of the land to the tribe, in terms of Section 19(2), the tribes were prevented 
from alienating or disposing the land ten years from the date of commencement of this 
Act, except with the consent of a court (Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act, 1991).  
 
However, in terms of Section 19(2), the court would only grant consent if it was 
satisfied: 
“(a) that the relevant disposal is authorised by a tribal resolution; 
(b) that the relevant disposal is not in conflict with the interests of the 
members of the tribe; and 
(c) that satisfactory alternative residence is available for persons residing on 
the land concerned, if the relevant disposal results in those persons waiving 
their right to the occupation of such land” (Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights 
Act, 1991). 
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While this might sound impressive, it is not clear as to whether this law had an impact 
on the status quo. Such an analysis falls beyond the scope of this analysis; save to say 
that if this Act had been successful, there would have been no need to enact restitution 
legislation.  
 
5.5.2. Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act 31 of 1996 
This Act is a relatively short Act with the stated aim in the Long Title being to 
“provide for the temporary protection of certain rights to and interests in land which 
are not adequately protected by law” (Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act, 
1996). 
 
The Act provides a comprehensive and detailed definition, in Section 1, of an 
informal right to land in that it means: 
“(a) the use of, occupation of, or access to land in terms of –  
(i) any tribal, customary or indigenous law or practice of a tribe; 
(ii) the custom, usage or administrative practice in a particular area or 
community, where the land in question at any time vested in –  
(aa) the South African Development Trust . . . 
(bb) the government of any area for which a legislative assembly was 
established in terms of the Self – Governing Territories Constitution 
Act . . .; or 
(cc) the governments of the former Republics of Transkei, 
Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei; 
(b) the right or interest in land of a beneficiary under a trust arrangement in 
terms of which the trustee is a body or functionary established or appointed by 
or under an Act of Parliament or the holder of a public office; 
(c) beneficial occupation of land for a continuous period of not less than five 
years prior to 31 December 1997; or 
(d) the use or occupation by any person of an erf as if he or she is, in respect of 
that erf, the holder of a right mentioned in . . . the Upgrading of Land Tenure 
Rights Act . .  
but does not include –  
(a) any right or interest of a tenant, labour tenant, sharecropper or employee if 
such right or interest is purely of a contractual nature; and 
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(b) any right or interest based purely on temporary permission granted by the 
owner or lawful occupier of the land in question, on the basis that such 
permission may at any time be withdrawn by such owner or lawful 
occupier” (Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act, 1996) 
 
While the Act, in Section 2(1), provides that “no person may be deprived of any 
informal right to land without his or her consent”, it does, in Section 2(2), recognise 
that this is subject the consent to dispose by the majority of the holders of the right to 
land as well as the provisions of the Expropriation Act(1975) (Interim Protection of 
Informal Land Rights Act, 1996). Section 2(2) of the Act also recognises that a person 
can be deprived of land and the right to the land where the custom and usage of the 
community that holds the land provides for such deprivation (Interim Protection of 
Informal Land Rights Act, 1996). 
 
5.5.3. Security of Tenure under the Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development 
Act (MPRDA) (2002) 
In light of the changes to the S African minerals regime brought about by the 
enactment of the MPRDA (2002), the Act provides for security of tenure in Item 2 of 
Schedule II which has the following objects: 
“(a) ensure that security of tenure is protected in respect of prospecting, 
exploration, mining and production operations which are being undertaken; 
(b) give the holder of an old order right . . . an opportunity to comply with this 
Act; and 
(c) promote equitable access to the nation’s mineral and petroleum resources” 
(MPRDA, 2002). 
 
It is fitting that the MPRDA (2002) makes provision for security of tenure considering 
that it had specifically removed the application of the cuius est solum, eius est ad 
coelo usque ad inferos principle which had formed the basis for many mining 
operations in SA.
22
 
 
                                                 
22
See Chapter 4 for a discussion on the Schedule to the MPRDA (2002) 
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In considering the provisions of Schedule II of the MPRDA (2002), it seems that a real 
attempt has been made to ensure the protection of security of tenure. However, the 
recognition of security of tenure is based on mining companies having the mining 
right once properly converted. There seems to be no recognition of any ownership 
rights in the Schedule. 
 
Bakheit (2005, p. 13) was of the opinion that the MPRDA (2002) places a general 
preference on mining over other land uses. After briefly assessing SA’s mining 
legislation, Bakheit (2005, p. 14) concluded that “the overall common law position 
that mining has precedence over other land uses seems to have been perpetuated, 
albeit benignly restricted, under the MPRDA.” 
 
While this may support the State’s vision of a national sharing in the wealth generated 
from mining, it does not favour IPs who just acquired ownership of their land. 
Further, while an agreement between private individuals would be, for the most part, 
secure; the same cannot be said for the State which, in a democracy, is subject to 
change and which also has the ability to change laws as it sees fit. As Cawood (2004, 
p. 126) suggested: “investors must be reassured that mining can proceed without 
policy uncertainties, which can be regarded as threats, in the form of expropriation, 
groundless indigenous claims and new taxes”. 
 
Unfortunately, in a country that is coming to grips with proper handling of BEE and 
transformation, the eradication of all uncertainties cannot be guaranteed. Each case 
would have to be looked at in its own circumstances. While some companies, such as 
Goldfields, have been rewarded at an early stage with new mining permits for 
complying with BEE and transformation policies (Editorial (a), 2007), others, such as 
Anglo Platinum, have been vilified for non-compliance and have not received mining 
permits quickly (Bailey, 2007, p. 1). So it would seem that if a company prioritises 
and complies with the DMR pre-requisites for BEE and transformation then security 
of tenure would be guaranteed, within the limits of the MPRDA (2002).While this 
would suffice as far as land not belonging to IPs are concerned, this does not bode 
well for land belong to IPs as government has eroded IP’s ownership rights. 
Government should therefore provide a special dispensation to IPs to ensure that they 
have a greater certainty with regard to security of tenure that would assist them when 
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dealing with mining companies. From the above discussion, Bastida’s (2001) wider 
view of security of tenure would be the most favoured option to be followed in SA. 
 
5.6. Restitution of Land  
According to the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (nd, p. 1): 
“Restitution was introduced in South Africa in 1994, with the focus on 
redressing past injustices created as a result of racially based legislation or 
practices. It is closely linked to the need for the redistribution of land and 
tenure reform programme currently underway in South Africa. The aim is to 
implement restitution in such a way as to provide support to the vital process 
of reconciliation, reconstruction and development.” 
 
The White Paper on South African Land Policy (1997) indicated that 1913 was the 
year from which restitution was to be made. As mentioned above, the Native Land Act 
(1913) was the first piece of legislation that deprived IPs of land and became the focal 
point for restitution. 
 
5.6.1. Native Land Act 27 of 1913 
The Native Land Act (1913) prevented “Natives” from buying, hiring or selling land 
from any other person – they could only buy, hire from or sell to another “Native”. A 
“Native”, in terms of Section 1(1)(a) would need to get the permission of the 
Governor-General to transact with a “non-Native” (Native Land Act, 1913). The 
Native Land Act(1913) had even gone so far, in Section 1(1)(b), as to provide that a 
non-“Native” would have to obtain the permission of the Governor-General to 
transact for land in a “Native area” (Native Land Act, 1913). 
 
To seal this issue, the Native Land Act (1913) specifically stated, in Section 1(2), that: 
“. . . no person other than a native shall purchase, hire or in any other manner 
whatever acquire any land in a scheduled native area or enter into any 
agreement or transaction for the purchase, hire or other acquisition, direct or 
indirect, of any such land or of any right thereto or interest therein or servitude 
thereover, except with the approval of the Governor-General” (Native Land 
Act, 1913). 
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To ensure compliance with the Native Land Act (1913), Section 5(1) provided that 
non-compliance with the Act would result in a criminal prosecution for the 
“perpetrators”; and in terms of Section 5(2), even juristic persons and their officers 
and members were “liable to prosecution and punishment” (Native Land Act, 1913). 
 
It had been reported that although the Native Land Act (1913) was opposed by the S 
African Native National Congress, the forerunner to the African National Congress 
(ANC), the effect of the Native Land Act (1913) as regards land was that “over 80% 
went to the White people, who made up less than 20% of the population” 
(SAHistoryOnline (c), ,nd.). It is very clear that the Native Land Act (1913) was the 
fore-runner of the various Group Areas Acts (see Chapter 4); which had restricted the 
Black races to specified areas in the country. With this kind of deprivation of land 
(and the access thereto) from such an early part SA’s history, it is understandable that 
land issues would play a prominent role in the minds of the new government in 1994 
and the Native Land Act (1913) became the focal point for restitution. 
 
5.6.2. Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act 108 of 1991 
According to De Villiers (2003, p. 47), this Act was the first step taken by the 
Apartheid administration towards a process of restitution.This Act, in Sections 1 – 80, 
repealed all legislation relating to the restriction of land ownership based on race 
(Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act, 1991). 
 
It then goes on, in Section 81, to establish an Advisory Committee on Non-racial 
Areas Measures which had the following functions, in terms of Section 83: 
“(a) may of its own accord, or . . . at the request of the Minister of Justice, 
investigate and consider any matter relating to the exercise of any power 
conferred upon the State President by this Act;  
(b) may make recommendations to the State President in connection with any 
such matter;  
(c) may, with the approval of the said Minister [of Justice], establish one or 
more sub-committees to inquire into, and to report to the Committee in regard 
to, any matter falling within the scope of the Committee’s functions” 
(Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act, 1991) 
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The Act gives the State President, in Section 87, the power to effect enactments to 
readjust certain laws by repeal, amendment or supplementation (Abolition of Racially 
Based Land Measures Act, 1991). In addition, in terms of Section 98, the majority of 
residents in an area could, with the local authority, draft by-laws relating to the 
election and establishment of neighbourhood committees, overcrowding of residential 
premises, suitability of premises for habitation, repair and maintenance of residential 
premises, use of amenities, etcetera (Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act, 
1991). However, Section 99(1) provides that a by-law that “discriminates on the 
ground of race, colour or religion or is grossly unfair shall be of no force and effect” 
(Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act, 1991). However, Section 99(2) goes 
on to provide that any by-law made under this Act would carry precedence over any 
other law made by the local authority as a law inconsistent with a by-law made under 
this Act would be of “no force and effect to the neighbourhood concerned” (Abolition 
of Racially Based Land Measures Act, 1991). 
 
While a lot of discriminatory legislation has been removed, this Act can assist IPs 
who might find themselves inhibited by discriminatory legislation that has evaded the 
attention of the legislature. 
 
5.6.3. Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 
In light of the above, the most significant legal development after the promulgation of 
the Constitution(1996), in the opinion of the writer, was the promulgation of the 
Restitution of Land Rights Act (1994). The Long Title of the Act states that it is to 
“provide for the restitution of rights in land to persons or communities dispossessed of 
such rights after 19June 1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or 
practices; to establish a Commission on Restitution of Land Rights and a Land Claims 
Court. . .” (Restitution of Land Rights Act, 1994). 
 
Those who had been dispossessed of lands by discriminatory legislation would be 
able to use this legislation to reclaim their land. At the outset, it must be pointed out 
that “right in land” is defined, in Section 1, as:  
“any right in land whether registered or unregistered, and may include the 
interest of a   labour tenant and sharecropper, a customary law interest, the 
interest of a beneficiary under a trust arrangement and beneficial occupation 
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for a continuous period of not less than 10 years prior to the dispossession in 
question” (Restitution of Land Rights Act, 1994). 
 
Further to this definition, the Act makes a distinction, in Section 1, between 
“restitution” and “restoration” of a right in land as follows: 
“Restitution of a right in land” was defined as: 
“(a) the restoration of aright in land; or 
  (b) equitable redress” 
and 
“Restoration of a right in land” was defined as: 
“the return of a right in land or a portion of land dispossessed after 19 June, 
1913 as a    result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices” 
(Restitution of Land Rights Act, 1994). 
 
As such, “restitution” is much wider than “restoration” in that “restoration” would 
entail just a return of the right in land while “restitution” entails restoration or 
equitable redress, whichever is applicable to the case at hand. The Restitution of Land 
Rights Act (1994) sets out, in Section 2, who was entitled to claim for restitution of a 
right in land; namely: 
- a person or deceased estate that was dispossessed of a right in land after 19th 
June 1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices; 
- a direct descendent of such a person; 
- community or part of a community so dispossessed. 
 
These persons, however, did not have an unlimited time to lodge claims for restitution 
of land rights. Section 2(1)(e) of the Restitution of Land Rights Act (1994) required all 
applications to be lodged by 31
st
 December 1998. Further, it should be noted that, in 
terms of Section 2(2) those who have been dispossessed but have received “just and 
equitable compensation” or “any other consideration that is just and equitable”, did 
not have a claim under the Act. As a result, this Act only applied to those who have 
been dispossessed and have not been adequately compensated or had no 
compensation. Also, it seems that Section 1 provided that only the actions of the State 
or any public institution is covered by the Act (Restitution of Land Rights Act, 1994). 
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So, only if a person had been deprived by some sort of State action, would they have 
been entitled to lodge a claim in terms of the Act.  
 
Where a community is involved, the Act provides in Section 42D(2), that the 
agreement “must provide for all the members of the dispossessed community to have 
access to the land or the compensation in question, on a basis which is fair and non-
discriminatory towards any person . . . and which ensures that accountability of the 
person who holds the land or compensation on behalf of such community to the 
members of the community” (Restitution of Land Rights Act, 1994).  
 
While the Restitution of Land Rights Act (1994) had been used successfully by the 
Richtersveld Community;
23
 not all IPs were so lucky. The Pniel community seems to 
be one such unlucky community where they felt that they were being subjected to 
unnecessary delays by government officials, while the land officials felt that they had 
to work carefully to avoid land grabs by unscrupulous persons(Jordan, 2007).  
 
In addition, in expressing the problems with the land restitution programme, the 
editorial of the Financial Mail states: 
“Most white farmers do not behave illegally, and resent being tarred by 
generalisations. In any case, many of them are prepared to give up their land, 
but the obstacle is often the state’s incapacity to effect transfer and productive 
use of the land, rather than price or political resistance” (Editorial (b), 2007). 
 
This is, in part, confirmed by the Groenewald (2007) who reported that the State will 
not be able to meet the target of distributing 30% of SA’s land to black people by 
2014.
24
 In addition, while Groenewald (2007) highlighted the impediments created by 
rising property prices, she reported that the Director-General of the Department of 
Land Affairs had stated that “the only viable option, short of outright nationalisation 
of land, will be to reconsider the target by changing either the extent of land or the 
time or both”.  
                                                 
23
 See Chapter 7 below 
24
See also: Groenewald (2010) 
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While there have been subsequent calls by the ANC Youth League for the 
nationalisation of the mining industry (Malema, 2009),
25
 the writer is of the opinion 
that prudence would suggest that any form of nationalisation would not be 
appropriate, especially as it would impact on security of tenure. Diliza (nd), a Chief 
Executive of the Chamber of Mines, as quoted by Letsoalo (2009), stated: 
 “The calls for nationalisation must be reasonable, not ideological”. 
 
While the Restitution of Land Rights Act(1994) is a controversial piece of legislation, 
it seems to be the only acceptable attempt at reversing the land deprivation of IPs. As 
Gutto (2007) had stated: 
“The bottom line is that colonialism and apartheid rendered the majority of 
black people non-citizens by depriving them of meaningful connections with 
the land – they lost their sovereignty, dignity and identity. The land question 
in South Africa must address itself to this historical reality if genuine 
reconciliation and national cohesion are to be realised.” 
 
However, in voicing his objection to the creation of “second-class land rights” by the 
placing of unilateral restrictions on the title deeds of beneficiary communities of the 
land restitution process, Harding (2007) stated: 
“It is disturbing that our nascent democracy is not affronted by the creation of 
a new generation of second-class land rights, which perpetuate paternalistic 
racial relationships imported into our society by colonialism. It is this 
confusion that is the heart of many disputes between mining companies and 
communities, based on inappropriate interventions by department officials, 
and it does not bode well for future political and economic stability in rural 
areas.”  
 
A Landless Peoples Movement (LPM) had been formed by those who had been 
dispossessed to ensure that their rights are protected and enforced (Greenberg, 2004).  
Whether IPs are part of this is moot at this point in time though they may feel that 
much aggrieved that they might wish to join. However, the effectiveness of this 
                                                 
25
See also: Sergeant (2009) for an analysis of the effect of nationalisation on investment. 
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movement is still to be determined as they themselves realise that they do not have an 
easy job ahead: 
“The LPM and allied movements are engaging in this historical process 
against overwhelming odds. A new capitalist hegemony has entrenched itself 
in post-apartheid South Africa, and the process of overcoming this will 
involve long, difficult and painstaking work to rebuild popular struggle against 
capitalist exploitation and the attendant expressions of racial, gender and other 
forms of oppression and exclusion that are constantly reproduced by it.” 
(Greenberg, 2004, p. 34)   
 
While the IPs may be included in the LPM, they would still be forming part of a 
larger unit. Will their interests play second fiddle to the interests of other landless 
peoples? At this time, this is not very clear, save to say that if this proves to be true, 
then IPs, as minorities, would find themselves being marginalised once again.  
 
It is reported that the Centre for Development and Enterprise (CDE) has stated that at 
least 50% of land reform projects to be abject failures (Van Schalkwyk, 2008).The 
CDE report sketches two scenarios for the future of land reform. The first, titled 
“Nobody Wins”, is where the “public and private sectors have good intentions 
towards each other, but limited capacity and a misreading of the situation leads to 
serious difficulties” (CDE, 2008). The second scenario, titled “Everybody Loses”, 
“assumes worsening relationships and increasing demands on the state to act by 
undercutting land markets, by setting much higher targets, and by adopting a much 
more unilateral state-led approach in general” (CDE, 2008).   
 
The editor of the CDE report, Bernstein (2008), stated: 
“Instead, the slow pace of processing and settling the remaining claims 
appears to be largely attributable to two factors: lack of skills and a serious 
mismatch between the value of the land under claim and the land-restitution 
budget. Many officials know far too little about the realities of agriculture to 
be effective. . . Incorrect, racially tinged assumptions, low budgets and low 
capacity all look alarmingly like the beginning of a Zimbabwe-style approach 
to land issues. We need to change the course. The Centre for Development and 
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Enterprise is calling for urgent action to get restitution – and the whole land-
reform process – back on track”. 
 
The CDE report has however sparked an angry retort from the Acting Chief Land 
Claims Commissioner who is reported as stating: 
“The trajectory of the (CDE) report seems to be saying black people should 
not have anything to do with land and agriculture, and should instead leave it 
to the whites” (Jordan, 2008). 
 
This retort is unfortunate in that it reduces constructive criticisms to an argument 
along racial lines. It diverts attention from the problem at hand and, while it deflects 
criticism in the short term, it does not solve the underlying problem. It would be more 
constructive to look at the issues raised and consider options to alleviate the problems 
or set out the impediments that hinder solving the issues raised. It is imperative that a 
strict control of the restitution process be maintained to ensure the attainment of the 
objectives that are sought to be achieved. A failure could result in a Zimbabwe-style 
land grab in SA. 
 
As was pointed out by Ntsebeza (2007): 
“One important lesson to draw from Zimbabwe’s experience is that land 
inequality that is rooted in colonial conquest and violent dispossession does 
not easily melt away. A closely related lesson is the need to address the land 
question proactively and democratically to avert . . . ‘a crisis of the first 
order’”26 
 
While a Zimbabwe-style land grab should be avoided at all costs, perhaps it is best to 
step away from arguments on Apartheid and look at how the effects of Apartheid can 
be eradicated. However, this may be easier said than done.In arguing that Apartheid is 
still alive, Desmond (2008) stated: 
“Since 1994 more people . . . have been evicted from white farms than have 
won land claims. And whites, with the support of our ultraliberal Constitution, 
                                                 
26
The land grab by the Zimbabwe war veterans falls beyond the scope of this analysis 
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still lay claim to the ownership of about 60-million hectares of land that was 
originally stolen from the indigenous population.” 
 
Desmond (2008), similarly to Ntsebeza (2007), seemed to lay the blame on the 
Constitution (1996), which the writer feels is wrong, especially when, as indicated 
above, there seems to be failings on the part of government. While initially there were 
many hardships one cannot and should not write off the entire process nor seek blame 
unnecessarily – the problems need to be identified and sorted out (Newmarch, 2007). 
 
5.6.4. Communal Property Associations Act 28 of 1996 
In addition to the Restitution of Land Rights Act (1994), the Communal Property 
Associations Act (CPAA) (1996), in terms of Section 2, applied to a community: 
-  that had been granted restitution by the Land Claims Court on condition that 
an association was to be formed,  
- received property or other assistance from the State on condition that an 
association be formed, 
- to which property has been donated, sold or otherwise disposed by any person 
on condition that an association be formed, with the approval of the Minister 
of Land Affairs; 
- that is acquiring land or acquiring rights in land and wishes to form an 
association with the approval of the Minister of Land Affairs. 
 
In terms of Section 5(1), a community could apply to the Director-General of Land 
Affairs for the registration of a provisional association (CPAA, 1996). The 
provisional association, in terms of Section 5(4), once registered: 
“may acquire a right to occupy and use land for a period of 12 months from 
the date of registration”, may not alienate any right in land and would become 
a “juristic person with the capacity to sue or be sued” (CPAA, 1996). 
 
It seems that, in terms of Sections 6 – 7, the provisional association would have to 
have a constitution to regulate its affairs which had to comply with the following 
principles in terms of Section 9: 
- fair and inclusive decision-making processes, 
- equality of membership, 
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- fair access to the property of the association, 
- accountability and transparency (CPAA, 1996). 
 
The Director-General is empowered, in terms of Section 11, to monitor compliance of 
the association with its constitution and the CPAA (1996). As such, this Act, with the 
Restitution of Land Rights Act (1994), would ensure that IPs with valid claims would 
be assured of restitution. However, this Act would subject IPs to the will of the state, 
in that they will not be able to act as they see fit as regards their land – their 
independence is curtailed. It could be argued that this would protect the IPs from 
unscrupulous persons; however, these provisions would not be sufficient. Apart from 
merely providing legal protections, the State should provide education to equip IPs to 
effectively utilise the land using modern techniques. 
 
It is interesting that, according to the Restitution of Land Rights Act (1994), land that 
is acquired or expropriated for restoring to a claimant, in terms of Section 42A, “vests 
in the State, which must transfer it to the claimant” (CPAA, 1996). So a claimant 
would not receive the land immediately but would wait for it to be transferred to the 
State first and then to themselves. From the above, it would appear that the CPAA 
(1996) was the reason for such provision in the Restitution of Land Rights Act (1994). 
 
5.7. Expropriation of Land 
5.7.1. Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 
The Expropriation Act (1975) governs expropriation in SA and, in terms of Section 2, 
grants the Minister of Public Works the right to expropriate property for public 
purposes “subject to the obligation to pay compensation”. It appears that no 
expropriation can take place without compensation and that all expropriations in 
terms of this Act would have to occur via the office of the Minister of Public Works. 
 
The owner of the property to be expropriated, in terms of Section 9, has to give a 
written statement to the Minister indicating: whether or not he accepts the offered 
compensation, the amount he claims as compensation if no compensation is offered, 
full particulars of improvements to the property which in the owner’s opinion would 
affect the value of the land, change of address (Expropriation Act, 1975). 
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The Minister, in terms of Section 9(3), is empowered to request for the title deed to 
the immovable property and may offer compensation for the expropriation, in terms 
of Sections 10 - 11(Expropriation Act, 1975). The amount of the compensation, in 
terms of Section 12(1), may not exceed: 
(a) the amount that the property would obtain if sold on the open market on a 
willing seller willing buyer basis; and 
(b) the amount to make good the actual financial loss caused by the expropriation 
(Expropriation Act, 1975) 
 
Section 12(1) also provides that Compensation could be determined by reference to 
the improvements made, with a supplementation, in terms of Section 12(2) being 
added under certain circumstances (Expropriation Act, 1975).Section 12(5) provides a 
set of rules that are applicable in determining the amount of compensation 
(Expropriation Act, 1975). 
 
In the absence of any agreement, Section 14 provides that compensation can be 
determined by the High Court. Further, in terms of Section 23, expropriation can be 
withdrawn if the Minister is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to withdraw 
the expropriation (Expropriation Act, 1975). 
 
As pointed out above, Ntsebeza (2007) postulated for State expropriation of land to 
boost restitution.
27
 However, he was not the only one who called for expropriation. 
Speaking on the agricultural sector, Jara (2005) also argued for expropriation though 
he did not advocate it in isolation. He stated: 
“The country needs targeted policy reform advocacy and litigation. We could 
then witness well-argued constitutional challenges to the anti-poor 
jurisprudence established by the Land Claims Court. However, expropriation 
for its own sake is not sufficient to make another countryside possible. It must 
be part of a broader strategy to transform agriculture and develop rural areas. 
If this is not done, land reform may redistribute land only to isolated islands of 
beneficiaries in a sea of hostile white commercial farms”(Jara, 2005). 
 
                                                 
27
See also: Carter, (2005) 
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It may be debateable as to whether his opinion has actually materialised or not, 
though it seems that the proposed Expropriation Bill may cater for some of his 
concerns. According to the Preamble of the Bill, the Bill is to ensure: 
 “• equitable access to all South Africa’s natural resources; 
• that there is a framework for expropriation of property, including land; 
• the expropriation of property in the public interest or for public purposes, 
subject to just and equitable compensation; and 
• the respect of the rights of everyone including the rights of access to court 
and other forums and to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair” (Expropriation Bill). 
 
While this may seem to be admirable sentiments, there is a lot of ill-will harboured 
against the Bill. While the Minister of Agriculture had claimed in a Parliamentary 
Statement (2008) that the Bill will be in the public interest; it is reported that the 
Minister “has blamed white land owners for abusing the willing buyer, willing seller 
principle by demanding exorbitant prices for land, while the land claims commission 
has accused land owners of ‘giving it the run around’ in reaching acquisition 
agreements” (Blom, 2008).  
 
On the other hand, Blom (2008) further reported that the problems seemed to be 
related to “inadequacies in the way the land claims commission has gone about the 
validation and verification of land claims”. This is later reiterated by the Business Day 
(Editorial BD, 2008) which commented that by “preferring a drastic measure, which 
expropriation has always been, to a negotiated settlement, which is the South African 
way, the government betrays a desperation to obfuscate the inadequacies of its 
administration.”28 
 
Whatever the reason for government requiring the Expropriation Bill, it can be seen 
that the Bill does not enjoy support. Perhaps the harshest criticism for the Bill is from 
the Business Day: 
“Public Works Minister Thoko Didiza’s proposed new expropriation law 
would be a dangerous piece of legislation if enacted, not only to the equitable 
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See also: Hofstatter, (a) (2008) 
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administration of land reform, but also to the sovereignty of property 
ownership that is every citizen’s inalienable right” (Editorial BD, 2008).29 
 
The objections to the Bill seem to have been successful as the Bill, in 2008, has been 
shelved (Donnelly, 2008).
30
 However, while indications were that in 2010 a re-
introduction was imminent (Mabunga, 2010), this has not been the case. 
 
IPs should be made aware of the expropriation legislation available so that they can be 
assured of a just compensation in the event of an expropriation. It goes without saying 
that if IPs have proved their mineral rights to a particular property and the government 
is unable to effect the transfer of the mineral rights then expropriation rules could 
apply as the IPs are being deprived of the exercise of their mineral  rights. 
 
5.7.2. Expropriation in the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 
(MPRDA) (2002) 
While there has been a lot of support for the MPRDA (2002), an issue that is of 
concern has been whether the Act has expropriated the mineral rights of the 
landowner when it, in Section 3, had reversed the Common Law, in that, the owner of 
the land no longer owned the minerals of his/her land.  
 
Section 55 of the MPRDA (2002) gives the Minister of Mineral Resources the power 
to expropriate property for prospecting or mining and pay compensation for such 
expropriation. In addition, Item 12 of Schedule 2 of the MPRDA (2002) makes 
provision for compensation for expropriation. However, the language seems to create 
the impression that the MPRDA (2002) could not possibly be accused of expropriation 
as Item 12(1) provides: 
“Any person who can prove that his or her property has been expropriated in 
terms of any provision of this Act may claim compensation from the State.” 
 
The rest of Item 12 is as follows: 
 “(2) When claiming compensation, a person must – 
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(a) prove the extent and nature of the actual loss and damage suffered 
by him or her; 
(b) indicate the current use of the property; 
(c) submit proof of ownership of such property; 
(d) give the history of acquisition of the property in question and price 
paid for it; 
(e) detail the nature of such property; 
(f) prove the market value of the property and the manner in which 
such value was determined; and  
(g) indicate the extent of any State assistance and benefits received in 
respect of such property. 
(3) In determining just and equitable compensation all relevant factors must be 
taken into account, including, in addition to sections 25(2) and 25(3) of the 
Constitution –  
(a) the State’s obligation to redress the results of past racial 
discrimination in the allocation of and access to mineral and petroleum 
resources; 
(b) the State’s obligation to bring about reforms to promote equitable 
access to mineral and petroleum resources; 
(c) the provisions of sections 25(8) of the Constitution; and 
(d) whether the person concerned will continue to benefit from the use 
of the property in question or not” (MPRDA, 2002). 
 
This issue came before the High Court in AGRI South Africa v The Minister of 
Minerals and Energy and Annis Mohr Van Rooyen v The Minister of Minerals and 
Energy (2010).In this case, Hartzenberg J had to consider whether the MPRDA (2002) 
constituted an expropriation of the mineral rights of AGRI SA. Hartzenberg J stated 
the Common Law position as follows: 
“Prior to 1 May 2004 mineral rights in respect of property formed part of the 
rights of the landowner. It was possible, however, to sever the mineral rights 
and the surface rights and third parties could and did become the holders of the 
mineral rights. Such rights were freely transferable and were valuable assets” 
(South Africa v The Minister of Minerals and Energy and Annis Mohr Van 
Rooyen v The Minister of Minerals and Energy, 2010, p. 110). 
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 After considering various cases, Hartzenberg J stated further that: 
“It is evident that the holder of the mineral rights was under no obligation to 
exploit the rights. He could keep it for as long as he wished. He could 
bequeath it to his heirs. He could sell it. The State could not force him to start 
with the exploration of the minerals even if it would be to the public benefit. 
The advantage to individuals was that they could own valuable rights which 
they in many cases would be unable to exploit but which they could sell to 
mining houses or others for handsome amounts” (South Africa v The Minister 
of Minerals and Energy and Annis Mohr Van Rooyen v The Minister of 
Minerals and Energy, 2010, p. 111). 
 
He thereupon concluded that: 
“But for the further provisions under the heading ‘Transitional Arrangements’ 
contained in Schedule II to the Act that gives certain rights to the holders of 
‘old order rights’ and in particular to the holders of ‘unused old order rights’, 
the effect of the Act would have been to extinguish all those rights. Such an 
expropriation would have been effected without provision for compensation. 
That would clearly offend the provisions of section 25 of the Constitution and 
would have rendered the Act unconstitutional” (South Africa v The Minister of 
Minerals and Energy and Annis Mohr Van Rooyen v The Minister of Minerals 
and Energy, 2010, p. 112). 
 
In this vein, he further stated: 
“. . . there were many holders of mineral rights with commercial value, before 
the commencement of the Act. But for the transitional arrangements those 
rights are not recognised in the Act, at all. Apart from the plaintiffs in these 
matters, I believe that many holders of other old order rights have not been 
expropriated in terms of section 55(1) of the Act. Except to the extent that the 
transitional arrangements afford some relief to them, those rights have been 
extinguished by the coming into operation of the Act. Not only have those 
rights been extinguished by the Act but the State is now at liberty and obliged 
to administer those rights” (South Africa v The Minister of Minerals and 
Energy and Annis Mohr Van Rooyen v The Minister of Minerals and Energy, 
2010, p. 114). 
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The conclusion of Hartzenberg J is clear: 
“In short it is my interpretation of the Act that it admits that holders will be 
deprived of their rights and that such deprivation coupled with the State’s 
assumption of custody and administration of those rights constitute 
expropriation thereof” (South Africa v The Minister of Minerals and Energy 
and Annis Mohr Van Rooyen v The Minister of Minerals and Energy, 2010, p. 
114). 
 
This judgment, obviously, placed the MPRDA (2002) and its reforms in issue. Leon 
(2009) commented as follows as regards the judgment: 
“. . . the court’s findings are potentially troubling for the government. First, the 
government’s position that the act did not cause an expropriation of privately 
owned common law mineral rights has been found legally wanting. Second, 
the door has been opened judicially for substantial expropriation claims 
against the state by farmers and other holders of unused old-order rights. 
Third, the act’s institution of a system of state custodianship for mineral rights 
does not appear to have let the government off the expropriation hook.”  
 
5.8. Other Legislation 
There are other legislation that impact on land in SA. 
 
5.8.1. Land Affairs Act 101 of 1987 
This Act is a short Act and primarily establishes the Land Affairs Board, in Section 2, 
which has the basic function, in terms of Section 6(1) to “determine the amounts of 
compensation, purchase price or rents payable in respect of immovable property 
which is expropriated, purchased or leased by the department [of Public Works and 
Land Affairs] . . .” (Land Affairs Act, 1987). 
 
In terms of Section 6(2), the Land Affairs Board could also advise other Ministers, 
other State Departments and other bodies on: 
“(a) the value of land and the rights on or in respect of land; 
(b) amounts of compensation, purchase prices, rents or other amounts which in 
the opinion of the board ought to be paid when immovable property is 
expropriated, or a right to use such property temporarily is taken, or such 
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property is purchased or otherwise acquired or leased, by any such Minister, 
department, Administration or body; and 
(c) the amounts which in the opinion of the board ought to be paid when 
immovable property is alienated, let or otherwise disposed of by any such 
Minister, department, Administration or body” (Land Affairs Act, 1987). 
 
With this broad mandate, IPs and IP organisations could also make use of the Board’s 
services to determine the appropriate compensation that would be applicable. Further, 
they could use the past decisions of the Board as a means to determine what the Board 
would consider to be reasonable compensation. 
 
5.8.2. Development Facilitation Act 67 of 1995 
The Long Title of the Act states that the Act is to, inter alia, “introduce extraordinary 
measures to facilitate and speed up the implementation of reconstruction and 
development programmes and projects in relation to land; and in so doing to lay down 
general principles governing land development throughout the Republic . . .” 
(Development Facilitation Act, 1995). 
 
The principles, alluded to in the Long Title of the Act, are contained in Section 3(1) 
and include the following: 
 “. . .  
(b) Policy, administrative practices and laws should discourage the illegal 
occupation of land, with due recognition of informal land development 
processes.  
. . .  
(d) Members of communities affected by land development should actively 
participate in the process of land development.  
(e) The skills and capacities of disadvantaged persons involved in land 
development should be developed. . . .  
(h) Policy, administrative practice and laws should promote sustainable land 
development at the required scale in that they should – 
(i) promote land development which is within the fiscal, institutional 
and administrative means of the Republic; 
(ii) promote the establishment of viable communities;  
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(iii) promote sustained protection of the environment;  
(iv) meet the basic needs of all citizens in an affordable way;  
(v) ensure the safe utilisation of land by taking into consideration 
factors such as geological formations and hazardous undermined areas.  
. . .  
(k) Land development should result in security of tenure, provide for the 
widest possible range of tenure alternatives, including individual and 
communal tenure, and in cases where land development takes the form of 
upgrading an existing settlement, not deprive beneficial occupiers of homes or 
land or, where it is necessary for land or homes occupied by them to be 
utilised for other purposes, their interests in such land or homes should be 
reasonably accommodated in some other manner . . .” (Development 
Facilitation Act, 1995). 
 
The Minister of Land Affairs and the Premier of a province are also given the 
authority, in terms of Sections 3(2) and 3(3), to prescribe other principles so long as 
those new principles are consistent with the Section 3(1) principles (Development 
Facilitation Act, 1995). General principles for decision-making and conflict resolution 
are also prescribed in Sections 4, 16 and 24 (Development Facilitation Act, 1995). 
While IPs could use this Act to develop their lands, it is unfortunate that they would 
require some form of legal knowledge to be able to efficiently implement this Act for 
their benefit. 
 
5.8.3. Communal Land Rights Act 11 of 2004 
Communal land is defined in Section 1 as land “which is, or is to be, occupied or used 
by members of a community subject to the rules or custom of that community” 
(Communal Land Rights Act, 2004). 
 
This Act, similarly to the MPRDA (2002), also makes reference to new and old order 
rights. However, in this Act the new order rights, in terms of Section 1, are defined as 
being “a tenure or other right in communal or other land which has been confirmed, 
converted, conferred or validated by the Minister [of Land Affairs] . . .” (Communal 
Land Rights Act, 2004). 
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The definition of an old order right, in Section 1, though is much more detailed: 
“a tenure or other right in or to communal land which –  
(c) is formal or informal; 
(d) is registered or unregistered; 
(e) derives from or is recognised by law, including customary law, practice or 
usage; and 
(f) exists immediately prior to a determination by the Minister . . . but does 
not include –  
(i) any right or interest of a tenant, labour tenant, sharecropper or 
employee if such right or interest is purely of a contractual nature; 
and 
(ii) any right or interest based purely on temporary permission granted by 
the owner or lawful occupier of the land in question, on the basis 
that such permission may at any time be withdrawn by such owner 
or lawful occupier” (Communal Land Rights Act, 2004). 
 
Section 19(1) provides that a community whose communal land is, or is to be 
registered, must make and adopt community rules. These rules must, in terms of 
Section 19(2), regulate the following: 
“(a) the administration and use of communal land by the community as land 
owner within the framework of law governing spatial planning and local 
government; 
(b) such matters as may be prescribed; and  
(c) any matter considered by the community to be necessary” (Communal 
Land Rights Act, 2004). 
 
While these community rules are subject to any other applicable law, in terms of 
Section 19(3), they are binding on the community and its members “and must be 
accessible to the public and are on registration deemed to be a matter of public 
knowledge” (Communal Land Rights Act, 2004). While Section 19(2) refers to “any 
other applicable law” it, in terms of Section 19(4), does specifically state that the 
community must comply with the Constitution and the Communal Land Rights Act 
(Communal Land Rights Act, 2004). 
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With the registration of these community rules, in terms of Section 3, the community 
acquires a juristic personality which entitles the community to: 
“(a) acquire and hold rights and incur obligations; and 
(b) own, encumber by mortgage, servitude or otherwise deal with such 
property subject to any title or other conditions” (Communal Land Rights Act, 
2004). 
 
An interesting development in this Act is that Section 4(1) provides the community or 
person “either to tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress if the tenure 
of land of such community or person is legally insecure as a result of past racially 
discriminatory laws or practices” (Communal Land Rights Act, 2004). This seems to 
be a wide-reaching provision, though it provides for a better security of tenure subject 
to the available resources of the State. 
 
Another positive development is the provision encapsulated in Section 4(3), that a 
woman “is entitled to the same legally secure tenure, rights in or to land and benefits 
from land as is a man, and no law, community or other rule, practice or usage may 
discriminate against any person on the ground of the gender of such person” 
(Communal Land Rights Act, 2004). 
 
Section 5 provides that communal land and new order rights are capable of being 
registered (Communal Land Rights Act, 2004). However, the Section goes further and 
states that these rights must be registered in the “name of the community or person, 
including a woman, entitled to such land or right in terms of this Act and the relevant 
community rules” (Communal Land Rights Act, 2004). The rest of the Section and 
Chapter (Sections 5(2) – 11) provides for security of tenure and title to the community 
or person concerned (Communal Land Rights Act, 2004). 
 
A holder of an old order right, which is unsecured, may apply to the Minister of Land 
Affairs, in terms of Section 12, for “comparable redress” (Communal Land Rights 
Act, 2004). The Section continues that this “comparable redress” would entail 
alternate land, monetary or other compensation or both alternate land and 
compensation (Communal Land Rights Act, 2004). Further, in terms of Section 13, it 
seems that the Minister may cancel an old order right if he has the written agreement 
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of the holder of the old order right including any agreed condition (Communal Land 
Rights Act, 2004). 
 
Prior to providing security of tenure in terms of Section 4, transferring communal land 
to a community or person in terms of Section 6 or determining the Section 12 
comparable redress, the Minister has to institute a land rights enquiry in terms of 
Section 14(1). This enquiry, in terms of Section 14(2), must enquire into: 
 “(a) the nature and extent of all –  
(i) constitutional and human; 
(ii) old order and other land and tenure; and 
(iii) competing and conflicting, 
rights, interests and tenure of land, whether legally secure or not which are or 
may be affected by such enquiry; 
(b) the interests of the State; 
(c) the options available for legally securing any legally insecure rights; 
(d) the provision of access to land on an equitable basis; 
(e) spatial planning and land use management, land development, and the 
necessity for conducting a development or a de – densification or other land 
reform programme, and the nature of such programme; 
(f) the need for comparable redress and the nature and extent of such redress; 
(g) the measure required to ensure compliance with section 4 and to promote 
gender equality in the allocation, registration and exercise of new order rights; 
(h) any matter relevant to a determination to be made by the Minister in terms 
of section 18; 
(i) any other matter as prescribed or as instructed by the Minister, 
And must endeavour to resolve any dispute relating to land and rights in, or to, 
land and a report on such matters must be submitted to the Minister 
(Communal Land Rights Act, 2004). 
 
A Land Rights Board is established, in terms of Section 25, to inter alia, in terms of 
Section 28, provide advice on sustainable land ownership and use, the development of 
land and the provision of land on an equitable basis; monitor compliance with the 
Constitution and this Act.  
 
 149 
5.9. Conclusion 
Land, and access to land, is of vital importance to IPs and any attempt to assist IPs, 
especially for the mining industry, should demonstrate an appreciation of the 
relationship between IPs and their land. Granting security of tenure in land to IPs 
would secure their rights when negotiating with mining companies. Although IPs’ 
land had been colonised and the Native Land Act (1913) had deprived IPs of their 
land, initiatives post-1994 seem to secure IPs’ rights to their land. 
 
The land legislation in SA is a complex one and there is a need for some consolidation 
to ensure an eradication of confusion and to minimise land use conflicts. There can be 
no doubt that IPs would be able to use the legal avenues to enforce their rights to 
land.
31
 This could be placing legal remedies out of the reach of IPs in that they would 
depend on an interpretation of the necessary legislation to obtain the necessary 
protections.  
 
Closely related to the issue of land, though providing better consideration of IPs and 
their rights, is that of Sustainable Development, which would be considered in the 
next chapter. 
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See: Cotula, L and Mathieu P (2008), on the legal empowerment of IPs with regard to land rights. 
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Chapter Six 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (SD) 
 
6.1. Introduction 
The previous Chapter dealt with the issue of land, its importance to IPs and the 
various applicable legislations. This Chapter would consider the concept of 
Sustainable Development (SD) and its relevance to the mining industry. Although a 
relatively new concept, its implementation, and the manner thereof is very much 
contentious, especially between the mining industry and the various regulators in the 
various jurisdictions. As Pring, et al ((a) 1999, p. 39) stated: 
“The biggest new trend faced by mining and other economic development 
efforts is the reorientation of international and national laws and regulatory 
frameworks to comply with the new paradigm of ‘sustainable development’. 
 
Mining has various positive aspects (such as the development of the economy, 
providing employment and promotion of infrastructure development); and negative 
impacts as well (such as destruction of land and vegetation, water pollution and air 
pollution).
32
 The Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining Sustainable Minerals 
Institute identifies the positive and negative aspects of mining as follows: 
“On the positive side of the ledger, mines can stimulate economic activity, 
create local opportunities, and deliver significant improvements on 
infrastructure and services. On the negative side, impacts can include; adverse 
effects on the lifestyle and amenity of nearby residents; strains on the local 
‘social fabric’; damage to the natural resources of an area; and distortion of the 
operations of local housing and labour market” (Centre for Social 
Responsibility in Mining Sustainable Minerals Institute, 2005, p. 4). 
 
Although SD can be seen as a way of reversing the negative impacts of mining and 
highlighting the positive aspects; it also incorporates IPs affected by mining as being 
an integral part of a company’s SD obligations and the company’s relations with IPs. 
However, the Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development project (MMSD (a), 
                                                 
32
See, for example, Mpofu (2009) 
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2002, p. 17) advanced the following argument for the mining industry getting 
involved in SD issues: 
“Perhaps the greatest challenge of all is the fact that past practices and social 
and environmental legacies, combined with continuing examples of poor 
performance and inadequate accountability, have undermined trust among 
companies, governments, and some in civil society. The public’s perception of 
what industry is doing is often very different from what company managers 
think they are doing. As far as some observers outside the industry are 
concerned, companies have been resisting or at best offering only token 
improvements: they are seen as failing to meet rising standards of 
accountability, transparency, and participation”. 
 
However, the all-encompassing nature of SD could result in IPs’ interests have 
become entwined with the broader aspect of SD and their interests may have become 
diluted thereby as mining companies concentrate on SD as a whole, resulting in less 
attention being given to IPs. 
 
6.2. Definition of Sustainable Development 
Seeing that the MMSD has made a huge contribution to mining and SD, it is 
appropriate to consider what it sees SD to be. The MMSD ((b), 2002, p. xvi) 
provided: 
“One of the greatest challenges facing the world today is integrating economic 
activity with environmental integrity, social concerns, and effective 
governance systems. The goal of that integration can be seen as ‘sustainable 
development’. In the context of the minerals sector, the goal should be to 
maximize the contribution to the well-being of the current generation in a way 
that ensures an equitable distribution of its costs and benefits, without 
reducing the potential for future generations to meet their own needs.” 
 
This observation is reflected by the Extractive Industries Review (EIR) of the World 
Bank Group ((a), 2003, p. 3)in its definition of SD; that is, development “that meets 
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs”.  
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The EIR of the World Bank Group ((a), 2003, p. 3) explained its definition thus: 
“This definition covers both intragenerational sustainability, which strives for 
equity among those alive today, and intergenerational sustainability, which 
struggles for equity between current and future generations. There is a 
connection between extractive resources and sustainability that is affected by 
equity as well as by intergenerational issues”. 
 
The MMSD ((b), 2002, p. 21) explained the EIR definition as follows: “This 
definition has received broad support, not least because it is a deceptively simple 
formulation. But it has multiple layers of meaning and some profound implications. It 
allows flexibility within defined boundaries, and can be applied to the development of 
many activities. There is no single goal or path for getting there; sustainable 
development presents more a framework for change than a list of prescriptions to 
achieve it. In this sense, it is as hard to define as other ideas that guide society – such 
as democracy, or justice, or freedom of speech.” 
 
It would seem that the explanation is as complicated as the wording of the definitions 
itself is clear – the present generation should act responsibly so that their offspring 
can have just as good or a better life. It is no use having complicated explanations 
requiring an academic exercise to clarify the meaning thereof. Any act that complies 
with the definition would then fall within the concept of SD. While it may not be as 
specific as mining companies would like, it does then give the companies a degree of 
flexibility to be innovative and to ensure that they are compliant without being 
subjected to strict interpretations of the concept. 
 
SD involves a strategic decision relating to the company’s future operations in the 
area and the way its interactions with the local IPs would impact on the operations. 
Companies would need to understand SD without complications and would need to 
communicate it to IPs. A complicated concept would be even more difficult to 
communicate – if the company cannot understand its own expectations and 
responsibilities regarding SD, how can it communicate its programmes to the IPs?  
 
In SA, SD was first defined in Section 1 of the National Environmental Management 
Act (1998) as: 
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“The integration of social, economic and environmental factors into planning, 
implementation and decision-making so as to ensure that development serves 
present and future generations.” 
 
This definition is substantially reproduced in Section 1 of the MPRDA (2002) and 
both definitions accord with the EIR definition though they are not stated as 
simplistically. Though a simple definition is warranted, it should be noted that the 
ambit of SD is not simple. The understanding of the concept is different from the 
implementation thereof.   
 
Though dated, the following comment of Pring, et al ((a) 1999, p. 46) seems 
appropriate: 
“Fundamentally, for all types of development, including mining, sustainability 
requires three things: 
(i) Preservation of options for future generations; 
(ii) Promotion of social and community stability; and  
(iii) Maintenance and restoration of environmental quality. 
Specifically for mining, sustainability requires: 
∙ alleviation of poverty; 
∙ meeting basic human needs; 
∙ environmental impact assessment; 
∙ pollution abatement; 
∙ minimisation of environmental impacts; 
∙ conservation of resources; 
∙ adequate worker health and safety standards; 
∙ community betterment; and 
∙ protection and restoration of the environment.”33 
 
While this list covers many issues impacting IPs, it is opportune that poverty 
alleviation is mentioned first as, especially in SA, this would be of utmost importance 
to IPs. On the other hand, although a comprehensive list, it lacks an important aspect 
of SD, that of economic sustainability. If an operation is not economically sustainable, 
                                                 
33
 See also: Pring, et al ((b), 1999, p. 151) 
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then there is no possibility of SD occurring; after all, if an operation is not 
economically viable then there would be no operation and hence no SD can take 
place.  
 
The issues identified by Pring et al ((a), 1999) have found acceptance in various 
international instruments and local laws as well. However, in looking at these 
requirements, it can be seen that IPs and their interests are included in SD. As such, a 
company cannot profess to be practicing SD when it ignores the plight of IPs. Then 
again, a company cannot only cater for IPs and claim to be practicing SD. A middle 
ground seems to be where a company only sees to the basic needs of IPs but 
concentrate on the other aspects of SD as well. This is not ideal as IPs are provided 
with their basic needs and so become dependent on the mining company. A balance 
needs to be achieved where IPs and companies together agree on the SD that would 
apply to IPs. 
 
6.3. SD on the International Arena 
SD has enjoyed major international development and it is gratifying to note that the 
mining industry is not a passive participant but an active contributor to its 
development. The various international instruments relating to SD would now be 
considered. 
 
6.3.1. The Extractive Industries Review 
The World Bank Group (WBG) has considered the issue of SD with specific 
reference to the mining and other extractive industries in the EIR. The WBG has been 
financing projects involving the extractive industries in developing countries and 
undertook this study to answer the question: “whether WBG involvement in the 
[extractive] industries is consistent with its objective of achieving poverty alleviation 
through Sustainability Development” (World Bank Group (a), 2003, p. 1). 
 
The result of the study is encapsulated in the executive summary of the EIR: 
“Based on more than two years of consultations and research, the answer is 
yes, the Extractive Industries Review believes that there is still a role for the 
World Bank Group in the oil, gas, and mining sectors – but only if its 
interventions allow extractive industries to contribute to poverty alleviation 
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through sustainable development” (EIR emphasis) (World Bank Group (a), 
2003, p. VII). 
 
However, a study that was part of the EIR recommended that the “Extractive 
Industries sector should be a ‘no-go zone’ for the Bank” (Caruso et al, 2003, p. 106). 
It is fortunate that this study was not influential on the WBG as it would not have 
worked to the benefit of the poorer countries. The WBG’s involvement, with the 
necessary appropriate management, could assist these poorer countries to effectively 
participate in the mining operations within their borders and derive benefit therefrom. 
This seems to accord with the view of the WBG as the WBG Management Response 
to the EIR process has been summed up as follows: 
“Our future investments in extractive industries will be selective, with greater   
focus on the needs of poor people, and a stronger emphasis on good 
governance and on promoting environmentally and socially sustainable 
development” (WBG Management Response, 2004, p. iii).34 
 
6.3.2. Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development Project 
This project commenced when “nine of the world’s largest mining companies decided 
to embark on a new initiative intended to achieve a serious change in the way industry 
approached today’s problems.”(MMSD (b), 2002, p. 4) and represented one of the 
most, if not – the most, extensive studies of this nature. In stating the reasons for 
undertaking the study, the MMSD ((b), 2002, p. 16), inter alia, stated: 
“One of the greatest challenges facing the world today is integrating economic 
activity with environmental integrity, social concerns, and effective 
governance systems. The goal of that integration can be seen as ‘sustainable 
development’”. 
 
The MMSD ((b), 2002, p. 17) later stated: 
“The industry has generated wealth in direct and indirect ways, but it is 
alleged, there is a mismatch of opportunities and problems – the wealth often 
being enjoyed far from the communities and environments that feel the 
adverse impacts. The operational life of a mine is finite. Unless there is 
                                                 
34
 For a review of the implementation of the EIR see: World Bank Group (b) (2008) 
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effective planning, the economic and social benefits brought by minerals 
development may last only as long as the mine, while the environmental 
damage may remain indefinitely.” 
 
It is clear that the industry does regard the issue of SD as being an important part of 
the modern mining business. Whether the industry has actually followed through on 
the recommendations of the MMSD (2002) project falls beyond the scope of this 
study save to say that it is unlikely that the industry would invest in a project of this 
nature without implementing same. As was stated in the report by MMSD Southern 
Africa (2002):  
“The momentum that has been created by the MMSD project must not be 
allowed to dissipate. If all the stakeholders in the sector bring their strengths to 
a multistakeholder forum to carry the process forward, the mining and 
minerals sector can make a real and lasting difference to ensure an equitable 
dispensation for all aspects of sustainable development – governance, society, 
economic growth and the environment” (MMSD Southern Africa, 2002, p. 1). 
 
As the MMSD project concluded in Chapter 1:  
“There remains much to be done in improving the sector’s contribution to all 
aspects of sustainable development. But the largest companies and their 
newest operations at least are now being held to higher standards. Indeed, the 
best mining operations are now in the sustainable development vanguard – not 
merely ahead of what local regulations demand, but achieving higher social 
and environmental standards than many other industrial enterprises” (MMSD 
(b), 2002, p. 30). 
 
One would be forgiven for thinking that the MMSD places the burden of SD on the 
mining industry alone. However, while it requires a great deal of commitment from 
the industry, it does not close the doors to all the other sectors. The MMSD Final 
Report stated: 
“Implementation of sustainable development principles in the minerals sector 
requires the development of integrated tools capable of bringing these diverse 
principles and objectives into focus in a manageable decision-making 
structure. A wide range of instruments is available, including regulatory, 
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fiscal, educational, and institutional tools. Instruments need to be effective; 
administratively feasible; cost-efficient, with incentives for innovation and 
improvement; transparent; acceptable and credible to stakeholders; reliable 
and reproducible across different groups and regions; and equitable in the 
distribution of costs and benefits” (MMSD (b), 2002, p. xvii). 
 
It is clear that the government is being referred to herein. The government plays an 
important role and if there is no commitment from government to the SD process then 
mining companies would find that being the sole player a difficult task indeed. 
However, the MMSD does extend the traditional activities of government to include a 
more facilitating role as well. Government involvement is also stressed in the 
Preamble to Agenda 21, discussed below, which states that Agenda 21’s “successful 
implementation is first and foremost the responsibility of Governments” (UN 
Department of Economic Affairs – Division of Sustainable Development (a), 1992). 
 
In emphasizing the importance of SD to the mining industry, the MMSD ((b), 2002, p. 
xvii) identified nine key challenges for mining ranging from viability of the minerals 
industry to sector governance issues. One of the nine challenges identified relates to 
“Local Communities and Mines” which the MMSD ((b), 2002, p. xvii) described as: 
“Minerals development can also bring benefits at the local level. Recent trends 
towards, for example, smaller work forces and outsourcing affect communities 
adversely, however. The social upheaval and inequitable distribution of 
benefits and costs within communities can also create social tension. Ensuring 
that improved health and education or economic activity will endure after 
mines close requires a level of planning that has too often not been achieved.” 
 
It is clear that the MMSD favoured a more holistic approach to IPs and their affairs by 
mining companies and proposed a Community SD Plan (CSDP) which: 
“. . . should be based on the community’s concept of how the mine can best 
contribute to achieving its social, environmental, and economic goals. The 
plan should provide the fundamental framework for relationships among the 
company, the community, and the government (and any other parties) through 
the project life and into post-closure. It should identify the specific actions 
needed and the respective roles and responsibilities to achieve the agreed-upon 
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vision. It should also create some obligations, on all sides, for taking those 
steps” (MMSD (b), 2002, p. xxviii). 
 
While a CSDP seems appropriate, same has, to the writer’s knowledge yet to be 
implemented and/or tested. The work commenced by the MMSD has been assumed 
by the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) which was formed in 
2001 “to represent the world’s leading companies in the mining and metals industry 
and to advance their commitment to sustainable development” (ICMM (a), nd). With 
the ICMM being a Chief Executive Officer (CEO)-led organization it would certainly 
have the necessary commitment from the mining industry to ensure that the MMSD 
study would be expanded further together with the further development of CSDPs. On 
the face of it, it would appear that the SLP of the MPRDA (2002) is a form of CSDP, 
albeit a regulatory imperative. 
 
6.3.3. UN Commission on SD 
This Commission was set up by the UN General Assembly to review progress on the 
implementation of two important international SD instruments; namely, Agenda 21 
and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development which were both dealt 
with 1992 (UN Department of Economic Affairs – Division of Sustainable 
Development, (a) and (b)). Seeing that these initiatives predate the MMSD, it is clear 
that the MMSD was an industry response to the UN efforts. 
 
The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development consists of twenty-seven 
principles providing for the protection of the environment and ensuring the effective 
implementation of SD. Principle 8 states that: 
“To achieve sustainable development and a higher quality of life for all 
people, States should reduce and eliminate unsustainable patterns of 
production and consumption and promote appropriate demographic policies” 
(UN Department of Economic Affairs – Division of Sustainable Development, 
(c) (1992)). 
 
This is a major commitment to the signing State to SD as, in addition to committing 
States to SD, it also requires States to eliminate all unsustainable practices. However, 
Principle 22 is of particular interest to IPs in that: 
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“Indigenous people and their communities and other local communities have a 
vital role in environmental management and development because of their 
knowledge and traditional practices. States should recognize and duly support 
their identity, culture and interests and enable their effective participation in 
the achievement of sustainable development” (UN Department of Economic 
Affairs – Division of Sustainable Development, (c) 1992). 
 
While this Principle attempts to increase the profile of IPs in SD, this is not replicated 
in Agenda 21.Agenda 21 is a programme of action aimed at the environment and SD. 
The Preamble of Agenda 21, paragraph 1.3. , stated: 
“Agenda 21 addresses the pressing problems of today and also aims at 
preparing the world for the challenges of the next century. It reflects a global 
consensus and political commitment at the highest level on development and 
environmental cooperation (sic). Its successful implementation is first and 
foremost the responsibility of Governments. National strategies, plans, 
policies and processes are crucial in achieving this. International cooperation 
(sic) should support and supplement such national efforts. In this context, the 
United Nations system has a key role to play. Other international, regional and 
subregional organizations are also called upon to contribute to this effort. The 
broadest public participation and the active involvement of the non-
governmental organizations and other groups should also be encouraged” (UN 
Department of Economic Affairs – Division of Sustainable Development, (a) 
(1992)). 
 
Agenda 21 is a document that provides the details in ensuring that the environment 
and developmental goals are met. The Preamble further, in paragraph 1.6., states: 
“The programme areas that constitute Agenda 21 are described in terms of the 
basis for action, objectives, activities and means of implementation. Agenda 
21 is a dynamic programme. It will be carried out by the various actors 
according to the different situations, capacities and priorities of countries and 
regions in full respect of all the principles contained in the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development. It could evolve over time in the light of 
changing needs and circumstances. This process marks the beginning of a new 
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global partnership for sustainable development” (UN Department of Economic 
Affairs – Division of Sustainable Development, (a) (1992)). 
 
While Agenda 21 does not refer to IPs, it has incorporated the Rio Declaration as an 
integral component. As a result, the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 together create 
the broadest and most in-depth UN initiative on SD to date, yet have a small mention 
of IPs. In addition, it is interesting that Principle 22 of the Rio Declaration, just as the 
MMSD, recognises the role of government as not being a passive one. 
 
6.3.4. Africa Mining Vision 
The Africa Mining Vision (2009), to date, represents the most comprehensive 
initiative relating to deriving benefit from the exploitation of mineral resources 
drafted by the AU. 
 
The vision for the exploitation of minerals in Africa is stated by the Africa Mining 
Vision as: 
“Transparent, equitable and optimal exploitation of mineral resources to 
underpin broad-based sustainable growth and socio-economic development” 
(Africa Mining Vision, 2009, p. v) 
 
It is further stated that the “shared vision will comprise: 
· A knowledge-driven African mining sector that catalyses and contributes to 
the broad-based growth & development of, and is fully integrated into, a single 
African market . . .  
· A sustainable and well-governed mining sector that effectively garners and 
deploys resource rents and that is safe, healthy, gender & ethnically inclusive, 
environmentally friendly, socially responsible and appreciated by surrounding 
communities; 
· A mining sector that has become a key component of a diversified, vibrant 
and globally competitive industrialising African economy; 
· A mining sector that has helped establish a competitive African 
infrastructure platform, through the maximisation of its propulsive local and 
regional economic linkages; 
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· A mining sector that optimises and husbands Africa’s finite mineral resource 
endowments and that is diversified, incorporating both high value metals and 
lower value industrial minerals at both commercial and small-scale levels; 
· A mining sector that harness the potential of artisanal and small-scale mining 
to stimulate local/national entrepreneurship, improve livelihoods and advance 
integrated rural social and economic development; and 
· A mining sector that is a major player in vibrant and competitive national, 
continental and international capital and commodity markets” (Africa Mining 
Vision, 2009, p. v) 
 
The African Mining Vision (2009) was drafted by a technical taskforce that had been 
convened by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and it was stated 
that the Africa Mining Vision was “informed by the outcomes of several initiatives 
and efforts made at sub-regional, continental and global levels to formulate policy and 
regulatory frameworks to maximise the development outcomes of mineral resources 
exploitation” (Africa Mining Vision, 2009, p. 1) 
 
In providing a rationale for the establishing the Africa Mining Vision, it is stated that:   
“Lessons learnt from experience in Nordic countries, suggest that it is 
important to have a shared strategic vision, deliberate and proactive 
government-led collective action, timely interventions and coordination of 
public, private and community interests at all levels in order for a resource-
based development and industrialization strategy in Africa to be brought to 
fruition at the continental level. In addition, there is a need to identify, at 
national and regional levels, anchor projects that would underpin the strategy” 
(Africa Mining Vision, 2009, p. 4). 
 
The Africa Mining Vision is based on the following fundamental pillars: 
“· Optimizing knowledge and benefits of finite mineral resources at all levels 
of mining and for all minerals; 
· Harnessing the potential of small scale mining to improve livelihoods and 
integration into the rural and national economy; 
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· Fostering sustainable development principles based on environmentally and 
socially responsible mining, which is safe and includes communities and all 
other stakeholders; 
· Building human and institutional capacities towards a knowledge economy 
that supports innovation, research and developments; 
· Developing a diversified and globally competitive African mineral industry 
which contributes to broad economic and social growth through the creation of 
economic linkages; 
·Fostering a transparent and accountable mineral sector in which resource 
rents are optimized and utilized to promote broad economic and social 
development; and 
· Promoting good governance of the mineral sector in which communities and 
citizens participate in mineral assets and in which there is equity in the 
distribution of benefits” (Action Plan For Implementing The AMV, 2011, p. 9) 
 
These pillars are clearly including SD principles. However, SD is emphasised in the 
Action Plan For Implementing The Africa Mining Vision (2011) which had been 
implemented grouped into Programme Clusters (Action Plan For Implementing The 
AMV, 2011, p. 10). 
 
The most significant Programme Clusters are: 
a) Programme Cluster 3 of the Action Plan, dealing with “Building human and 
institutional capacities”, provides that “a number of stakeholder institutions that are 
important to the well functioning of a development oriented mineral sector will also 
need significant skills upgrading. This, for example, includes providing capacity 
building courses to parliaments, local communities, civil societies and NGOs to 
enable them discharge (sic) their roles in providing checks and balances to 
Government functions, and to generally permit their effective participation” (Action 
Plan For Implementing The AMV, 2011, p. 18). 
 
b) In addition, Programme Cluster 5, dealing with “Mineral sector governance”, 
provides that “The exploitation of minerals has been associated with the violation of 
human rights. This is one of the most prominent issues raised by mining-affected 
communities and civil society organizations and civil society organizations working 
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on mining issues. Respect for human rights by companies is an important part of their 
social licence to operate, but the scope of the obligations imposed on them by 
international human rights law is limited and contentious, even as it is widely 
recognized that with the growth of global power and reach of corporations, domestic 
regulation is inadequate to protect human rights from corporate infractions” (Action 
Plan For Implementing The AMV, 2011, p. 24). 
 
Incidentally, the goal for this Programme Cluster is: “To create a sustainable and well 
governed mining sector that is inclusive and appreciated by all stakeholders including 
surrounding communities” (Action Plan For Implementing The AMV, 2011, p. 24) 
 
c) Programme cluster 7, dealing with “Environment and social issues”, provided “the 
poor management and regulation of negative environmental and social impacts of 
mining have fuelled criticism and, in some cases, hostile attitudes towards the mining 
industry and governments among communities affected by mining and a range of civil 
society organisations. The occurrence of these impacts can be reduced and the effects 
mitigated, where impacts are unavoidable” (Action Plan For Implementing The AMV, 
2011, p. 31) 
 
The Africa Mining Vision (2009), with its Action Plan For Implementing The Africa 
Mining Vision (2011), represents the most comprehensive SD initiative relating to 
mining in the continent. While the Programme Clusters refer to “communities”, can it 
be conclusively stated that IPs are included in the Africa Mining Vision (2009). With 
the AU not wishing to define IPs (see Chapter 2), it can be argued that IPs are not 
being included in the Africa Mining Vision (2009), which makes it sorely deficient. 
 
6.3.5. World Summit on SD 
SD was brought to the fore in SA when the World Summit on SD (WSSD) was held 
in Johannesburg in 2002.This Summit, as per Resolution 1 of WSSD (UN, 2002) 
culminated in the adoption of the Johannesburg Declaration on SD (2002) which 
committed the signatories to SD practices. A Plan of Implementation of the WSSD 
was also adopted as per Resolution 2 (UN, 2002). 
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The Plan of Implementation consists of 170 Articles, with Article 24 in particular, 
inter alia, stating that “Managing the natural resource base in a sustainable and 
integrated manner is essential for sustainable development” (UN, 2002).While Article 
24 acknowledged the importance of “mining, minerals and metals” to the economies 
and social development of many countries, and further that minerals are “essential for 
modern living” (UN, 2002); Article 46 provided actions to enhance the contribution 
of “mining, minerals and metals” to SD which includes: supporting efforts to address 
the environmental, economic, health and social impacts and benefits of mining, 
minerals and metals throughout their life cycle, enhancing participation of 
stakeholders throughout the lifecycles of mining operations and the fostering of 
sustainable mining practices (UN, 2002). 
 
Similarly to the MMSD, Article 46(b) provides that contribution to SD includes 
actions to: 
“Enhance the participation of stakeholders, including local and indigenous 
communities and women, to play an active role in minerals, metals and mining 
development throughout the life cycles of mining operations, including after 
closure for rehabilitation purposes, in accordance with national regulations and 
taking into account significant transboundary impacts” (UN, 2002). 
 
In considering the various international initiatives, two stand out as being of 
importance to IPs; namely, the UN instruments and the MMSD project. The UN 
instruments have placed IPs at the forefront of SD considerations while the MMSD 
project, being an extensive study in response to the UN efforts, places IPs in the 
context of mining and highlights the importance of taking care of IPs’ interests.  
 
6.4. Impact of International Sustainable Development (SD) on South Africa (SA) and 
the Proposed Strategies  
From the above, it is clear that SD is an internationally recognised principle that 
enjoys industry support. The various international instruments also reflect that SD is a 
widely defined concept that includes IPs and their interests. While SD is a concept 
that IPs can exploit to their advantage; it should be noted that, by including IPs’ rights 
within the concept of SD, it would not entail mining companies doing something 
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extraneous to their business practice as IPs can be included in the companies’ existing 
SD programme. 
 
The international instruments, in particular the UN documents, requires co-operation 
between mining companies and governments to have effective SD. While 
international instruments acknowledge that IPs are significantly weaker than either 
companies or governments, the instruments provide for IPs active involvement in SD 
programs. In the same way, Strategies proposed herein must recognise and provide for 
the principles of SD. In recognising SD, the Strategies must further provide for the 
effective co-operation of government and mining companies, whilst not excluding 
IPs. All 3 stakeholders would need to work together for the Strategies to be 
successfully implemented in SA. 
 
6.5. Measuring SD Compliance 
In addition to these international instruments recognising SD, there were also 
international initiatives to measure compliance with SD. 
 
6.5.1. The Equator Principles 
These principles apply to financiers of mining transactions. The reason that financiers 
would involve themselves with SD can be gleaned from the Preamble to the Equator 
Principles (2006) which, inter alia, provides: 
“Project financiers may encounter social and environmental issues that are 
both complex and challenging, particularly with respect to projects in the 
emerging markets. 
The Equator Principles Financial Institutions (EPFIs) have consequently 
adopted these Principles in order to ensure that the projects we finance are 
developed in a manner that is socially responsible and reflect sound 
environmental practices. By doing so, negative impacts on project-affected 
ecosystems and communities should be avoided where possible, and if these 
impacts are unavoidable, they should be reduced, mitigated and/or 
compensated for appropriately. We believe that adoption of and adherence to 
these Principles offers significant benefits to ourselves, our borrowers and 
local stakeholders through our borrowers’ engagement with locally affected 
communities. We therefore recognise that our role as financiers affords us 
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opportunities to promote responsible environmental stewardship and socially 
responsible development”. 
 
The Equator Principles (2006) consists of nine statements to which the participating 
financing institutions must comply before providing finance. In this regard, a mining 
company that requires funding from an Equator compliant financial institution would 
have to comply with SD principles. If not, then that financial institution would not be 
providing the required funding to enable the company to commence or continue 
operations. 
 
While the Equator Principles (2006) do not mention IPs, there is a reference to 
“affected communities” which, in Footnote 4 of Principle 5, are defined as 
“communities of the local population within the projects area of influence who are 
likely to be adversely affected by the project”. Coupled with the emphasis on social 
issues, it is clear that Equator compliant financial institutions can deny funding 
support for projects that do not adequately cater for IPs’ interests. 
 
6.5.2. The Global Reporting Initiative 
There also seems to be an initiative to measure a company’s compliance with SD. The 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is a body that provides a framework for the 
reporting of sustainability (GRI (a), nd.) with a mission, as per the Preface of its 
Sustainability Reporting Guidelines, to provide “a trusted and credible framework for 
sustainability reporting that can be used by organizations of any size, sector, or 
location” (GRI (b), nd, p. 2). 
 
In stating the purpose of sustainability reporting, the Preface also stated that: 
“Sustainability reporting is the practice of measuring, disclosing, and being 
accountable to internal and external stakeholders for organizational 
performance towards the goal of sustainable development. ‘Sustainability 
reporting’ is a broad term considered synonymous with others used to describe 
reporting on economic, environmental, and social impacts (e.g., triple bottom 
line, corporate responsibility reporting, etc.)”(GRI (b), nd, p. 3). 
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While the Guidelines provides for standards of sustainability reporting for all 
participants, it also provides reporting guidelines for various sectors. Provision is 
made for the mining sector in the Mining and Metals Sector Supplement, which 
“deals with the aspects of sustainable development that characterize the mining and 
metals sector, often because they are encountered more frequently or in greater 
measure than in the other sectors” (GRI (c), nd. p. 7).  
 
In indicating the need for The Mining and Metals Sector Supplement, it states: 
“Reporting companies and the users of their reports are actively interested in 
these aspects [sustainable development], which therefore may merit a level of 
treatment not captured in the main Guidelines” (GRI (c), nd, p. 7).  
 
The Supplement recognises IPs as communities who are stakeholders requiring 
engagement in the various Indicator Protocols on Society (GRI (c), nd.).  
 
6.5.3. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) was proposed by the then 
British Prime Minister, Blair, in 2002 at the WSSD in Johannesburg which 
culminated in the establishment of the Board in 2006 (EITI (a), nd). It is stated that 
the benefits of subscribing to the EITI “include an improved investment climate by 
providing a clear signal to investors and international financial institutions that the 
government is committed to greater transparency. EITI also assists in strengthening 
accountability and good governance, as well as promoting greater economic and 
political stability” (EITI (b), 2006). 
 
While the benefits also encompass companies as well (EITI (b), nd) it also includes 
civil society; in that, the benefit for civil society can benefit from the increased 
“amount of information in the public domain about those revenues that governments 
manage on behalf of citizens, thereby making governments more accountable” (EITI 
(b), nd). 
 
It seems that, as at 20
th
May 2012, thirteen countries are EITI compliant (EITI (c)), 
with twenty candidate countries (EITI (c), nd), two countries being suspended (EITI 
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(c), nd) and eighteen supporting countries that support the EITI by providing political, 
technical and financial support (EITI (d), nd). 
 
It would seem that the EITI shares commonalities with the GRI. It is reported by 
Moberg, et al (nd. p. 42) that: 
“Both the . . . (GRI) and the . . . (EITI) are tools for voluntary disclosure. . . 
Both initiatives are global in nature, but while the EITI advances transparency 
in public payments of the extractive industries per country of operation, the 
GRI advances corporate-level transparency on sustainability topics including 
economic, environmental and social performance in all types of companies 
and organisations in all sectors.” 
 
It is therefore clear that there is a need for the GRI and EITI to together ensure that 
the mining industry does in fact report properly on its SD practices and do not play lip 
service to it. In expressing its support for the EITI, the ICMM ((b) nd. p. 92) stated: 
“It is generally accepted that development outcomes are enhanced by stronger 
economic and legal institutions, and the EITI is often seen as a component of 
governance-strengthening, offering particular value as a means of initiating 
broader reform”. 
 
The ICMM ((b), nd. p. 93) further stated: 
“The case for mining companies to support the EITI is clear: better 
governance standards support development efforts and improve the business 
environment for mining investment. Simply put, business support for the EITI 
could be viewed as enlightened self-interest.” 
 
Engaging in SD practices is not always easy for mining companies and it seems that 
the EITI would assist in ensuring that SD is a success. Darby and Lampa (nd, p. 117) 
stated: 
“While the EITI does not have an explicitly forensic anti-corruption focus, 
there is emerging evidence that it serves as a useful component in corruption 
prevention by increasing scrutiny . . . of payments and revenues. The EITI is 
also increasingly being used to identify poor administration by providing a 
diagnostic of the efficacy of revenue assessment, collection, and . . . 
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redistribution systems. Most intangibly, but possibly of greatest value of all, is 
the EITI’s ability to reduce political tensions and risks to extractive industry 
investments by creating a forum in which all parties (government, companies 
and civil society) regularly meet and come to better understand each other’s 
position and concerns. This confidence-building aspect of the EITI is the most 
difficult to establish, but also has the potential to deliver long- term benefits by 
reducing the risk of conflict.” 
 
While the EITI principles do not mention IPs, there is a strong indication that they can 
be included in EITI considerations. This is due to the following principles: 
“1. We share the belief that the prudent use of natural resource wealth should 
be an important engine for sustainable economic growth that contributes to 
sustainable development and poverty reduction, but if not managed properly, 
can create negative economic and social impacts. 
2. We affirm that management of natural resources wealth for the benefit of a 
country’s citizens is in the domain of sovereign governments to be exercised 
in the interests of their national development. 
. . . 
8. We believe in the principle and practice of accountability of government to 
all citizens for the stewardship of revenue streams and public expenditure” 
(EITI (e), nd). 
 
From the above, although there is provision for companies, civil, society and 
institutional investors, amongst others from subscribing to EITI, its biggest impact 
would be on governments, who are expected to engage in responsible SD practices as 
well and to efficiently report thereon. However, it seems that SA is not being the 
leader it ought to be as they refused to sign onto the EITI (Fabricius, 2007). 
 
6.5.4. The Natural Resource Charter 
The Natural Resource Charter is stated as being “a global initiative designed to help 
governments and societies effectively harness the opportunities created by natural 
resources” (Natural Resources Charter (a), nd). It goes further to state that it is a 
“common framework for addressing the challenges of natural resource management. 
It is also a toll for citizens. It has the potential to be an international convention in the 
 170 
making, but one that will be built by a participatory process guided by academic 
research” (Natural Resources Charter (a) nd). 
 
This sentiment is carried forward in the current version of the Preamble which states, 
inter alia: 
“The purpose of the Resource Charter is to assist the governments and 
societies of countries rich in non-renewable resources to manage those 
resources in a way that generates economic growth, promotes the welfare of 
the population in general and is environmentally sustainable” (Natural 
Resources Charter (b), nd). 
 
The Natural Resource Charter, in its current format, provides 12 precepts followed by 
explanations of each precept (Natural Resources Charter (c), nd). While there is no 
mention of IPs, two of the precepts make it clear that IPs cannot be ignored: 
 
Precept 1 states: 
“The development of natural resources should be designed to secure the 
greatest social and economic benefit for the people. This requires a 
comprehensive approach in which every stage of the decision chain is 
understood and addressed” (Natural Resources Charter (c), nd) – Natural 
Resource Charter emphasis. 
 
In addition, Precept 5 states: 
“Resource projects can have significant positive or negative local economic, 
environmental and social effects which should be identified, explored, 
accounted for, mitigated or compensated for at all stages of the project cycle. 
The decision to extract should be considered carefully.” (Natural Resources 
Charter (c), nd) 
 
The Charter ensures that governments are enabled to act more responsibly towards IPs 
affected by mining in their countries. In the opinion of the writer, the Natural 
Resources Charter, would definitely prove to be one of the most definitive 
instruments regarding SD and the mining industry. 
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In considering all the instruments measuring SD compliance, with each having 
consideration for IPs, it is clear that IP’s rights are being linked to SD and mining 
companies are being encouraged to ensure IP’s rights are catered for as part of their 
SD obligations. 
 
6.6. Corporate Social Responsibility  
Closely related to SD is the issue of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). 
According to Warhurst (nd.,p. 4), CSR implies: 
“compliance plus the active development and implementation of mainstream 
business strategy, supported by technological and organisational innovation, to 
prevent negative social impacts and optimise social benefits from the outset. It 
also involves, through responsible management, the mitigation, on an ongoing 
basis, of negative effects, if and when they occur”.  
 
According to flashpoint Issue 5 of the Conflict-Sensitive Business Practice: Guidance 
for Extractive Industries: 
“Social investment is a tool for ensuring that even in operational contexts 
where local governance and service delivery are poor, the communities most 
directly impacted by a company’s investment experience some tangible 
benefits. It represents one of the major channels of interaction available to 
companies seeking a ‘social licence to operate’ through winning the support of 
local stakeholders” (International Alert, 2005, p. 2) 
 
Warhurst (nd.) distinguished between “Traditional CSR” and “Pro-active CSR”. The 
traditional CSR involves “successfully running a business paying regard to the 
interests of employees, investors, suppliers and customers, while making charitable 
donations and social investment in the local community, in response to perceived 
moral imperatives, as well as to ensure the maintenance of a health workforce” 
(Warhurst’s emphasis) (Warhurst, nd., p. 4). 
 
Pro-active CSR entails a more “forward looking longer term approach to the 
integration of social responsibility at the very heart of doing business” which, 
according to Warhurst, means that “negative environmental social impacts in all 
spheres: the bio-physical, the economic, and the social are anticipated and prevented 
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from the outset, and that participative approaches to working with stakeholders 
towards improving the balance benefits for all, over time, are integrated into the very 
way of doing modern business” (Warhurst’s emphasis) (Warhurst, nd., p. 5). 
 
For mining companies, it would not matter whether the CSR is traditional or pro-
active as mining companies engage in both and it can be reasonable assumed that they 
would be expected to continue doing both. Jenkins (2004, p. 24) succinctly 
conceptualises CSR for the mining industry as: 
“balancing the diverse demands of communities and the imperative to protect 
the environment with the ever present need to make a profit”. 
 
In reviewing the reports of various mining companies, Jenkins (2004, p. 29) stated 
that the companies had framed “themselves as central components of the communities 
in which they operate, as neighbours and as key instigators of economic development 
and improved standards of living”. 
 
In addition, the Africa Mining Vision (2009) provided as follows in Programme 
Cluster 7 with regard to CSR:  
“On their part, companies need to improve the practice and application of 
corporate social responsibility. Today there is a proliferation of CSR 
frameworks, norms and reporting formats – some are legislated, but most are 
guidelines or voluntary codes. These myriad sources and frameworks are often 
uncoordinated and sometimes confusing. It is important therefore to embed 
CSR in a framework whose responsibilities are clear and is part of a broader 
social development agenda that has been consultatively developed between 
Government, mining companies and communities. This would strengthen the 
social licence for mining projects” (Action Plan For Implementing The AMV, 
2011, p. 31) 
 
In addition, the goal for this Programme Cluster stated:  
“To create a mining sector that is environmentally friendly, socially 
responsible and appreciated by all stakeholders and surrounding communities” 
(Action Plan For Implementing The AMV, 2011, p. 31) 
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In comparing SD and CSR, Jenkins (2004, p. 31) was of the opinion that mining 
companies “use the concept if sustainable development as a framework around which 
to hang their social and environmental responsibility and their commitment to 
economic development in the areas in which they operate. Like CSR, the sustainable 
development narrative has become an acceptable organizational expression for the 
motives of corporations”.35 
 
While mining companies may use SD and CSR inter-changeably, the CSR model 
provides a greater emphasis on social aspects. However, the social aspects of CSR 
would be broad and IPs might find themselves being excluded once again. As such, 
being included in the SD prerogative of mining companies would serve IPs better. 
 
6.7. Impact of CSR on the Strategies 
From the above discussion, a marked difference between CSR and SD is that, in CSR, 
there is an emphasis on mining companies indicating that CSR is of a voluntary nature 
and not an imposition of government. In addition, in the opinion of the writer 
Government does not form part of CSR projects unless the specific CSR project is 
geared towards addressing a government duty; for example, providing electricity to 
the community. 
 
However, SD which makes better provision for IPs, could be legislated, especially 
where it deals with IP rights. For IPs to benefit, they cannot be dependent on the 
goodwill of a mining company alone – government involvement is required as well. 
However, while regulation of CSR is not advisable, it is important for mining 
companies and government to work together on certain projects, especially those 
relating to service delivery. As such, CSR would not form part of the strategy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35
 Also see: Canadian Business for Social Responsibility, (2009) for an evaluation of the various CSR 
frameworks. 
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6.8. SD in SA 
There are many legislative initiatives in SA that relate to SD.  
 
6.8.1. Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA) 
Being that piece of legislation with the greatest impact on the mining industry, it is 
not surprising that the MPRDA (2002) makes provision for SD. The Long Title of the 
MPRDA (2002) states that the Act is to “make provision for equitable access to and 
sustainable development of the nation’s mineral and petroleum resources”. This is 
carried forward in the Preamble which affirms “the State’s obligation to protect the 
environment for the benefit of present and future generations, to ensure ecologically 
sustainable development of mineral and petroleum resources and to promote 
economic and social development” (MPRDA, 2002).  
 
The Section 2 objects of the MPRDA (2002) that deal with SD are: 
“(e) promote economic growth and mineral and petroleum resources 
development in the Republic, particularly development of downstream 
industries through provision of feedstock, and development of mining and 
petroleum inputs industries; 
(f) promote employment and advance the social and economic welfare of all 
South Africans; . . . 
(h) give effect to section 24 of the Constitution by ensuring that the nation’s 
mineral and petroleum resources are developed in an orderly and ecologically 
sustainable manner while promoting justifiable social and economic 
development. . .”36 
 
While Section 3 of the MPRDA(2002) grants the Minister of Mineral Resources a 
wide range of powers in the administration of natural resources it does place a duty on 
the Minister in Section 3(3) that: 
“The Minister must ensure the sustainable development of South Africa’s 
mineral and petroleum resources within a framework of national 
environmental policy, norms and standards while promoting economic and 
social development”. 
                                                 
36
Section 24 of the Constitution (1996) deals with the right to Environment 
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Though the MPRDA (2002) makes an effort to cater for SD, it is disappointing that 
SD does not form part of the considerations for granting the Section 12 assistance to 
HDPs. From the objects clauses mentioned, the environment is also regarded as an 
essential component of SD, which is dealt with by the National Environmental 
Management Act (1998), which is incorporated into the MPRDA (2002) by Section 
37.  
 
To assist the Minister, Section 57 established the Minerals and Petroleum Board 
which, inter alia, in terms of Section 58, acts as an advisor to the Minister on various 
aspects affecting mining and minerals and ensures human resources development in 
the sector. Specifically, Section 58 also requires the Board to advise the Minister on 
“the sustainable development of the nation’s mineral resources” (MPRDA, 2002). 
 
6.8.2. Mining Charter 
While it was not so clear in the Mining Charter (2002) that it provided for SD, the 
Amended Mining Charter (2010) is unequivocal in establishing its SD prerogative 
commencing with the definition of SD (Amended Mining Charter, 2010, pp. v) and in 
its Article 1 objects to “promote sustainable development and growth of the mining 
industry” (Amended Mining Charter, 2010). In fact, the Amended Mining Charter 
(2010) goes further than the MPRDA (2002) as regards the provision of SD practices. 
 
Article 2.8.specifically deals with a mining company’s SD commitments and 
specifically includes environmental management, health and safety and capacity and 
skills development (Amended Mining Charter, 2010). By specifying these issues, it 
can be seen that the Amended Mining Charter (2010) is creating a linkage between 
the SLP and the Health and Safety legislation of the country. This creates a broad 
spectrum of SD which companies can use when reporting on their SD compliance.  
 
6.8.3. National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 
The Long Title of the National Environmental Management Act (NEMA) (1998) 
states that it is to: 
“provide for co-operative environmental governance by establishing principles 
for decision-making on matters affecting the environment, institutions that will 
promote co-operative governance and procedures for co-ordinating 
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environmental functions exercised by organs of state; to provide for certain 
aspects of the administration and enforcement of other environmental laws . . 
.” 
 
While the Preamble makes reference to SD, Section 2(4) of NEMA (1998) contains a 
list of principles that make a clear reference to SD: 
- “Development must be socially, environmentally and economically 
sustainable”, in terms of Section 2(3); 
- “Sustainable development requires the consideration of all relevant factors 
including the following: 
(i) That the disturbance of ecosystems and loss of biological diversity are 
avoided, or, where they cannot be altogether avoided, or minimised and 
remedied; 
(ii) that pollution and degradation of the environment are avoided, or, where 
they cannot be altogether avoided, are minimised and remedied; 
(iii) that the disturbance of landscapes and sites that constitute the nation’s 
cultural heritage is avoided, or where it cannot be altogether avoided, is 
minimised and remedied; 
(iv) that waste is avoided, or where it cannot be altogether avoided, minimised 
and re-used or recycled where possible and otherwise disposed of in a 
responsible manner; 
(v) that the use and exploitation of non-renewable natural resources is 
responsible and equitable, and takes into account the consequences of the 
depletion of the resource; 
(vi) that the development, use and exploitation of renewable resources and the 
ecosystems of which they are part do not exceed the level beyond which their 
integrity is jeopardised; 
(vii) that a risk-averse and cautious approach is applied, which takes into 
account the limits of current knowledge about the consequences of decisions 
and actions; and 
(viii) the negative impacts on the environment and on people’s environmental 
rights be anticipated and prevented, and where they cannot be altogether 
prevented, are minimised and remedied.” 
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NEMA (1998) can be regarded as the basis for all environmental legislation in SA. 
The fact that NEMA (1998) makes such concise provision for SD, which is 
incorporated into the MPRDA (2002) by Section 37(1), indicates that mining 
companies would have to take note of these principles in their operations as well. 
From these objects, IPs are an important consideration which mining companies 
cannot ignore. 
 
6.8.4. National Environment Management: Air Quality Act 39 of 2004 
As with NEMA (1998), SD is specifically mentioned in this Act. The Long Title of the 
National Environment Management: Air Quality Act (2004) (Air Quality Act) states 
that the Act is to “reform the law regulating air quality in order to protect the 
environment by providing reasonable measures for the prevention of pollution and 
ecological degradation and for securing ecologically sustainable development while 
promoting justifiable economic and social development . . .” 
 
This is mirrored in the objects clause of Section 2 of the Act which provides, inter 
alia, that the objects of the Act are:  
“to protect the environment by providing reasonable measures for  
. . .  
(iii) securing ecologically sustainable development while promoting justifiable 
economic and social development” (Air Quality Act, 2004). 
 
While the language of the Act is general and applicable to SA as a whole, it is clear 
that IPs are included herein. While another Act having such a broad remit might 
negatively impact IPs, the general provision of air quality obviously does not. 
 
6.8.5. National Water Act 36 of 1998 
This Act also makes reference to SD. Section 2 states the purpose of the Act which is, 
inter alia: 
 “(a) meeting the basic human needs of present and future generations 
. . .  
(d) promoting the efficient, sustainable and beneficial use of water in the 
public interest; 
(e) facilitating social and economic development” (National Water Act, 1998). 
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The Act, in Section 3(1) regards the Minister of Water Affairs as the trustee of the 
Nation’s water resources and provides that he or she must “ensure that water is 
protected, used, developed, conserved, managed and controlled in a sustainable and 
equitable manner, for the benefit of all persons” (National Water Act, 1998). 
 
It seems that, from Sections 27 to 55) water licences would be needed for water usage 
in certain circumstances, and it would also seem that, on reading of these Sections, 
that the mining industry is subject to this licence requirement (National Water Act, 
1998).As with the previous 3 legislations, the broad ambit of this Act encompasses 
IPs in the SD process. 
 
With all these legislations providing for SD, mining companies cannot easily avoid 
their SD commitments and thereby avoid their commitments to IPs.  
 
6.9. The Role of Education in Sustainable Development (SD)  
A major issue in SA is the lack of skills and initiatives involving skills development 
are welcomed. An important imperative in skills development is education. Rungan, 
et al (2005, p. 739) had argued for an improved education for people involved in 
mining. In referring to empowerment, it was stated: 
“Education would not only increase the skills of existing employees, it would 
also create a workforce that is already empowered when they enter the 
industry. Where a person already has the necessary education, he/she would be 
able to choose the level of entry in the industry, be it as management, 
partnering a mining enterprise, or even establishing one’s own exploration 
venture. Education would enable individuals to rise up the corporate ladder at 
a much faster rate, thus ensuring a greater degree of broad-based 
empowerment at a quicker rate. Without the necessary skills base, 
empowerment would progress at a much slower pace than desired. More 
measure should be made available for the educational component of black 
empowerment.” 
 
In addition, according to Education for Sustainable Development (nd, p. 1) (ESD): 
“Education is an essential tool for achieving sustainability. People around the 
world recognize that current economic development trends are not sustainable 
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and that public awareness, education, and training are key to moving society 
toward sustainability.” 
 
The company should therefore proactively engage in educating IPs and should not 
stop at just ensuring IPs are literate – they need to ensure that IPs receive basic 
education but also have opportunities to proceed to higher levels of education and 
further, if possible. SD implies that an investment in education would not end on 
completion of the traditional schooling curriculum or Adult Basic Education and 
Training (ABET).  
 
As the ESD Toolkit (nd, p. 5) stated: 
“The relationship between education and sustainable development is complex. 
Generally, research shows that basic education is key to a nation’s ability to 
develop and achieve sustainability targets. Research has shown that education 
can improve agricultural productivity, enhance the status of women, reduce 
population growth rates, enhance environmental protection, and generally 
raise the standard of living. But the relationship is not linear.” 
 
If education is not seen as an integral facet of SD in SA, then any SD programme will 
be slow to commence, slow to implement and even slower for benefits to accrue. The 
ESD Toolkit (nd, p. 6) postulated as follows: 
 “Education directly affects sustainability plans in the following three areas: 
Implementation. An educated citizenry is vital to implementing informed and 
sustainable development. In fact, a national sustainability plan can be 
enhanced or limited by the level of education attained by the nation’s citizens . 
. .  
Decision making. Good community-based decisions – which will affect 
social, economic, and environmental well-being – also depend on educated 
citizens. Development options, especially ‘greener’ development options, 
expand as education increases . . .  
Quality of life. Education is also central to improving quality of life. 
Education raises the economic status of families; it improves life conditions, 
lowers infant mortality, and improves the educational attainment of the next 
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generation, thereby raising the next generation’s chances for economic and 
social well-being.” 
 
Education should be a key facet of any strategy, whether mentioned or not. All 
companies, as part of their SD program should have an educational plan. They should 
conduct a basic assessment of the educational levels of IPs and then tailor their 
program thereto. It should be possible for more than one company to join forces to 
provide a better educational service and both should share in their SD rewards thereto. 
The industry, as a whole, could benefit the educational development of students in 
three ways: 
- Partnering with the education faculties of tertiary institutions to develop 
apposite programmes  
- Consulting with national and provincial government educational departments 
to develop new primary and secondary schools or enhance such existing 
schools so that a better educational service can be offered to IPs. 
- Companies identifying deserving students to study mining courses at tertiary 
institutions.  
 
6.10. SD in Practice 
SD, especially for IPs, is an important aspect of a mining company’s business 
strategy. As Jenkins (2004, p. 32) stated: 
“It is clear that the decision of companies to develop community strategies 
does not stem from a moral choice; it is as a strategic response to social 
challenges that constantly shift the background of constraints in which the 
organisation must operate”. 
 
With the significant developments in SD on the international arena, the legislation 
discussed indicates that SA is not isolated from these developments. However having 
amongst the best legislations and legislative principles in the world does not indicate 
the ability to implement these rules.  
 
It would be easy to place blame on mining companies for failing to implement SD 
principles, yet government also has an important role to play. SD is a partnership 
between all stakeholders. Though the parties may not be on a footing of equality, it is 
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important to note that, no matter how small, the contribution of all stakeholders would 
lead to a successful implementation of SD. No one can expect companies to perform 
when governments do not. It is the opinion of the writer that should governments fail 
in their responsibilities, it would impact as greatly on SD as when companies do not 
engage in SD. 
 
In the preface to Wise and Shtylla’s (2007, p. 4) paper, it is stated: 
“Creating or expanding economic opportunity could rightly be considered a 
responsibility of governments towards their citizens. But in today’s global 
market environment, various risks and opportunities provide reason for 
business to engage. 
“One key reason, across industries, is for business to leverage its own 
comparative advantage in society . . . Business activity creates jobs, cultivates 
inter-firm linkages, enables technology transfer, builds human capital and 
physical infrastructure, generates tax revenues for governments, and, of course 
offers a variety of products and services to consumers and other businesses.” 
 
While this would seem to make sense; it is a difficult case to argue that a mining 
company should engage in social activities in lieu of government. While it would help 
the public relations activities of the company, they should not be seen as the providers 
of social services – it should remain a government prerogative. In addition, as a 
participant in the SD process, IPs must actively engage with the mining company to 
ensure successful mining projects. As was stated by ESMAP, et al (2005, p. 8): 
“. . . community development is a reciprocal process. By helping communities 
to develop themselves in a sustainable manner, a mining company is 
simultaneously helping its own business to succeed. If we can all move 
beyond the donor/recipient model of community relations and view mining 
operations and their community development programs as a mutually 
beneficial partnership process, the goal of sustainability will become more 
achievable.”  
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In this way, IPs would ensure that they do not become completely dependent on 
mining companies. As ESMAP, et al (2005, p. 9) further provided: 
“. . . if local communities and government agencies become accustomed to 
mining companies taking charge of the provision of infrastructure and 
services, an unhealthy dependency relationship can evolve, which works 
against sustainability.” 
 
Bearing the above in mind, IPs taking a proactive role would perhaps find that 
negotiating with mining companies to be more feasible and effective than negotiating 
with the DMR, if media reports are to be believed.
37
One of the major driving forces 
for companies to engage in SD practices is to ensure that, regardless of government 
action or inaction, the company is seen by the community as an independent entity 
that would not deliberately harm the community. A major reason for this train of 
thought is, as Wise and Shtylla (2007, p. 7) stated: 
“Frequently, the actual benefits of natural resource flow do not equal 
anticipated ones. There is often a mismatch between revenues generated and 
local benefits, which is due primarily to issues of governance, transparency, 
and accountability in funding allocation, as well as weak administrative 
capacity in many governments”. 
 
It has further been reported by Wise and Shtylla (2007, p. 7) that the Ministers of 
Minerals and Energy, Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Land Affairs (as they 
then were) had been summoned to appear before the Human Rights Commission with 
regard to mining along the Pondoland coast. It seems that the “mining proposal had 
led to community divisions that contributed to the failure of an eco-tourism project 
and that supporters of the tourism initiative had been intimidated” (Groenewald (a), 
2008).
38
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37
 See: Brummer, and Sole, (2009) and Marshall (2009) 
38
See also: Rabkin, (2008)  
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It later transpired that the DMR had approved the mining at the Wild Coast with a 
DMR spokesman quoted by Hofstatter (b)(2008) as having stated: 
“We must move away from the notion that only environmental issues decide a 
mining application. A host of factors, including housing and social ones, must 
be considered.” 
 
However true this might be, SD requires the consideration of all necessary factors and 
if the operation does not accord with the needs of future generations then mining 
cannot take place. While environmental issues cannot be the only consideration, it 
might well be the deciding issue of whether the mining operation is worth pursuing or 
not. 
 
Legislation might be vague as regards IPs rights, the facts seem to point that if IPs do 
not support a project, it would not continue. It has been reported by Kockott (a) 
(2008) that the announcement of the approval of the mining operation at the Wild 
Coast had resulted in a violent reaction from the community. Later Kockott (b) (2008) 
further reported that the community intended taking the Minister of Mineral 
Resources to court to halt these operations. 
 
Compton (2008) stated that: 
“. . . if one is looking for the wisest and most sustainable land use option for 
this region, then eco–tourism, or more specifically community–based tourism, 
is the option”. 
 
He concluded as follows: 
“In my opinion, it is absolutely disgraceful that a region of such extraordinary 
value can be left in the hands of a government department that is either 
patently ignorant of this region’s significance, or has little interest in 
protecting its assets, human and otherwise. Allegations of corruption and guile 
seem to be supported by evidence and widespread perception. A semblance of 
democratic governance might have exposed, or at least clarified, any 
murkiness”(Compton, 2008). 
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It would seem that all the objections had their effect as the Minister of Mineral 
Resources announced the suspension of the licence (Groenewald (b), 2008).
39
Further, 
in highlighting the relationship between government and companies, Jackson (2009) 
stated:  
“Businesses need to look more critically at the needs of communities in areas 
where they operate and formulate targeted investments that will make a real 
difference. 
“Government’s key role will be to create an enabling environment for 
corporate social investment . . . and ensure sustainability of projects after they 
have run their course.” 
 
While the legislation might be defective, the media has lost no time in coming to the 
aide of IPs and ensures that SD issues for IPs remain at the fore–front of public 
attention. Anglo Platinum, for example, has been accused of ill–treating local 
communities in their area of operations (Stickler, 2008).
40
 This was as a result of a 
study conducted by ActionAid (2008) on various communities directly affected by 
Anglo Platinum operations. In fact, the report states: “ActionAid contends that the 
impact of platinum mining from the mines described in this report hardly promotes 
the ‘social upliftment’ of communities not is it consistent with ‘accepted principles of 
sustainable development’ (ActionAid, 2008, p. 49). This is a serious indictment of one 
of the world’s leading mining companies and this report has already had a reaction to 
a recommendation for an investigation by the Human Rights Commission (ActionAid, 
2008, p. 51). It has been reported that the report has attracted the attention of the 
Human Rights Commission who had announced an investigation of rights abuses in 
the S African mining industry (Groenewald (c), 2008). 
 
The ActionAid report had elicited a speedy and strong response from Anglo Platinum 
(2008, p.4): 
“Anglo Platinum always strives to be a responsible corporate citizen and is 
concerned by the allegations made by ActionAid, which it believes to be 
inaccurate and to contain many distortions”. 
 
                                                 
39
See also: Salgado (2011) 
40
 See also: BBC (2008) and Mathews, (2008)  
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In response to the recommendation for an investigation by the Human Rights 
Commission, it is stated:  
“We welcome the ActionAid recommendation that the South African Human 
rights Commission undertake an investigation as we believe such an 
investigation will yield a balanced and positive outcome” (AngloPlatinum, 
2008, p. 4). 
 
The response then considered and rejected each of the allegations raised by 
ActionAid. One of the final comments made was: 
“Some of the communities in Limpopo Province face many challenges and 
have histories of internal conflict. Relocation brings change and this too can 
generate controversy and rivalries. But we honestly believe that we have 
conducted ourselves in line with international good practice, that impacted 
people have been fully consulted about issues of relevance to their lives, that 
we have provided fair compensation including land for agriculture, that we 
have improved the living conditions and facilities of the communities 
concerned and that we will be generating significant economic and social 
benefits for local people, for the Province of Limpopo and for South Africa” 
(AngloPlatinum, 2008, p. 39). 
 
SD, as it currently stands, appears to be driven by mining companies who 
“accommodate” the IP and environmental interests. This would evolve into being 
driven by IP and other interested parties “accommodating” the mining. This evolution 
of SD should not be lightly disregarded.  
 
SD comes to the assistance of IPs and IPs should make every effort to ensure that they 
reap the maximum benefit that SD practices afford them. Failure of IPs to take notice 
of SD, or to even ignore the benefits it offers, could be disastrous.
41
 After all, IPs form 
an integral part of SD and even though the government may not be committed to SD, 
mining companies are bound by international best practice to ensure that the rights of 
IPs are protected.  
 
                                                 
41
Proper SD practices would have assisted, for example, De Beers and the communities of Kleinzee 
and Koingnaas – See: Jordan, (2009) 
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6.11. Conclusion 
With the introduction of the MPRDA(2002), the Mining Charter (2002) and the 
Amended Mining Charter (2010), and the various environmental legislations, this 
indicates that the S African legislative framework does provide for mining companies 
to engage in SD practices. The S African framework reflects the international 
developments in SD from the various industry and international organisations’ 
initiatives to the various compliance mechanisms that monitor SD practices. In this 
manner, in complying with S African regulatory mechanisms, companies are 
complying with international standards as well. 
 
While the Africa Mining Vision (2009) also provided for SD, unlike other 
international documents it does not adequately cater for IPs. In addition, while it 
recognises CSR, CSR is too narrow a concept and IPs’ interests are better protected in 
SD practices, which is broad enough to encompass the education requirements of SA 
as well. 
 
In light thereof, the strategy should include SD principles as of necessity. The strategy 
must further recognise and provide for the interaction and co-operation of all 
interested parties; namely, mining companies, government and IPs and these parties 
must be committed to the processes as per the general SD principles. This would 
convert various international mining, UN and other organisations’ efforts into a 
reality. Further, the academic exercise that is the Natural Resources Charter would 
easily become one of the most important instruments as far as SD practices in mining 
is concerned. 
 
The next chapter would involve a consideration of three case studies involving IPs 
affected by mining and how each IP concerned has responded to the various 
challenges in asserting their mineral rights.   
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Chapter Seven 
CASE STUDIES 
 
7.1. Introduction 
This chapter comprises three case studies, the first is on the Richtersveld Community 
who instituted the first judicial review on the reclaiming of dispossessed land and 
mineral rights in terms of the Restitution of Land Rights Act (1994); the second 
involves the Royal Bafokeng Nation who had substantial autonomy over their land 
and mineral rights which enabled them to significantly develop themselves; and the 
third centres on the Swazi Nation where the traditional leadership and traditional 
structures could determine how IPs could enforce their mineral rights.  
 
7.2. The Richtersveld Community 
With the introduction of democracy, and the subsequent legislative reforms, the 
Richtersveld Community was propelled into the forefront of legal scrutiny, especially 
for the legal protection and enforcement of mineral rights for IPs. The Richtersveld 
Community was fortunate in that they had the advices of, and were represented by, 
the Legal Resources Centre (LRC); which enabled them to explore available judicial 
avenues for the protection of their rights. 
 
7.2.1. Background of the Richtersveld Community 
In considering the Richtersveld Community and the geographical area from whence 
they hail, Gildenhuys, AJ in the Land Claims Court (LCC) stated as follows: 
“The Richtersveld forms part of a larger area known as Namaqualand. One 
part of Namaqualand is north of the Garib River, and is known as Great 
Namaqualand. The other part is south of the Garib River in the Northern Cape 
Province, and is known as Little Namaqualand. The Richtersveld is part of 
Little Namaqualand. The original inhabitants of Namaqualand were 
overwhelmingly KhoiKhoi, but also included some San people. They were 
present in the area long before the Dutch colonisation at the Cape. The 
KhoiKhoi were mainly pastoralists, whilst the San were hunter gatherers. They 
moved about in nomadic fashion, according to the seasons and the rainfall. 
Over time, people from the two groups (at least in Little Namaqualand) 
merged with each other and with others who came to the area, in particularly 
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with the so-called basters (people of mixed descent, mainly from white fathers 
and San or Khoi mothers). They are at times referred to as Khoisan” 
(Richtersveld Community and Others vs Alexkor Ltd and Another (2001, p. 
1306). 
 
From the above, the Richtersveld Community comprised the communities that lived 
in the Richtersveld area. They were mostly pastoralists, which was emphasised by 
Vivier ADP of the SCA who stated that, “archaeological discoveries showed a 
pastoralist presence in the Richtersveld as early as 700 AD” (Richtersveld Community 
and Others vs Alexkor Ltd and Another (2003, p. 114).While they might not have 
been on the land on a permanent basis, the Richtersveld Community did have a 
presence in the area. With the expansion of the Cape, the area was annexed to the 
Cape by Proclamation on 17
th
 December 1847; (Richtersveld Community and Others 
vs Alexkor Ltd and Another (2003, p. 119) that is, it became subject to British rule. 
However, it seems that there was no attempt by the British to inhabit the area. 
However, with alluvial diamonds being discovered in the Richtersveld in 1925, this 
resulted in the Richtersveld Community being progressively denied access to their 
lands (Barry, 2004, p. 365). A State company was subsequently formed to mine the 
diamonds.  
 
According to the LCC, a Richtersveld Reserve was declared over the area in 1930 in 
terms of Section 6 of the Crown Disposal Act (1887) “in favour of the Minister of 
Native Affairs for the use of persons residing therein” (Richtersveld Community and 
Others vs Alexkor Ltd and Another, 2001, p. 1309). Ownership of the land was passed 
from the State onto the Alexander Bay Development Corporation (a State-owned 
company) in 1989, which later became Alexkor Ltd (Barry, 2004, p. 365) - which 
received ownership of the land from the Alexander Bay Development Corporation 
between 1992 and 1995 (Richtersveld Community and Others vs Alexkor Ltd and 
Another, 2001, p. 1308 - 1309).  
 
From the above, the Richtersveld Community had no access to all the land of the 
Richtersveld, which would have affected their pastoralist way of life and it also shows 
that they did not benefit from the discovery of diamonds on the land. 
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7.2.2. The Journey Through the Courts 
7.2.2.1. Land Restitution 
The Richterveld Community initially lodged a claim, as per the Restitution of Land 
Rights Act (1994), in the LCC but split the issues. The first set of issues dealt with the 
Richtersveld Community’s claim for restitution, with the remaining issues to be 
decided at a subsequent separate hearing. The first set of issues that the LCC dealt 
with was: 
“(a) whether the plaintiffs are communities or individuals who themselves or 
through their forebears 
(b) had rights in the subject land 
(c) of which they were dispossessed after 19 June 1913 
(d) by racially discriminatory laws or practices” (Richtersveld Community and 
Others vs Alexkor Ltd and Another, 2001, p. 1304). 
 
After considering the circumstances of the Richtersveld Community, Gildenhuys, AJ 
concluded:  
“The [Richtersveld Community] failed to establish two essential elements of 
its restitution claim, namely that its dispossession was of a kind that will 
support a claim for restitution, and that it resulted from a racially 
discriminatory law or practice. In essence, the [Richtersveld Community] 
seeks to undo the appropriation of the subject land by the British colonial 
authorities, and not the restitution of rights in land lost through racially 
discriminatory laws or practices” (Richtersveld Community and Others vs 
Alexkor Ltd and Another, 2001, p. 1348). 
 
The LCC found that by virtue of the annexation to the Cape, the Richtersveld had 
become a terra nullius. In these circumstances, the Richtersveld Community lost the 
LCC case. In losing this claim for land restitution, the Richtersveld Community also 
lost their right to claim restitution of their mineral rights together with any 
compensation they might have been entitled to. The Richtersveld Community 
thereupon appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeals (SCA).As regards the notion 
that the land was terra nullius, the SCA’s Vivier ADP stated: 
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“The primary rule was that the land belonged to the Richtersveld community 
as a whole and that all its people were entitled to the reasonable occupation 
and use of all land held in common by them and its resources. All members of 
the community had a sense of legitimate access to the land to the exclusion of 
all other people. Non–members had no such rights and had to obtain 
permission to use the land for which they sometimes had to pay” (Richtersveld 
Community and Others vs Alexkor Ltd and Another, 2003, p. 115). 
 
Vivier ADP subsequently rejected the principle of terra nullius as being applicable in 
this case. In doing so, the learned judge considered and recognised the customary law 
claim of the Richtersveld Community to the land as follows: 
“With regard to the Richtersveld people’s occupation of the subject land two 
aspects need to be stressed. First, uninterrupted presence on the land need not 
amount to possession at common law for the purpose of an indigenous law 
right of occupation. Second, a nomadic lifestyle is not inconsistent with the 
exclusive and effective right of occupation of land by indigenous people.” 
(Richtersveld Community and Others vs Alexkor Ltd and Another, 2003, p. 
117) 
 
This is of high import, as the SCA hereby gave credence to and recognised the 
traditional practices of the Richtersveld Community as pastoralists, which was 
regarded as not being an impediment to their claim for restitution. After considering 
various other issues, Vivier ADP concluded that “the Colonial Government and its 
successor at all material times from annexation until immediately prior to the alleged 
dispossession, recognised the Richtersveld people as a distinct community which had 
occupied the whole of the Richtersveld from prior to annexation and had continued to 
do so” (Richtersveld Community and Others vs Alexkor Ltd and Another (2003, p. 
133). 
 
While the SCA had made other pertinent statements, it is opportune, at this juncture, 
to also consider the appeal lodged by Alexkor to the Constitutional Court (CC). 
Regarding the Richtersveld Community’s claim for restitution of land, the CC 
considered the establishment of the Richtersveld Reserve in 1926 and the Precious 
Stones Act (1927) (which made provision for the state alluvial diggings) and 
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concluded that the establishment of the Reserve could not be clearly stated to be 
dispossessing the Richtersveld Community, while the Precious Stones Act(1927) 
“rendered the occupation of the subject land by the Richtersveld Community unlawful 
and dispossessed it of the rights it had as owner of the land” (Alexkor Ltd vs 
Richtersveld Community and Others, 2004, pp. 488 – 490). 
 
7.2.2.2. Mineral Rights 
While the land claim might seem to have been a contentious issue, it was the mineral 
rights that proved to be even more so. If the claim for mineral rights was approved, 
then the issue of compensation becomes paramount considering that the Richtersveld 
Community never benefitted from the exploitation thereof. In the SCA, Vivier, ADP 
accepted expert evidence that the Richtersveld Community “appreciated the value of 
minerals” and that they granted mineral leases to outsiders (Richtersveld Community 
and Others vs Alexkor Ltd and Another, 2003, p. 134).  
 
Vivier, ADP thereupon concluded: 
“This evidence clearly establishes that the Richtersveld community believed 
that the right to minerals belonged to them and that they acted in a manner 
consistent with such a belief. They exploited the minerals without requesting 
permission from anyone to do so and, significantly, strangers respected their 
rights by obtaining their permission to prospect for minerals and concluding 
mining and mineral leases with them” (Richtersveld Community and Others vs 
Alexkor Ltd and Another, 2003, p. 135). 
 
The SCA then granted the appeal of the Richtersveld Community and stated that they 
were entitled to restitution of the land including the minerals and precious stones. As 
previously stated, Alexkor took the case on appeal to the CC and claimed that the 
Richtersveld Community could not have ownership of the minerals and precious 
stones. In this regard, the CC stated: 
“We are satisfied that under the indigenous law of the Richtersveld 
Community communal ownership of the land included communal ownership 
of the minerals and precious stones. Indeed both Alexkor and the government 
were unable to suggest in whom ownership in the minerals vested if it did not 
vest in the Community. Accordingly, we conclude that the history and usages 
 192 
of the Richtersveld Community establish that ownership of the minerals and 
precious stones vested in the Community under indigenous law” (Alexkor Ltd 
vs Richtersveld Community and Others, 2004, p. 483). 
 
The CC found that the act of annexation of the land by the British did not “extinguish 
the right to ownership which the Richtersveld Community possessed in the subject 
land and that such right was not extinguished prior to 19 June 1913” (Alexkor Ltd vs 
Richtersveld Community and Others, 2004, p. 488). The CC thereafter concluded that: 
“In effect what the state did was to treat the subject land as its own and to pass 
laws that excluded the Community from all benefits in it and ultimately to vest 
ownership of the subject land in Alexkor” (Alexkor Ltd vs Richtersveld 
Community and Others, 2004, p. 492).  
 
The CC therefore denied Alexkor’s appeal and ordered that the Richtersveld 
Community was entitled to “restitution of the right to ownership of the subject land 
(including its minerals and precious stones) and to the exclusive beneficial use and 
occupation thereof” (Alexkor Ltd vs Richtersveld Community and Others, 2004, p. 
493). 
 
7.2.2.3. The Remaining Issues 
After the CC decision, the parties returned to the LCC to have the remaining issues 
dealt with. The remaining issues were:  
- restoration of the rights to minerals and the exclusive beneficial use and 
occupation of the subject land to the Richtersveld Community,   
- compensation for the diminution of their rights as a result of the removal of 
the minerals 
- repair of the environmental damage that was capable of repair and 
compensation for irreparable environmental damage (The Richtersveld 
Community and Others vs Alexkor and The Government of the Republic of 
South Africa, 2004, p. 5). 
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Following the CC upholding the claims of the Richtersveld Community, the second 
LCC decision was far reaching: 
- After considering various cases, Gildenhuys J concluded that the LCC could 
order both “restoration and compensation in satisfaction of a claim for 
restitution whenever a combination of both are required to achieve the 
objectives of the Restitution of Land Rights Act” (The Richtersveld 
Community and Others vs Alexkor and The Government of the Republic of 
South Africa, 2004,p. 16). 
- The LCC can order the State “to repair the damage to the land, insofar as it is 
feasible to do so and to pay compensation for it insofar as it is not” (The 
Richtersveld Community and Others vs Alexkor and The Government of the 
Republic of South Africa, 2004,p. 18). 
 
As such, in addition to receiving the land, the Richtersveld Community could also 
claim for compensation for not benefitting from the diamond operations and to also 
have their environment restored; that is, Alexkor had to rehabilitate the Richtersveld 
where the mining operations were being conducted. 
 
7.2.2.4. The Settlement 
A settlement agreement was subsequently entered into which, inter alia, provided 
that: the land be transferred to the Richtersveld Community, the creation of a Pooling 
and Sharing Joint Venture (PSJV) with the Richtersveld Community having 49% and 
Alexkor having 51% of the PSJV for the mining of diamonds, Alexkor could exit the 
PSJV by exercising a “Put Option” to sell its stake in the PSJV or to sell its stake after 
5 years, R 190 million (one hundred and ninety million rand) to be paid to the 
Richtersveld Community’s Investment Holding Company over 3 years and R 50 
million (fifty million rand) paid as a lump sum development grant to the Investment 
Holding Company (Department of Public Enterprises, 2007). 
 
The Minister of Public Enterprises at that time, Erwin, spoke glowingly of the 
settlement and that would stimulate, inter alia, agriculture, tourism and, important for 
the mining industry, he hinted at the possibility of diamond beneficiation in the region 
involving the Richtersveld Community as well (Hill, 2007). However, while there was 
celebration of this settlement, the LRC did not agree therewith and withdrew as legal 
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representatives (Joubert (a), 2007). It seems that the agreement was signed against the 
advice of the LRC which felt that the agreement was flawed and was only a partial 
settlement of the claim (Maclennan, 2007). This also caused a split in the community 
with a new set of representatives being tasked to join the legal proceedings in 
opposition to the settlement agreement (Joubert (a), 2007) and (Joubert (b), 2007).  
 
In support of the LRC’s concerns, the chief executive of the Bench Marks Foundation 
(2009, p. 1), Capel, is quoted as stating: 
“in spite of their spirited efforts, the people of Richtersveld may not be able to 
reap the rewards since alluvial diamond mining in Alexander Bay has come to 
a standstill and Alexkor, like De Beers is shifting its focus from alluvial 
diamond mining to marine mining.” 
 
In reading the Summary of the Deed of Settlement, it would appear that the marine 
operations of Alexkor are also subject to this agreement. However, this does not in 
fact appear to be the case as Capel further quoted as stating: 
“In terms of the Deed of Settlement the land mining rights will be transferred 
to the community, whilst the marine mining rights stay with Alexkor”(Bench 
Marks Foundation, 2009, p. 1).
42
 
 
It is interesting to note the timeline of the journey through the courts: 
- 2001 – LCC delivers first judgment; 
- March 2003 – SCA delivers judgment; 
- October 2003 – CC delivers judgment; 
- April 2004 – LCC delivers second judgment; and 
- April 2007 – Settlement agreement entered into 
 
Ignoring the exchange of legal documentation between the parties, possible settlement 
negotiations and the arguments before the LCC prior to it delivering the first 
judgment; it was obviously a cumbersome and time consuming process which could 
have been resolved at any time by Alexkor and the State. It is unfortunate that the 
State had not used this opportunity to set an example to the mining industry but had 
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See also: Seccombe (2011) 
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behaved as the worst form of company – securing the best deal for itself at the 
expense of IPs. The government, it appears, had succumbed to the famous saying of 
Boccaccio: “Do as we say, and not as we do” (Think Exist, nd). 
 
While the settlement agreement was to have ended the disputes and was to have 
ushered in a new era for the Richtersveld Community, it has transpired that the 
community is still very much divided and the settlement has not aided them at all; in 
fact, it has divided them further (Pressly, 2010).
43
At the same time however, it seems 
that Alexkor is adding to the discord by granting contracts to those outside of the 
Richtersveld Community (SAPA, 2009).It would appear that Alexkor could be 
shirking its SD responsibilities to the Richtersveld Community. Even though there has 
been a settlement; that does not absolve Alexkor of its SD responsibilities to the 
Richtersveld Community.
44
 
 
A key consideration for IPs, from the experience of the Richtersveld Community, is 
that, in seeking a judicial solution, IPs must be certain of their requirements and, 
further, have no unresolved issues and disputes amongst themselves. This should 
guard against protracted delays in effecting a settlement and IPs could receive benefit 
sooner. This could also prevent IPs from being susceptible to exploitation by 
opportunists from outside the community.
45
 
 
Lesson:   
- IPs can resort to the judicial system to enforce their mineral rights; 
- Approaching the judiciary for remedy is expensive and time consuming; 
- While the law can provide a mechanism for protection of IPS mineral rights, it 
is for the IPs themselves to proactively engage with such mechanisms. ; 
- IPs’ representatives must represent, and must be seen to be representing, the 
interests of the IPs; 
- All community issues, concerns and conflicts must be sorted out prior to 
engaging with mining companies, including the leadership and decision-
making issues; 
                                                 
43
See also: Khuzwayo, (2010) 
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See: Ntsaluba, (2010); for an exposition on the problems as regards the settlement.  
45
See: Rose, (a) (2009) and Rose, (b) (2009) 
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- The terra nullius principle is recognised in S African law though it is not 
applicable; 
- Unlawful/Incorrect State action can be remedied by recourse to the judiciary; 
- IPs, regardless of their “sophistication”, must familiarise themselves with all 
aspects of mineral laws so that they are not taken advantage of; 
- IPs must be wary of the agendas of mining companies, whether State-owned 
or privately owned, to ensure that their rights are not ignored or subverted; 
- IPs are entitled to compensation for loss of past mineral benefits; 
- If going the judicial route, IPs must be certain of their expected outcomes and 
the minimum requirements for any settlement; 
- Settlements must be aimed at achieving the maximum benefit with the 
reasonable participation of the IPs; and 
- IPs should not be swayed by the once-off benefits of the perceived massive 
financial injection but must also consider the nature of the activity, the inroads 
into their livelihoods, customs and lifestyles as well.  
 
7.3. The Royal Bafokeng Nation 
The Bafokeng have been described as being “Setswana-speaking people who lived as 
a distinct community close to the modern town of Rustenburg from the end of the 
seventeenth century . . .” (Manson and Mbenga 2003, p. 26). The Raw Materials 
Group describes the Royal Bafokeng Nation (RBN) as being “a state with ownership 
in the mining industry. It has an interest in the production of chromite, coal, copper, 
gold, nickel, palladium, pgms, platinum, rhodium” (Raw Materials Group, nd). 
 
It seems that the RBN are using their skills and finances obtained from mining to 
develop their capital, Phokeng, into a “miniature Dubai” on the lines of a “State 
within a State” (Gqubule, 2007). In voicing his circumspection with this vision of 
creating a “miniature Dubai”, Gqubule (2007, p. 70) stated: 
“The vision relies on a large degree of independence from the SA government, 
but it is not yet certain that the ‘state within a state model’ will be given the all 
clear, in view of the tax and other regulatory exemptions the Bafokeng are 
seeking. For now, indications are that the Bafokeng have the political backing 
of Pretoria, and have co-operation agreements with both the North West 
provincial government and the town council of Rustenburg”. 
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It is interesting that the RBN would seek such a grand vision, taking into 
consideration the Nation’s humble beginnings, and illustrates the strides the Nation 
has undertaken. In their submissions with regard to the Communal Land Rights Bill, 
as it then was, the RBN stated that they were initially prevented from owning land by 
the Boers. This changed when:  
“The British Administration altered the position in that it initiated the principle 
of vesting land title for blacks in a responsible representative of the 
government as official trustee”(Royal Bafokeng Nation, 2003, p. 3). 
 
It seems that when the British lost the Transvaal to the Boers, they sought to ensure 
that the interests of the RBN were protected in the Pretoria Convention (Royal 
Bafokeng Nation, 2003, p. 4).The RBN purchased land in the North West Province, as 
it is now known, as from 1871 until 1935 (Royal Bafokeng Nation, 2003, pp. 3 - 6). 
However, due to Apartheid policies they were prevented from registering themselves 
as owners of land which resulted in the RBN being “compelled to adopt a form of 
registration in terms of which the Bafokeng land was registered in trust in the name of 
either of a white clergyman or a government official” (Bafokeng Tribe vs Impala 
Platinum Ltd and Others, 1999, p. 532).
46
 
 
However, the RBN described this part of their history as follows: 
“As the money accumulated, Kgosi enlisted the help of Lutheran  
missionaries, living and teaching in Phokeng to register the purchase of 
Bafokeng farms in their names. The land titles were held in trustfo the 
Bafokeng. Over a 20-year period, two-thirds of the land currently owned by 
the Royal Bafokeng Nation (RBN) was acquired.  
“. . . It was not until the 1920s that geologist Hans Merensky discovered in the 
Rustenburg Valley the surface outcrop of the Bushveld Complex, which has 
the largest known deposit of platinum group metals . . . 
“Over the next seven decades, efforts were made by the governments of the 
day to dispossess the RBN of their land rights. . . Attempts to strip the 
Bafokeng of their heritage did not succeed, however, and from the late 1990s, 
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See also: Bennett, TW and Powel, CH (2000, p. 601) for an exposition of the nature of these trusts 
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mining companies started to pay equitable royalties to the RBN in exchange 
for the right to mine on the land”(Royal Bafokeng Holdings, 2008, p. 2).47 
 
It seems that the Native Land Act (1913) had no effect on the RBN’s purchase of land. 
The RBN noted: 
“There is no recorded instance where the government of the Republic of South 
Africa sought to deal with the Bafokeng land contrary to the wishes of the 
Bafokeng. On the contrary the trustee inevitably adopted the attitude that he 
should act as required by the Bafokeng in land related transactions. 
In dealing with their land the Bafokeng have always exercised rights 
consistent with ownership. The government functionaries holding the land in 
trust for the Bafokeng have never purported to exercise rights inconsistent 
with the Bafokeng’s rights of ownership. The single notable exception to this 
was President Lucas Mangope of Bophuthatswana who purported in 1990 to 
conclude mining contracts on behalf of the Bafokeng against the will of the 
Bafokeng”(Royal BafokengNation (2003), p. 7).48 
 
It thus appears that while the law at that time did not offer preferential treatment to the 
RBN, the appointed functionaries, empowered the RBN by letting them exercise 
effective control over their land. This ownership of the land places the RBN in a 
unique position as compared to other IPs in SA – they own their traditional lands. 
Even though the MPRDA (2002) has transferred ownership of minerals away from 
landowners, being the legal title holders of their traditional lands means that the RBN 
can operate on their traditional lands without being forced to prove their traditional 
titles to do so. Further, though custodianship of minerals now rests with the S African 
State, as landowners the RBN are a major stakeholder of mineral development and 
therefore have a say in the development of such resources on their land, especially 
with regard to their further development. 
 
With this in mind, it is understandable that the RBN has compiled the Royal 
Bafokeng National Masterplan which contains the plan of development of the RBN 
from 2006 to 2035 and is described as “a vast developmental exercise which will be 
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implemented over a 30-year period, and is based on a detailed assessment of the 
opportunities offered and constraints imposed by the land owned and controlled by 
the RBN” (Royal Bafokeng Nation, 2007, p. 3). 
 
The Masterplan covers, inter alia, commercial and industrial development, residential 
development, recreational and tourist development, road and transport development, 
environmental protection and educational development, health care and social service 
development (Royal Bafokeng Nation, 2007, p. 1).  It is evident that this plan has 
been carefully thought through and that the development of the area is of paramount 
importance to the RBN. With these developments, it is understandable that the DMR 
regards the RBN as the ultimate example of what IPs in SA could achieve (Rocha, 
2010). 
 
While Schedule II of the MPRDA (2002) required the RBN to disclose its royalty 
receipts to the Minister and thereby obtain permission to continue receiving such 
payments, the RBN opted for shareholding in mining companies instead (Bain, 2006). 
In this way, as far as the RBN was concerned, companies that mine on RBN land 
would not be liable for both State and community royalties. The RBN benefits in that 
the shareholding allows them greater participation in the mining businesses and to 
also receive dividends from such involvement. It goes without saying that the RBN 
has used the available options to ensure they receive a maximum benefit from the 
exploitation of the natural resources. This has resulted in the RBN listing a mining 
company (Royal Bafokeng Platinum) on the Johannesburg Securities Exchange 
(SAPA, 2010).  
 
Mthanjane (2010) ascribed the development of the RBN to, inter alia, effective 
leadership.  According to Mthanjane (2010), the RBN’s traditional leadership 
comprises the Supreme Council headed by the current Kgosi, Kgosi Molotlegi. This 
Supreme Council exercises effective control of Royal Bafokeng Holdings (RBH), the 
investment vehicle of the RBN, which is also chaired by the Kgosi.  
 
While the Supreme Council comprises the traditional authority of the RBN, it is not 
the highest decision-making body. According to Mthanjane (2010), the highest 
decision-making body of the RBN is the General Meeting of All RBN Members 
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which meets annually and to which the Supreme Council reports. In this way, 
Mthanjane (2010) felt that a system of accountability is established where the 
members of the RBN are fully appraised of and participate in the mining investments 
of the RBN. He further believed that this system of accountability and participation of 
the RBN, with the traditional leadership, accounts for the success of the RBN. In the 
same way, a failure in leadership would negatively affect the development of a 
community, as evidenced by the leadership struggles of the Bakgatla community 
(Khuzwayo, 2011).  
 
In all these benefits that are accruing to the RBN, there were still many disgruntled 
people in the area (Hofstatter and Rose, 2010). However, as can be seen from above, 
it is unlikely that individuals would be completely sidelined when the whole 
community benefits. As Mthenjani (2010) stated: 
“The aim, and all actions, are geared to benefit the community as a whole, 
whether Bafokeng or not. If living in the area, we aim to ensure that all the 
people benefit from mining” 
 
Lessons: 
- Effective leadership and vision for IPs future is essential; 
- Traditional leadership has an active role to play in the development of IPs; 
- A long term vision is essential to derive maximum benefit which would accrue 
over time. As such, a dynamic programme is required that can be adapted, 
depending on the circumstances; 
- IPs must be able to balance the long-term vision with current expectations; and 
- The community must have the necessary faith in the traditional leadership and 
the leadership must not cause the community to lose such faith 
 
7.4. The Swazi Nation 
Having considered two case studies from either extremes in SA, it seems appropriate 
to consider the circumstances of one of SA’s closest neighbours and a member if 
Southern African Development Community (SADC); that is, the Kingdom of 
Swaziland. 
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The Kingdom is landlocked and shares its borders with SA and Mozambique 
(Coakley, 2001, p. 27.1). It obtained independence from Britain in 1968 with a 
constitutional monarchy and an elected Parliament (US Department of State, 2011, p. 
2). However, the then King Sobhuza repealed the Constitution, dissolved Parliament 
and assumed all government powers (US Department of State, 2011, p. 3). The 
current monarch is King Mswati III who was enthroned in 1986 (US Department of 
State, 2011, p. 3). 
 
It has been stated that: 
“According to Swazi law and custom, the monarch holds supreme executive, 
legislative, and judicial powers. In general practice, however, the monarch’s 
power is delegated through a dualistic system: modern, statutory bodies, like 
the cabinet; and less formal traditional government structures. The king must 
approve legislation passed by parliament before it becomes law. The prime 
minister, who is head of government, and the cabinet, which is recommended 
by the prime minister and approved by the king, exercise executive authority” 
(US Department of State, p. 3). 
 
Minerals are regulated by the Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland (Swazi 
Constitution) (2005) in that Section 213 of the Swazi Constitution (2005) provides 
that all minerals and mineral oils “vest in iNgwenyama in trust for the Swazi Nation . . 
.”  
 
Further, in Section 214, the Swazi Constitution (2005) creates the Minerals 
Management Board which, in terms of Section 214(5), is to advise the iNgwenyama 
“on the overall management of minerals and making of grants, leases or other 
dispositions conferring rights or interests in respect of minerals or mineral oils in 
Swaziland.” 
 
It is interesting that this Board is provided for in the Swazi Constitution (2005) as it 
implies that the Board is given a high status and indicates the seriousness of the Swazi 
State in dealing with its minerals. Further, by advising the iNgwenyama directly, it 
cements the high status the Board enjoys. 
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However, whilst having the world’s oldest mine, Coakley (2001, p. 27.1) reports that 
the mining industry is in decline though there are attempts to revive it.
49
 This is 
confirmed by the Geological Survey and Mines Department of Swaziland (2006, p. 
3), which harbours no misconception as regards the magnitude of the task; as the 
Department stated: 
“Government wishes to reverse the decline of the mining industry by 
attracting new investment in the exploration for and exploitation of mineral 
resources. Government recognises that to do this it must establish an enabling 
environment for investors that is based upon modern regulatory arrangements 
and competitive terms.” 
 
While there might be concern that the Swaziland government is going to do all it can 
to attract investment at the expense of other considerations, the Department stated: 
“Whilst Government is seeking to encourage investment by mining 
companies, there is also a need to ensure that mining operations are conducted 
responsibly. The neglect of the environment and harm to local communities as 
a result of mining operations is not acceptable. The intention is to ensure that 
Swaziland is securing the full economic and social benefits which mining 
development promises” (Geological Survey and Mines Department of 
Swaziland, 2006, p. 3). 
 
To promote investment, a change in the mineral legislation was warranted as the 
Mines, Minerals, Works and Factories Act was promulgated in 1958. To this end a 
National Mining Policy (2003) was formulated which states as follows: 
“In order to diversify the sources of economic development in the country the 
Government wishes to foster development of a thriving mining industry that 
will contribute to sustainable economic development. The Government 
recognises the positive contribution that mining can make as an engine for the 
economic development of Swaziland by diversifying the export base, 
widening the tax base, generating skilled employment, creating demand for 
local goods and services, contributing to infrastructure development, 
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producing raw materials for local usage and acting as a catalyst for wider 
investment in the economy” (National Mining Policy, 2003, p. 4). 
 
In reading the above, it is clear that in developing this policy the Swaziland 
government had an eye on the developments in SA. This is confirmed to an extent by 
the Mineral Policy itself when it states: 
“Moreover, to succeed, Swaziland has to compete effectively against near-
neighbours that are already established among the world’s leading mineral 
producers, such as South Africa, Botswana, Namibia and Zambia” (National 
Mining Policy, 2003, p. 4). 
 
In monitoring developments amongst its neighbours, it is obvious that Swaziland 
would be learning from the mistakes of these neighbours. In this way, the mineral 
development in SA has already influenced mineral development in Swaziland and 
perhaps other SADC countries as well; and any research aimed at improving the S 
African system would also impact the other countries as well. 
 
7.4.1. Mines, Minerals, Works and Factories Act 5 of 1958 
While the S African minerals legislation is comprised of various legislations that 
impact the industry, in Swaziland all issues affecting mining are contained in this 
Mines, Minerals, Works and Factories Act (1958) (Mining Act). As such, this Mining 
Act(1958) contained some 130 Sections covering the various aspects of mining and a 
Schedule that is only dealing with repealed laws. 
 
On reading the Mining Act (1958), it is the iNgwenyama (king), through the Minerals 
Management Board, that controls the mining industry, from the application for a 
prospecting right, in Section 4, and mining lease, in Section 41, the appointment of a 
Mining Board, Commissioner of Mines and other officers, in Section 6; to being 
notified of the discovery of any minerals of economic value, in Section 17, and the 
cancelling of rights, in Section 22. 
 
Further discussion is not warranted as this law is now replaced by the Mines and 
Minerals Act of 2010, as discussed below. 
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7.4.2. The National Mining Policy of October 2003 
As mentioned above, seeing that the Mining Act(1958) is over five decades old and 
did not effectively cover all aspects of mining, the Swazi government developed a 
National Mining Policy (Mining Policy) to look into the development of Swaziland to 
2020 (National Mining Policy, 2003, p. 4). 
 
The Mining Policy (2003) provides for some high ideals in that: 
“Whilst seeking to encourage investment by mining companies, there is also a 
need to ensure that mining operations are conducted responsibly. The neglect 
of the environment and harm to local communities as a result of mining 
operations is not acceptable. Opportunities must also be maximised for 
participation by Swazi’s in the mining sector, whether as providers of capital, 
labour or goods and services. The intention is to ensure that Swaziland is 
securing the full economic and social benefits which mining development 
promises” (National Mining Policy, 2003, p. 5). 
 
The Mining Policy (2003) has 11 guiding principles for sustainable mining 
development: 
“1. To ensure that Swaziland’s mineral endowment is managed on a 
sustainable economic, social and environmental basis and that there is an 
equitable sharing of the financial and developmental benefits of mining 
between investors and all Swazi stakeholders. 
2. To encourage local and foreign private sector participation in the 
exploration for and commercial exploitation of mineral resources, in keeping 
with the Government’s commitment to a free-market enterprise economy . . . 
the government will maintain: 
∙ a conducive macro-economic environment for mining investment 
∙ a stable regulatory environment in which investors are treated in an even-
handed and transparent manner 
∙ access by investors to and security of tenure over areas of mineral potential, 
and 
∙ a stable, competitive and fair fiscal regime 
3. To achieve a socially acceptable balance between mining and the physical 
and human environment and to ensure that internationally accepted standards 
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of health, mining safety and environmental protection are observed by all 
participants in the mining sector. 
4. To encourage and facilitate orderly and sustainable development of small 
scale mining . . .  
5. To empower Swazis to become professional miners, managers and owners 
by maximising opportunities for minerals-related education, training and 
career development and offering opportunities for financial participation in the 
mining sector. 
6. To require respect for employee, gender and human rights in mining . . .  
7. To encourage mining companies to develop a participatory and 
collaborative approach to mine planning and development, taking into account 
the needs of local communities, thereby fulfilling their role as good corporate 
citizens. 
8. To develop streamlined and effective institutional arrangements for the 
mining sector with adequate capacity to promote, authorise, monitor and 
regulate mineral operations. 
9. To apply principles of transparency and accountability to the administration 
of mining regulation and facilitate community participation in such processes. 
. . 
10. To equip the Ministry responsible for mining with the capacity to gather, 
analyse and disseminate geo-data necessary for the promotion of minerals 
sector investment. 
11. To act in harmony with regional and international partners and, to this end, 
to endorse principles that are established in the SADC Mining Protocol and in 
regional and international conventions and undertakings relevant to and which 
have an impact on mining to which Swaziland is a party” (National Mining 
Policy, 2003, p. 6). 
 
These guiding principles seem to reflect the notion that full cognisance has been taken 
of regional and international developments and standards. However, while cognisance 
is given to these standards, the policy is aimed at re-invigorating mineral investment 
with due consideration of the interests of the IPs of Swaziland. 
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The Mining Policy (2003) also deals with regulation of the mining sector (National 
Mining Policy, 2003, p. 9), minerals licensing (National Mining Policy, 2003, p. 11), 
a fiscal policy for mining (National Mining Policy, 2003, p. 16), environmental 
regulation for mining (National Mining Policy, 2003, p. 19) and a programme to 
secure the maximum benefits of mining (National Mining Policy, 2003, p. 22).The 
Mining Policy (2003) thus provides for an extensive revision of the regulation of 
minerals in Swaziland to take account of the various international developments and 
to secure more and better investment for the Kingdom. 
 
7.4.3. Mines and Minerals Act 4 of 2011 
Following the publication of the Mining Policy (2003), the Mines and Minerals 
Act(2011) repealed and replaced the Mining Act (1958) by virtue of Section 161.The 
Mines and Minerals Act (2011), in Section 3, makes a distinction between 
reconnaissance, prospecting and mining as distinct activities each requiring a permit 
or licence, as the case may be. The Mines and Minerals Act (2011), as per Section 2, 
refers to all rights, permits and licences by the collective term “mineral right”. As 
such, in the discussion of “mineral rights”, this would refer to the collective of the 
various rights recognised by the new Act. 
 
The Mines and Minerals Act (2011) specifically recognises the Minerals Management 
Board created in the Swazi Constitution (2005), in Section 8, and, in Section 11(1), 
expands its functions to include dealing with the administration of mineral rights if 
such functions are delegated to it, consider applications for mineral and mining rights 
and investigate allegations and complaints as regards mining licences and mining 
permits. 
 
This Act further provides, in Sections 16 and 17, for the establishment and 
appointment of a Commissioner of Mines with the various functions encapsulated in 
Sections 18 and 19. While the various permits and licences are dealt with individually 
between Sections 36 to 76, there are a few general provisions that apply to all mineral 
rights contained between Sections 20 to 35. While it is evident that many provisions 
of the Mines and Minerals Act (2011) has been influenced by the mineral legislation 
in SA, some bear specific mention such as the provisions relating to employment and 
training in Section 28, local procurement in Section 29, protection of the environment 
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in Sections 122 to 125 and Sections 127 - 129 and royalties in Section 132; which 
reflect the attempts by the S African government to better regulate the mining 
industry and to derive as much benefit as possible while protecting the environment 
and those affected by such operations. 
 
Incidentally, in Section 133, the Mines and Minerals Act (2011) provides that the 
iNgwenyama is entitled to a 25% shareholding in a large scale mining operation, 
without monetary contribution, in trust for the benefit of the Swazi nation. This 
reflects the 26% HDSA ownership requirement of the S African Mining Charter 
(2002). No such provision seems to apply for small scale operations. 
 
The Mines and Minerals Act (2011) distinguishes between large scale mining 
operations between Sections 35 to 80 and small scale operations between Sections 81 
to 94, which appears to be for the streamlining of administration of the Mines and 
Minerals Act (2011). 
 
From the above, it would appear as though Swaziland has noted the mineral law 
developments in SA and has responded thereto. However, there are a few lessons that 
SA can learn from Swaziland as well, the most significant being that the recognition 
of traditional leadership with regulation is possible. With IP’s traditional leadership 
being recognised, it does not mean that this would result in the provisions of the 
MPRDA (2002) being ignored or circumvented. As such, government’s participation 
is still required. At the same time, there should be a continuous evaluation of the 
regulations and other systems or it could lead to serious consequences for the viability 
of mining and may actually lead to corrective measures to revitalise mining. These 
reviews should take account of regional developments as well so that regional 
developments could be used to enhance the local circumstances.   
 
Lessons: 
- Traditional leadership can have a major role in facilitating applications for 
mining rights and to maintain cohesion within the community;  
- State control is desirable with the mining companies having a degree of 
independence to conduct their business; 
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- Government’s active and effective participation is essential for any 
development of IPs and the mining sector by properly monitoring, regulating 
and managing the resource exploitation; 
- Mineral regulation should not be static – there should be continuous review 
thereof to ensure that current developments are implemented; 
- Mineral regulation reviews should take regional developments into 
consideration; and 
- There should be a consideration and implementation processes for the 
“equitable” sharing of the financial and developmental benefits from mining. 
“Equitable sharing” should be determined by consultations between the 
mining industry and the State, in consultation with IPs 
 
 
7.5. Conclusion 
These case studies illustrate that community relations must be clear and properly 
defined, together with their hopes and desires, by the IP themselves. The company is 
expected to, and must, negotiate with the IP community as a whole and if the 
community is divided by various interests, then the company cannot state that it has 
the community support to operate.  
 
 
Coupled with a development prerogative, IPs in SA can count on the judiciary should 
they feel their rights have been infringed. However, to effectively implement any 
strategy to exploit their mineral rights, IPs must be able to demonstrate the requisite 
government support, by virtue of the various legislative developments; that is, the 
legal remedies must be clearly discernible from the various legislations and 
regulations. The strategies should be open to these developments which should form 
part of the contingency plans of IPs should an important aspect of the development 
strategy be impeded. Further, IPs should ensure that their traditional leadership is 
respected and included in their strategies and also that these strategies fall within the 
requirements of the various regulations with the traditional leadership not exceeding 
same to the detriment of the IPs.  
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While these case studies provide effective lessons for incorporation into a strategy, 
there are also various toolkits that are currently being used in various countries and 
postulated by various institutions and organisations that are designed to assist IPs. 
Some of these toolkits would be considered in the next Chapter to provide a better 
context for the strategies postulated herein. 
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Chapter Eight 
INTERNATIONAL TOOLKITS AND STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES 
 
8.1. Introduction 
While the previous Chapter considered three case studies involving IPs in different 
circumstances; the issues covered and the lessons learned are not by any means 
absolute, nor do they constitute all the circumstances experienced by IPs. In this 
regard, international organisations, governments and major mining companies have 
developed their own initiatives aimed at benefitting IPs, depending on the 
circumstances of the relevant IPs and the aspirations of the government concerned.  
 
This Chapter would consider some of these initiatives as well as provide a list of 
strategic principles that could be used in the development of strategies for IPs. Part A 
would consider some of the various international initiatives; while Part B would 
consider the basic Strategic principles.  
 
Part A – International Initiatives 
It should be noted that while there are many initiatives that are applicable to IPs, a 
few of the initiatives are considered herein and do not constitute the entire initiatives 
available internationally.  
 
8.2. The Community Development Toolkit (ESMAP, The World Bank and ICMM) 
This is a comprehensive generic toolkit which provides seventeen (17) tools that deal 
with the SD and IPs which can be applied to any extractive project and can be used by 
all stakeholders in the project. The tools are divided into five (5) categories: 
a) Assessment 
b) Planning  
c) Relationships 
d) Program Management 
e) Monitoring and Evaluation (ESMAP, et al, 2005). 
 
While this toolkit provides for a wide array of issues, only a few of the most 
important aspects, in the view of the writer, would be mentioned. The toolkit 
commences with a fairly comprehensive checklist that provides for the identification 
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of all possible stakeholders to the operation, (ESMAP, et al, 2005, Stakeholder 
Identification: Tool 1) which ensures that nobody who has an interest in the operation 
may be forgotten. In addition, the Planning Tools give a step-by-step guide to enable 
stakeholders to effectively plan for SD (ESMAP, et al, 2005, Planning Tools: Tools 5 
- 9). A table is also provided which identifies the tools most appropriate to each 
stakeholder. While the table might seem to be prescriptive, the language indicates that 
these are merely recommendations so that the stakeholders can use the table to guide 
their decision as to which tools to use. 
 
A Consultation Matrix (as reproduced in Annexure A) enables the development of a 
consultation plan well in advance of the actual commencement of the consultations 
(ESMAP, et al, 2005, Consultation Matrix: Tool 11), with a Partnership Assessment 
enabling the identification of potential partners and the benefits thereof(ESMAP, et al, 
2005, Partnership Assessment and Partnership Assessment Worksheet: Tool 12). 
Used in conjunction with each other, these tools would enable a mining company to; 
for example, identify possible partners and then conduct the initial consultations with 
such partners. This eliminates any wastage of time; in that, the company is alleviated 
of the responsibility of first conducting a consultation, making a decision on 
partnership and thereafter having a follow up meeting to discuss the possibility of a 
partnership agreement. 
 
Perhaps the best feature of the toolkit is a provision dealing with conflict management 
(ESMAP, et al, 2005, Conflict Management: Tool 13). This would enable the 
participants to plan well in advance and to identify the necessary risks and consider 
the various controls that might be applicable. 
 
Lessons: 
- While each situation is different, planning and considering all possible issues 
would ensure there is no unnecessary delay in negotiations. 
- Planning involves an in-depth and extensive process  
- Parties must plan for all activities, including the unpleasant ones such as 
delays and possible disputes 
- Never make assumptions – be sure of all issues, especially as regards the 
circumstances, aspirations, skills and experiences of IPs 
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8.3. Human Rights in the Mining and Metals Sector: Handling and Resolving Local 
Level Concerns & Grievances (ICMM) 
This guideline ensures that IPs are made active participants of a mining project at the 
earliest possible opportunity and is aimed at addressing concerns and grievances of 
IPs affected by mining operations. As it is stated in the Guideline: 
“The guidance takes as a starting point that the handling and resolution of 
complaints is a natural extension of good community relations, and rests on a 
foundation of effective and responsible management of interactions with 
communities” (ICMM, 2009, p. 4). 
 
In drafting these guidelines, the ICMM had taken the addressing of IPs’ concerns very 
seriously: 
“An important basic theme is that the way in which complaints mechanisms 
are designed and operated is often critically important to their success. For 
example, on paper such a mechanism may appear to have all the necessary 
elements, but if communities are insufficiently aware of its existence or 
distrustful of its outcomes, they won’t use it and instead may look for other 
ways to resolve their concerns or express their dissatisfaction” (ICMM, 2010, 
p. 5). 
 
It would thus seem that this document requires IPs to be aware of the guideline and 
have confidence in it. The guide goes on to provide a step-by-step process to assess 
the nature of complaints and grievances and also the potential therefor(as reproduced 
in Annexure B). Thereafter, it provides a mechanism for dealing with such 
complaints and grievances (as reproduced in Annexure C). However, while 
comprehensive, the Guideline does not purport to be the final answer for resolution of 
disputes as it states that it “is not intended to detail all the requirements that may exist 
in this area; for example, in national legislation or in standards such as the IFC 
Performance Standards” (ICMM, 2010, p. 4). 
 
Lessons: 
- A dispute resolution mechanism is an essential consideration for any mining 
operation; and 
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- The circumstances surrounding the dispute would determine the appropriate 
dispute resolution mechanism  
 
8.4. Good Practice Guide: Indigenous Peoples and Mining (ICMM) 
Also a creation of the ICMM and aimed at the relationship between the IPs and 
ICMM members, this Practice Guide is significant in that it takes specific cognisance 
of IPs. It explains the stages of mining and is aimed at encouraging IPs to positively 
engage with ICMM members by providing as follows: 
“ICMM members recognize that mining activity has and will continue to 
affect the land, territories, resources and way of life of Indigenous Peoples. 
ICMM members also understand the importance of maintaining a healthy and 
stable natural environment to support local communities and particularly those 
wishing to retain a traditional lifestyle. A healthy natural environment is a 
benefit to all people” (ICMM, 2010, p. iii). 
 
The Guide is aimed at assisting mining companies “in understanding the need to be 
aware and respectful of cultural, social, economic and political complexities 
associated with developing projects in close proximity to indigenous communities” 
(ICMM, 2010, p. iv). The Guide goes further to state that the aim “is to provide 
mining companies with positive, practical and comprehensive approaches to develop 
successful relationships with Indigenous Peoples” (ICMM, 2010, p. v). 
 
The Guide has the following structure: an introduction that provides the reasons for 
establishing the Guide and interaction between the ICMM and IPs; the engagement 
between IPs and mining and the participation of IPs in mining; building relationships 
between IPs and mining companies; the creation of agreements between IPs and 
mining companies; practical aspects of managing the impact of mining and strategies 
and mechanisms for dealing with grievances (ICMM, 2010, p. v). 
 
This Guide provides four reasons for its development: 
“First, there is now widespread recognition at the international level that 
Indigenous Peoples have distinct rights and interests, and a growing 
expectation that these will be respected by responsible companies. Second, 
through law, custom or a combination of both, Indigenous Peoples often have 
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a special relationship to land, territories and resources on which companies 
want to explore and mine. These can create specific obligations for companies, 
as well as presenting a range of unique challenges (and sometimes 
opportunities) that need to be understood and addressed. 
“Third, Indigenous Peoples often have cultural characteristics, governance 
structures and traditional ways of interacting and decision making that sets 
them apart from the non-indigenous population and which require companies 
to utilize forms of engagement that are sensitive to these characteristics. 
“Fourth, Indigenous Peoples have historically been disadvantaged, 
discriminated against and dispossessed of their land, and continue to be 
disadvantaged relative to most other sections of society. They are also likely to 
be more vulnerable to negative impacts from developments, particularly those 
that adversely impact culture and natural resources. Addressing these issues 
requires special attention to the interests and rights of indigenous groups 
across all stages of the mining project life cycle” (ICMM, 2010, p. 3). 
 
In light of the above, the Guide covers: 
- Engagement with IPs; 
- The provision of a solid basis for on-going engagement with IPs; 
- Use of negotiated agreements to define and regulate relations between mining 
companies and indigenous communities; 
- Managing impacts of mining and sharing the benefits thereof; and 
- Dealing with grievances (ICMM, 2010, pp. 16 - 105). 
 
In considering the importance of this document to the mining industry, the ICMM 
Good Practice Guide provides:  
“In the broadest terms, successful agreements are those that build and sustain 
positive, mutually beneficial relationships and partnerships between 
indigenous groups and companies” (ICMM, 2010, p. 55). 
 
Lessons: 
- Initiatives by mining industry organisations should not lightly be disregarded; 
and 
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- IPs traditional and customary connection to the land and resources should be 
recognised, acknowledged and by all parties  
 
8.5. Conflict-Sensitive Business Practice: Guidance for Extractive Industries 
(International Alert) 
This document concerns businesses engaged in the extractive industries who are 
conducting operations in conflict areas. In this document, International Alert has 
identified direct and indirect costs to the company which are: security, risk 
management, material, opportunity, capital, personnel, reputation and litigation being 
the direct costs and human, social, economic, environmental and political costs being 
the indirect costs (International Alert, 2005, p. 2).While this document deals with 
costs of operating in conflict areas, any mine that refuses to acknowledge the IPs in 
the area creates a potential for conflict and if not properly managed, that area could 
become a conflict area with the identified accompanying costs. 
 
International Alert favours companies engaging in a conflict-sensitive business 
practice (CSBP) which “benefits host communities, as well as the wider regional and 
international contexts, by ensuring that company investments avoid exacerbating 
violent conflict. Violent conflict clearly represents a threat to life, security, growth 
and prosperity for affected communities. . . CSBP can help companies avoid causing, 
triggering or accelerating these destructive dynamics to the mutual benefit of 
themselves and communities. It can also help them develop legitimate steps towards 
contributing to peace and stability in instable states” (International Alert, 2005, p. 3). 
 
This document commences by identifying the causes and phases of conflict, various 
applicable legislative instruments, identifying strategies for managing company-
conflict risks, engaging in peace-building, and providing a brief overview of the 
CSBP (International Alert, 2005, pp. 4 – 13). In addition, the document also provides 
Operational Guidance Charts, a Screening Tool, Macro-level Conflict Risk and 
Impact Assessment (M-CRIA), Project-level Conflict Risk and Impact Assessment 
(P-CRIA) and a series of Flashpoint Issue Papers (each dealing with different issues 
such as stakeholder engagement, resettlement, compensation, indigenous peoples, 
social investment, dealing with armed groups, security arrangements, human rights 
and corruption and transparency (International Alert, 2005). 
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Flashpoint Issue 4, dealing with IPs, states the inherent problem most succinctly: 
“The complexity of the dynamic between indigenous peoples and 
multinational companies challenges the best company and community leaders 
even in circumstances where both are willing to work together. Companies, 
whose mission is to remove natural resources, operate near the communities 
that are physically, culturally, spiritually and economically tied to traditional 
habitats and the resources lying under them. Through long histories of 
colonisation and turmoil, these communities exist within nation-states that 
have treated them much differently than full citizens living within the same 
borders. Successor governments are now dependent on revenues from natural 
resources in their territories. Add to this explosive mix opposing perspective 
on development, power differentials and centuries of prejudice about 
indigenous culture, and the result is a recipe for conflict” (International Alert, 
2005, p. 2). 
 
The toolkit provides an in-depth assessment for all companies to adopt, regardless of 
whether they operate in conflict areas or not and could form part of a company’s 
strategic preparations.  
 
Lessons: 
- Companies should recognise the inherent conflict that would exist in its 
relationship with IPs and cater therefor; and 
- While IPs have the traditional rights to land, governments have the 
right to regulate access to the minerals and mining companies have the 
knowledge and ability to mine; but they all need to work together to ensure as 
much conflict-free future relations as possible. 
 
8.6. UN Efforts (UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues) 
The UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues postulates that programmes 
benefitting IPs should follow a human rights based approach (HRBA) which: 
“is premised on the understanding that human rights principles guide all 
programming in all phases of the programming process, including assessment 
and analyses, program planning and design, implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation. These principles include universality and inalienability, 
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indivisibility, interdependence and inter-relatedness, non-discrimination and 
equality; participation and inclusion; accountability and the rule of law” (UN 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, 2005, p. 2). 
 
In illustrating this, the document stresses the need for implementing the principle of 
free, prior and informed consent; and sketches the various efforts of the Forum to 
engage HRBA policies in all UN and UN affiliated organisations and the benefits that 
these efforts have had on IPs (UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, 2005, p. 3 
- 8).This is further enhanced by the UN adopting the UN Common Country 
Assessment and UN Developmental Assistance Framework (CCA/UNDAF) “as 
strategic planning tools for coordinated (sic) UN programming at the country level” 
(UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, 2005, p. 8). 
 
The use of these instruments are explained as follows: 
“the CCA is a first step in analyzing the national developmental situation and 
identifying key development issues for a country, which are aligned with the 
national poverty reduction strategy papers and other national processes of 
governments. The CCA then informs the UNDAF processes which takes into 
account the priorities identified by the government and the CCA. UNDAF 
represents an agreement of the government and UN system agencies to work 
collectively to achieve developmental results, which are expressed as UNDAF 
outcomes and derived from the CCA” (UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
Issues, 2005, p. 8). 
 
It is the conclusion of this document that provides the reason why this document, 
though useful could be problematic for mining companies: 
“These frameworks have been developed utilizing the human-rights based 
approach to development, and provide practical guidance on how, specific 
sector-related programming models can be developed for indigenous peoples, 
which recognize their rights, promote the end to their exclusion and 
marginalization and foster their full contribution to development as valued 
members of national societies and the international community” (UN 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, 2005, p. 9). 
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This forces mining companies to implement international strategies benefitting IPs. 
Mining companies might find themselves with the conundrum of implementing 
international standards in countries that are may not have the regulatory, 
infrastructural and political structures to enable a company to effectively implement 
the standards. 
 
The frameworks discussed form a foundation for all other schemes aimed at 
community development. While the IPs Strategies postulated requires a degree of IP 
involvement and initiative, the UN documents expect a degree of IP passiveness – IPs 
though having a say in the development of programmes, would be completely 
dependent on other parties for the provision of the development. 
 
Lessons: 
- Mining companies would have to bear international standards, especially UN 
standards, in mind when engaging with IPs; and 
- Regardless of local conditions, mining companies, it would seem, would be 
expected to comply with international standards 
 
8.7. The Natural Resources Charter 
This document contains 12 Precepts which, according to its Preamble, were “written 
by an independent group of economists, lawyers, and political scientists under the 
oversight of a Board composed of distinguished international figures” which is 
“directed primarily at policy makers and citizens in resource-rich countries” (Natural 
Resources Charter, 2010, p. 1). Primarily, the Natural Resources Charter is aimed at 
governments as evidenced by the 12 Precepts listed in the Preamble: 
“· Precept 1 
The development of a country’s natural resources should be designed to secure 
the greatest social and economic benefit for its people. This requires a 
comprehensive approach in which every stage of the decision chain is 
understood and addressed. 
· Precept 2 
Successful natural resource management requires government accountability 
to an informed public 
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· Precept 3 
Fiscal policies and contractual terms should ensure that the country gets full 
benefit from the resource subject to attracting the investment necessary to 
realize that benefit. The long term nature of resource extraction requires 
policies and contracts that are robust to changing and uncertain circumstances. 
· Precept 4  
Competition in the award of contracts and development rights can be an 
effective mechanism to secure value and integrity. 
· Precept 5 
Resource projects can have significant positive or negative local economic, 
environmental and social effects which should be identified, explored, 
accounted for, mitigated or compensated for at all stages of the project cycle. 
The decision to extract should be considered carefully. 
· Precept 6 
Nationally owned resource companies should operate transparently with the 
objective of being commercially viable in a competitive environment 
· Precept 7 
Resource revenues should be used primarily to promote sustained, inclusive 
economic development through enabling and maintaining high levels of 
investment in the country 
· Precept 8 
Effective utilization of resource revenues requires that domestic expenditure 
and investment be built up gradually and be smoothed to take account of 
revenue volatility 
· Precept 9 
Government should use resource wealth as an opportunity to increase the 
efficiency and equity of public spending and enable the private sector to 
respond to structural changes in the economy 
· Precept 10 
Government should facilitate private sector investments at the national and 
local level for the purpose of diversification, as well as for exploiting the 
opportunities for domestic value added  
· Precept 11 
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The home governments of extractive companies and international capital 
centers should require and enforce best practice 
· Precept 12 
All extraction companies should follow best practice in contracting, operations 
and payments” (Natural Resources Charter, 2010, p. 2). 
 
It is clear that the first ten Precepts are directed at the governments where the natural 
resource occurs, who bear the ultimate responsibility for the effective exploitation of 
the mineral wealth of a nation. The last two Precepts are aimed at the host government 
of the extractive companies, and the extractive companies respectively. As such, the 
host government of the resources and the host government of the company would 
need to work together to ensure that the best possible practices are engaged in. This is 
most beneficial to IPs as it could entail governments working together for the benefit 
of IPs. Unfortunately, this contention can only be tested once the Charter is 
implemented. 
 
Lessons: 
- The host government has a major responsibility for the extraction of natural 
resources within their jurisdiction; 
- Host governments have to ensure that the decision to extract or not is done for 
the benefit of its citizens and that the taking of the decision is conducted in an 
open and transparent manner; and 
- Home countries of mining companies would also be expected to step in when 
mining companies based in their jurisdiction violates international best 
practice. 
 
8.8. Protocol on Mining (SADC) 
This Protocol, in Article 2(1), was entered into by the Heads of State of the SADC 
countries for economic reasons; that is, they wanted to use mining to develop the 
economies of the SADC countries (SADC, nd).However, the Protocol does not 
effectively deal with IPs. There is no separate provision for IPs nor are they properly 
defined; in fact, in Article 1, IPs are classified together with disabled people and 
women as being historically disadvantaged. 
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The only provision relating to the historically disadvantaged is one of the general 
principles in Article 2(8) which states: 
“Member states shall promote economic empowerment of the historically 
disadvantaged in the mining sector” (SADC, nd). 
 
It does not appear as though IPs are a priority for the SADC as the Preamble does not 
provide for them though it does mention the intention to “improve the living standards 
for people throughout the SADC region” and the promotion of economic and social 
development though it is “with a view of achieving competitiveness and increasing 
our market share in international markets” (SADC, nd).  
 
However, while this Protocol might seem not to apply to mining companies, mining 
companies should bear the economic development priorities of SADC countries in 
mind. Mining developments that are seen to be leading to, or even enhancing, the 
economic development of the region would enjoy the support of the government of 
the host country and also the other governments of the SADC region. 
 
Lessons: 
- Any policy, tool or initiative, especially that of government, aimed at 
benefitting IPs must be clear and specific; and 
- Regional initiatives must be considered as they might assist or impact 
relationships between mining companies, governments and IPs. 
 
8.9. Community Development Framework Study for the Mining Sector in the 
Republic of Guinea (Synergy Global Consulting Limited) 
This study was conducted by a consulting company on instruction of the World Bank 
to consider the development of Guinea’s mineral resources in order to develop the 
country. This study identified 4 levels at which mining companies were influencing 
community development: 
“· At the national level they provide taxes and revenues to the government, 
and they represent a powerful collective body of influence and power 
· At the local government level individual companies have strong 
relationships with the local administration to which they pay a tax which is 
destined for local community development and usually administered by the 
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Prefecture and in some cases by the CRD [Rural Development Communities] 
or CU [Communes Urbaines]. The degree of involvement in the management 
of this fund varies from company to company 
· At the mine level companies are involved in community development 
programmes supported by their own funds and managed by their own staff 
· Above and beyond the contributions that are made either through taxation or 
social investment are the impacts on the local community of their operations 
including through local employment and procurement” (Synergy Global 
Consulting Limited, 2007, p. 33). 
 
Although these levels of influence were identified, it was not easy to determine the 
impact of mining on community development. As is stated in the Community 
Development Framework (CDF): 
“The contribution mining companies make to overall community development 
in Guinea is difficult to gauge. A wide and complex range of factors influence 
the status of social and economic development and in some cases where 
companies partner with other organisations it is impossible to distinguish the 
impact the mining company has from the overall impact of the programme. It 
should also be noted that monitoring by mines of community development 
activities and assessments of their impacts are not widely undertaken, socio-
economic baseline studies against which impacts could be measured were not 
common, and the study was therefore not able to gather statistics on the 
magnitude of impacts” (Synergy Global Consulting Limited, 2007, p. 33). 
 
The Final Report consists of an assessment of the current practices and then provides 
certain recommendations; for example, with regard to management of Funds, the 
recommendation included the continuation of EITI reporting, the consideration of the 
benefits of establishing a fund for future generations, the addressing of concerns as 
regards revenues and taxes paid to the local government in a particular region 
(Synergy Global Consulting Limited, 2007, p. 38). 
 
The CDF, in Chapter 8 of the Report, has the aim of providing “a practical approach 
which all actors can follow regardless of their specific circumstances” (Synergy 
Global Consulting Limited, 2007, p. 86). It is further stated that the CDF “is intended 
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as a practical guide for organisations that work in mining areas in Guinea. It provides 
guidance on approaching Community Development at the national, local and 
organisational level. The framework is not intended to be prescriptive in its advice on 
which programmes should be supported by community development programmes, but 
rather how organisations together with the impacted groups can reach those 
decisions” (Synergy Global Consulting Limited, 2007, p. 86).  
 
It is further stated that the purpose of the CDF “is to provide a tool for an integrated 
approach to community development in the mining sector which helps to ensure that 
benefits and opportunities associated with mining activities are shared with, and 
contribute to the long-term sustainable development of local communities. The 
framework does not intend to be a community development implementation 
organisation but to focus on coordinating and enhancing the implementation of best 
practice by its partners. The CDF does not intend to duplicate the efforts of 
overlapping initiatives, for example the Extractive industries Transparency initiative . 
. . and instead will work in coordinating with relevant groups to enhance outcomes” 
(Synergy Global Consulting Limited, 2007, p. 87). 
 
The purpose of the CDF is further expounded as follows: 
“The framework has been developed to include a voluntary standard against 
which mining companies, government and other actors in the area of 
community development can commit to action, as well as a set of suggested 
actions, some of which may at some stage in the future be introduced into law. 
In the coming years the framework will be tested and revised by companies 
and governments, with a view to introducing some elements to legislation” 
(Synergy Global Consulting Limited, 2007, p. 87). 
 
The CDF has a Vision which is stated as being: 
“Mining makes a positive contribution to equitable and post-closure 
sustainable community development for present and future mining areas in 
Guinea” (Synergy Global Consulting Limited, 2007, p. 89). 
 
The Framework operates on a set of 15 Community Development Principles that are 
divided into management and performance principles. These principles are: 
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1. Assessment of social, environmental and economic content in project affected 
communities; 
2. Strategic planning for community development which is integrated with 
business, community and government planning; 
3. Improving local participation, partnership and engagement with local 
communities and stakeholders in all areas of business; 
4. Communication and transparency across the organisation and with local 
communities; 
5. Building capacity within the company, local communities and local 
government authorities to manage community development; 
6. Striving for continuous improvement through regular internal and external 
monitoring and review of activities and learning and sharing of experiences 
with peers; 
7. Demonstrating support and respect for the protection of human rights; 
8. Protecting the environment through the management of land use, emissions 
and waste and the rehabilitation of degraded sites; 
9. Promoting local procurement through seeking or sourcing goods and services 
locally and building the capacity of local businesses to supply goods and 
services; 
10. Promoting awareness and prevention of HIV/AIDS in the workforce and local 
communities; 
11. Ensuring transparent, fair and safe recruitment and employment practices 
which particularly benefit those directly affected by the project; 
12. Promoting human health at work and in the community; 
13. Ensuring that all social investments are sustainable and developed in 
partnership with local communities and government; 
14. Access to and acquisition of land in a way which involves fair, prior and 
informed negotiation and restoration of livelihoods; and 
15. Closure and post-mine planning ensures that affected communities sustainably 
benefit from the mine (Synergy Global Consulting Limited, 2007, p. 89). 
 
Principles 1 to 6 are the management principles, while principles 7 to 15 are the 
performance principles (Synergy Global Consulting Limited, 2007, p. 89). The 
Framework also contains criteria that provide recommended measurable activities for 
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implementing the principles; such as a Stakeholder Engagement Plan, socio-economic 
baseline studies and environmental and social impact assessment (Synergy Global 
Consulting Limited, 2007, pp. 90 – 94).50In addition, a monitoring, review and 
accountability mechanism is provided, with a governance and co-ordinating structure; 
together with an implementation plan for the CDF where short term and long term 
activities are identified (Synergy Global Consulting Limited, 2007, pp. 99– 106).51 
 
Lessons: 
- A strategic plan would need to incorporate the mining company (business), IPs 
(community) and Government; 
- Developing countries that are resource rich have fairly similar development 
expectations from the exploitation of their mineral resources; 
- Once development needs have been identified, governments should be able to 
access the necessary assistance from sources within and outside the country to 
develop the country’s natural resources; and 
- Outside organisations must understand local circumstances to effectively 
develop an effective mineral policy 
 
8.10. Leading Practice Sustainable Development Program for the Mining Industry 
(Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism of Australia) 
This programme is an initiative of the Australian government and applies to the 
Australian mining industry. It “seeks to promote industry self regulation through the 
pro-active adoption of leading practice principles” (Department of Resources, Energy 
and Tourism, (a), 2010). The Steering Committee of this Programme identified 
fourteen themes and developed a Handbook for each of these fourteen themes 
(Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, (a) 2010). Of these, two are of 
particular relevance to the current research; namely, “Community Engagement and 
Development” and “Working with indigenous Communities”. 
 
 
 
                                                 
50
 The Framework provides a table of criteria as well (Synergy Global Consulting Limited, 2007, p. 97) 
51
 The Framework was done in 2007 and at the time of research, no new information was available as 
regards the success or failure thereof. 
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8.10.1. Community Engagement and Development 
This handbook “focuses on the challenges that companies may encounter as they 
engage with local communities and seek to contribute to their long-term development, 
using case studies to illustrate how these challenges have been addressed in particular 
contexts” (Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources (b), 2006, p. 1). 
 
The aims of this handbook are to: 
“· outline the benefits to companies and operations of engaging with, and 
contributing to, the development of communities 
· provide a framework to help operations and companies assess the maturity of 
their current approach to dealing with communities 
· describe the basic steps involved in effectively planning and managing for 
community engagement and development 
· set out key principles that should guide these activities 
· highlight examples of evolving good practice” (Department of Industry, 
Tourism and Resources (b), 2006, p. 1). 
 
From these aims it is clear that the handbook is aimed at the mining company. It 
further outlines two frameworks for community engagement: 
a) The International Association of Public Participation Spectrum which 
“represents community engagement as a continuum of activities” (Department 
of Industry, Tourism and Resources (b), 2006, p. 6), and 
b) A Generational Framework (Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources 
(b), 2006, p. 7). 
 
The handbook also suggests an engagement process that can be used by companies, 
and ways to deal with the challenges of community engagement, with key steps for 
sustainable community development (Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources 
(b), 2006, pp. 20 – 36). It further lists the challenges for community development; 
such as, issues of control, valuing local knowledge, programme reach and “fly-in, fly-
out practices (Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources (b), 2006, p. 41). 
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8.10.2. Working with Indigenous Communities 
This handbook “focuses on the challenges that companies may encounter as they 
engage with Indigenous communities” (Department of Industry, Tourism and 
Resources (c), 2007, p. 1).Interestingly, it contains a profound statement that 
encapsulates the proposed relationship between a mining company and local 
communities: 
“Effective community engagement depends on the development of 
relationships based on trust. If companies are to contribute to the sustainability 
of Indigenous communities and earn exploration access and mine development 
consents for their operations, they need to develop trusting and mutually 
respectful relationships with local communities” (Department of Industry, 
Tourism and Resources (c), 2007, p. 1). 
 
Apart from acknowledging the basis of the relationship between IPs and mining 
companies, the handbook has a much wider focus than the Community Engagement 
and Development handbook as the aims of this handbook are listed as to: 
“· provide a history of Australia’s and resource developers’ interactions with 
Indigenous peoples that establishes the context of a contemporary 
understanding of ‘working together’ 
· provide a benchmark for Indigenous community engagement to help 
companies and operations assess the maturity and appropriateness of their 
current approaches 
· articulate key principles to guide resource developers working on Indigenous 
land and alongside Indigenous communities 
· describe the benefits to companies and operations of entering into sustainable 
and durable agreements with Indigenous communities that are based on 
mutual respect and recognition 
· set out the basic steps for planning and engaging in mutually beneficial 
agreement making 
· provide examples of good practice” (Department of Industry, Tourism and 
Resources (c), 2007, p. 1). 
 
It seems that this handbook is also directed at companies and is “intended to assist 
corporate managers in designing effective engagement strategies with relevant 
 228 
indigenous parties” (Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources (c), 2007, p. 2). 
The handbook suggests that mining companies institute policy statements which act 
as indicators of their commitment to sustainability. These policy statements should 
refer to: 
“· respect for human rights, cultures, customs and values of Indigenous 
employees and neighbours who are affected by exploration and mining 
activities 
· continual improvement of standards of environmental protection and 
rehabilitation at mining sites and associated operations to satisfy the concerns 
of the local Indigenous communities and the wider community 
· contributing to conservation of biodiversity using integrated Indigenous 
community approaches to land use planning” (Department of Industry, 
Tourism and Resources (c), 2007, p. 4). 
 
The handbook provides the history of the development of the relationship between 
mining companies and IPs, in particular as a result of judicial pronouncements and 
legislative developments (Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources (c), 2007, 
pp. 7 – 10 and 27 - 13) and also for environmental issues (Department of Industry, 
Tourism and Resources (c), 2007, pp. 48 - 54). The handbook stresses the need for 
mining companies to understand the circumstances and culture of the IPs in Australia 
so that effective engagement can occur (Department of Industry, Tourism and 
Resources (c), 2007, pp. 11 – 26 and 44 – 47).  
 
An important legal prerogative in any relationship is encapsulating all the terms of 
their relationship in an agreement. The handbook provides tips on such conclusion of 
agreements with IPs. It states: 
“It is of critical importance that mining companies do not approach agreement 
making with Indigenous people in the same way as they would approach 
commercial negotiation with another mining company. Indigenous peoples do 
not typically regard agreement making as a quick transactional way to protect 
assets or gain commercial advantage. Customary land connection, history and 
its consequences mean that most Aboriginal people do not regard land as a 
commodity to be bargained away. Accordingly, mining companies need to 
appreciate that the pace, tone and content of negotiations can be slow and do 
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not follow the pattern of offer, counter offer and brinkmanship typically 
experienced elsewhere.” (Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources (c), 
2007, p. 33) 
 
This sage advice would actually be applicable everywhere in the world where mining 
companies are encountering IPs. In many cases, as in SA, the level of education of the 
IPs would severely hamper the speedy conclusion of any such agreement. It is for the 
company to realise that in completing this type of agreement, extreme care and 
patience needs to be exercised so that unforeseen future developments are not 
hampered. The legislation does, to an extent, force the mining companies to consider 
the lot of IPs at the outset, in particular when completing the SLP. 
 
It is unfortunate that the handbook suggests the adoption of a staged process where a 
“protocol agreement” is initially concluded, followed by an “in-principle agreement” 
and then a “formal agreement” (Department of Industry, Tourism and Resources (c), 
2007, pp. 34 – 36). While these steps would secure their legal relationship with IPs 
and their access to the minerals, this would unnecessarily prolong the process and 
could be seen as an attempt by the mining company to avoid or delay its obligations. 
To implement the agreement, the handbook suggests that a mining company engages 
in: 
 “· allocating adequate and appropriate resources 
· understanding the socioeconomic context in which the agreement will 
operate 
· clear lines of responsibility 
· clear but flexible goals 
· the support of key political actors” (Department of Industry, Tourism and 
Resources (c), 2007, p. 40). 
 
It then goes on to suggest the following tools for agreement implementation: 
 “· guidance notes and checklists for the agreement implementation team 
· an agreed approach to implementation, signed off and supported at site 
management and corporate level 
· a site based implementation team with competencies in Indigenous relations, 
economic development and line management 
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· a clear set of reporting criteria and mechanisms 
· a set of review mechanisms against which management can report on the 
implementation of the agreement on a regular basis” (Department of Industry, 
Tourism and Resources (c), 2007, p. 41). 
 
While these implementation suggestions are comprehensive and seems to be practical, 
in SA, with a mining right of 30 years, it might seem to be a major drain on resources. 
It is perhaps opportune for mining companies in an area to combine their resources to 
provide an effective management of the process or even for the Chamber of Mines to 
act as a co-ordinator of all development processes for the relevant area. 
 
Lessons: 
- Trust is an essential element for ensuring an effective co-operation between 
IPs and companies; 
- Depending on the level of indigence, literacy and personal circumstances of 
IPs, companies would have to provide additional resources in securing the 
relationship between themselves and IPs; 
- Government’s involvement should include the facilitation of establishing and 
continuing positive relationship between IPs and the mining industry; 
- All parties must respect, acknowledge and support each other’s role in the 
mining relationship; and 
- Engaging in a comprehensive process might be too cumbersome, expensive 
and time-consuming for one company – the possibility of co-ordination and 
co-operation between companies in the same area would be a possibility 
 
8.11. Guidance Document for Australian Coal Mining Operations (Centre for Social 
Responsibility in Mining, Sustainable Minerals Institute) 
This document applies to the Australian coal industry and “provides guidance to 
mining operations on how to better understand and manage their impacts on local 
communities” (Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining, Sustainable Minerals 
Institute, 2005, p. 4).The roles of a Community Impacts Monitoring and Management 
Strategy (CIMMS) are identified as being to: 
“1. Prioritise impact areas for attention by the site  
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2. identify the actions that will be taken to mitigate negative impacts and 
enhance positive ones  
3. define a monitoring and measurement framework for tracking  changes 
impacts over time 
4. set out a process for engaging with stakeholders and regularly reviewing 
and updating the strategy” (Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining, 
Sustainable Minerals Institute, 2005, p. 5). 
 
It is envisaged that this will assist mines to: 
“• focus their efforts and resources on those areas of greatest concern and 
interest to the local community 
• identify opportunities to deliver mutually beneficial outcomes for the 
community and the mine 
• flag emerging issues at an earlier stage and deal with them proactively, rather 
than reactively 
• be more consistent in how they respond to community concerns and 
expectations 
• improve how they assess and report on their social performance” (Centre for 
Social Responsibility in Mining, Sustainable Minerals Institute, 2005, p. 5). 
 
This is obviously an ideal but it would seem that this is an ideal that could be attained 
if the parties are, and remain, committed thereto. The CIMMS development process is 
divided into four stages – preparation, obtaining community input, strategy 
formulation and implementation (Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining, 
Sustainable Minerals Institute, 2005, p. 6). This development process is an in-depth 
guide to formulating a strategy that would enable the company to effectively deal with 
communities. Companies following CIMMS would find that the various stages are a 
step-by-step process that would enable them to arrive at a particular workable 
strategy. Each stage comprises this step-by-step process so that the company would 
not find itself wanting if it follows all the stages identified. Unfortunately, this is a 
company centred approach and though it provides for the involvement of 
communities, they are widely defined (Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining, 
Sustainable Minerals Institute, 2005, p. 7) and the company is placed as the driving 
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force of the programme. As such, the company would be making all the necessary 
decisions affecting all the other parties as well. 
 
Lesson:  
- Company involvement is essential for any strategy – however care must be 
taken to ensure that IPs have a more active role and companies are not made 
the driving force of initiatives aimed at benefitting IPs 
 
8.12. The Anglo American Socio-Economic Assessment Toolbox (Anglo American) 
The Anglo American Socio-Economic Assessment Toolbox (SEAT) is an initiative of 
Anglo American and is intended: 
“. . . to help operations to benchmark and improve the management of their 
local social and economic impacts. The SEAT process enables operations to 
take a more strategic view of their interactions in relation to, for example, 
local employment; reducing the exclusion of disadvantaged groups; training; 
procurement and community social investment.” (Anglo American, 2003, p. 3)  
 
Anglo American has identified the following benefits of SEAT: 
“∙ enabling a more strategic approach to managing socio-economic impacts 
and the generation of data to show the local development opportunities created 
by each operation  so as to rebuff critics; 
∙ supporting operations in undertaking partnerships with governmental 
authorities and non-governmental organisations to raise the life chances of 
people in the communities associated with our operations in tackling problems 
like HIV/AIDS; 
∙ helping to make a reality of Anglo American’s corporate objective of 
balancing the depletion of natural resources with the announcement of local 
social and human capital; 
∙ facilitating the development of the social dimension of long-term closure 
planning; and 
∙ creating key performance indicators for local and corporate reporting” 
(Anglo American, 2003, p. 3). 
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From this, it would appear that the main reason for postulating SEAT is as a public 
relations exercise. This is somewhat confirmed as it is stated that SEAT “is not 
mandatory but represents ‘best practice’” (Anglo American, 2003, p. 3). 
 
SEAT comprises a number of steps each containing various tools to enable the 
particular stage to be completed. Stage 1 is a profiling exercise where the particular 
Anglo American operation is profiled, the community and other stakeholders are 
profiled and key issues are identified. Forms for completion and various information 
tables are provided. As part of the information tables, various advices are dispensed; 
for example, conducting of consultations, (Anglo American, 2003, p. 12) analysis and 
identification of stakeholders, building a basic community profile, and so on (Anglo 
American, 2003, p. 12 - 52). 
 
Subsequent stages follow a similar format though they deal with the identifying and 
assessment of social and economic impacts of Anglo American’s activities, 
assessment of the issues raised and sharing the results with stakeholders, developing 
management responses to the issued identified and planning for closure, and reporting 
on the assessment (Anglo American, 2003, pp. 53 - 129).  
 
This is an operation centred approach with, apparently, no further upper management 
or corporate engagement or involvement. While not mandatory, there is an element of 
monitoring due to the reporting aspect (Anglo American, 2003, p. 125). However it 
does not provide a mechanism for corporate management to assess the particular 
SEAT. The SEAT is comprehensive, but there seems to be no incentive for the 
operation management to engage in SEAT. While SEAT provides the management of 
the operation with the tools to “think outside the box” and seek solutions that would 
benefit IPs, the lack of incentives would not encourage operation management to do 
anything except the bare minimum. 
 
Lessons: 
- Any initiative should not amount to a “window-dressing” activity.  Mining 
companies, governments, and IPs should be fully committed to all processes; 
and 
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- Mandatory implementation would ensure that there is compliance at all 
operations and also that there is uniform compliance at mine and corporate 
level 
 
8.13. The socio-economic aspects of mine closure and sustainable development – 
guideline for the socio-economic aspects of closure (CSMI) 
Planning for mine closure is becoming an important aspect of a mining operation. 
This study was conducted by the Centre for Sustainability in Mining and Industry 
(CSMI) on commission from Coaltech with the mandate to “generate a locally 
relevant guideline for closure, taking into account local and global developments in 
the field, including existing closure toolkits”(Stacey, J., et al (a),2010, p. 379). 
 
The focus of the study was to “identify and address shortfalls in the management of 
the social aspects of closure in South frica (sic), with a view to providing a pragmatic 
social process guide for use by closure practitioners” (Stacey, J., et al (a),2010, p. 
380).This focus indicates that IPs would be included as part of the “social aspects” 
that would be affected by mine closure. This is borne out by a few of the identified 
generic principles; namely, “stakeholder engagement, consultation and 
empowerment” and “human rights” (Stacey, J., et al (a), 2010, p. 382). 
 
Stacey et al regard stakeholders as including “mine employees and related unions; 
host communities; service providers; people and companies involved in downstream 
economic activity; government, including local authorities; NGOs; and people 
involved in the greater economic processes in the region” (Stacey, J., et al (a),2010, p. 
384). 
 
The first part of the plan sets the context for the establishment of the mine closure 
guideline, with the second part being the guideline itself. A profound comment in the 
guideline can be regarded as a central feature of any toolkit: 
“Sound understanding of the context in which the mine is operating, genuine 
and robust stakeholder relationships, and systematic application of risk 
management principles are central to success” (Stacey, J., et al (b), 2010, p. 
395). 
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The Guideline, at the outset, requires the establishment of policy statements outlining 
various commitments; one of which relates to IPs in that it requires a commitment to: 
“Achieving closure goals to the satisfaction of all key stakeholders, engaging 
interested and affected parties consistently and transparently, considering the 
local communities’ requirements when, for example, designing mine 
infrastructure and environmental management strategies, reducing potentially 
negative impacts on communities, and maximising opportunities for lasting 
benefits to communities” (Stacey, J., et al (b), 2010, p. 395). 
 
The comprehensive guideline covers all aspects of the mining cycle from the 
exploration phase to post closure and integrates it with three other cycles – 
stakeholder engagement cycle, a socio-economic planning and implementation cycle 
and a community dependency cycle (Stacey, J., et al (b), 2010 p. 398).As this 
guideline is new, only time would tell how successful it would be. 
 
Lesson: 
- The full spectrum of the mining operation would have to be considered from 
beginning to end and beyond 
 
Indications are that, of the three parties, mining companies are the only ones who are 
aware of these and other initiatives, and have contributed to discussions thereon. 
Attempts by the writer to obtain comments from representatives of the other two 
parties seem to indicate that they are unaware of such developments or, if aware, 
especially for government, they are deemed not important for the transformation and 
development agenda of SA and there was no need to engage therewith. However, 
while the above instruments have been considered to develop appropriate strategic 
principles for IPs for the purposes of this research, it is submitted that government 
engage the services of an independent and impartial institution, such as the CSMI, to 
conduct an assessment of the various instruments applicable to IPs and to determine 
which instruments to be adopted in SA. Further, the CSMI should be engaged to 
develop implementation mechanisms for government and IPs to update their 
knowledge and practices. 
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Part B – Principles for IPs Strategy 
In considering the lessons from the previous chapters, the following general principles 
can be discerned: 
- There are three parties in a mining relationship (Government, the mining 
company and the affected/local community(ies) (IPs)) who need to work 
together and co-operate with each other; 
- Mining relationships are fraught with inherent conflict; 
- Effective leadership from all parties is essential; 
- Trust is an essential element – IPs must trust their leaders and IPs, 
governments and mining companies must trust each other; 
- While a generic strategy can be developed, it must be flexible enough to 
account for the unique circumstances of the IPs concerned and the specific 
requirements to effectively mine the mineral concerned; 
- Maximum benefit would not be immediate but would accrue over time; 
- Developmental programmes must be adaptable to change in circumstances; 
- IPs’ representatives must be fully au fait with all matters concerning their 
people and must effectively represent the interests of their charges; 
- IPs skills, capacities and needs must be considered for effective development 
of the community concerned; 
- IPs customs and traditional connection to land and resources must be 
acknowledged and respected; 
- Mining companies must not be the sole entity to assist IPs; 
- Sustainability of the mining business is a vital consideration; 
- Government’s active and effective participation is essential; 
- Government’s action should not be limited to just regulating the industry but 
should actively support the mining industry to grow and facilitate better 
relations between companies and IPs; 
- Government must demonstrate effective governance; 
- Independent and impartial advice should be obtained by a, or all, party(ies) as 
and when necessary; 
- The independence of all parties should be respected and encouraged. IPs must 
handle their affairs independently and their rights to traditional practices 
respected; companies must be free to conduct business and their right to 
security of tenure be respected; and finally government must be able to 
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regulate the industry in the best interests of its citizens and its right to 
sovereignty be respected; 
- There should be a consideration and implementation processes for the 
“equitable” sharing of the financial and developmental benefits from mining; 
- Local and foreign private sector participation should be encouraged and 
welcomed; 
- International, regional, local and industry standards must be respected and 
adhered to by all parties; 
- SD initiatives should be implemented as a matter of course and not as a public 
relations exercise or a basic compliance to legal and regulatory requirements; 
- Legislation must be certain but not so complicated that IPs would need to 
engage a team of legal experts to “decipher” it; and 
- Judicial assistance can be sought for enforcement of nationally recognised 
rights. 
 
From the above, certain fundamental principles can be discerned: 
- Development  of IPs; 
- Rule of Law; 
- Engagement and co-operation; 
- Sustainable mining business; 
- Trust; 
- Advice that is independent and impartial; 
- Leadership; and 
- Long-term vision and benefits 
 
In considering the first letter of the initial words, the acronym “DRESTALL” can be 
discerned for these fundamental principles. While not arranged in a particular 
hierarchy, the acronym does provide a guide to the major issues that IPs need to 
consider when developing Strategies. For example, it goes without saying that IPs 
would need to make their “Development” their main priority, yet they cannot make 
“Long-term Vision” a last consideration. Both aspects would need to be considered 
simultaneously. In the same manner, all of the aspects included in “DRESTALL” 
would need to be considered simultaneously and not in isolation of each other. This 
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“catchy” concept would ensure that IPs always bear the fundamental principles in 
mind. 
 
8.14. Conclusion 
In considering the various initiatives that provide for the development of minerals, 
there are many similarities between them. However, it is evident that due to the 
different circumstances there is no “one size fits all” approach that can be adopted.   
 
In considering the various international toolkits by the different organisations, it is 
clear that there are three parties to a mining transaction; namely, the company, the 
government and the IPs. Each must work with the others to ensure a successful 
mining operation. Further, the toolkits indicate that while there are many initiatives 
that account for IPs’ interests, it is not clear as to how effective these initiatives have 
been in informing IPs of the interests that are sought to be protected. 
 
However, it is submitted that IPs can be informed, or kept informed, by continuous 
engagement with the IPs concerned. This continuous engagement would also go a 
long way in addressing many of the issues identified in the general principles 
identified. While not exhaustive, the general principles highlight the most common 
features of the various toolkits considered. These common features, in turn, highlight 
the fact that some issues between IPs are generic and can be resolved if all parties can 
develop generic principles to cater for these common features, which can be 
combined into a set of fundamental principles as identified by the acronym 
“DRESTALL”. 
 
The next Chapter would consider various Strategies that could be used for the seeking 
of benefits from mining. Particular attention would be given to strategies that IPs 
could employ. 
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Chapter Nine 
STRATEGIES FOR THE EFFECTIVE USE AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
MINERAL RIGHTS BELONGING TO INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 
9.1. Introduction 
While the previous chapters highlighted the particular nuances of IPs in SA and 
internationally, this Chapter would consider the various strategies that can be adopted 
by IPs in SA to benefit from mining operations on their land. This Chapter would 
follow the method postulated by Ilbury and Sunter (2005), which entails, in essence, 
setting scenarios, which create a broad outline of a particular action, from which 
relevant strategies are developed. 
 
While Chapter 8 identified the fundamental and general principles applicable to the 
possible strategies, each party has certain basic considerations towards the other that 
is depicted in Table 2 below: 
 
Table 2: Considerations for Parties in a Mining Transaction 
 
IPs Considerations Company 
Considerations 
Government 
Considerations 
Current skills and 
capacities and 
development needs 
that is dependent on 
the minerals and 
mining method 
SD initiatives 
essential facet of 
company business 
Active and effective 
participant  
Representatives 
represent interests of 
the people 
 
SLP, MPRDA (2002) 
and Amended 
Mining Charter 
(2010) obligations 
are an extension of 
Government’s 
regulatory role 
includes facilitating 
growth of the 
industry and better 
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SD practices relations between the 
company and IPs 
Customs, traditional 
practices and to the 
land is acknowledged 
and respected 
Global and local 
industry standards 
are adhered to 
Global and local 
regulatory standards 
adhered to 
  Must demonstrate 
good Governance 
practices 
 
From the above Table 2, it is clear that while all parties would have to follow the 
“DRESTALL” fundamental principles, IPs would have the most basic of 
considerations followed by that of companies and thereafter government which bears 
the highest considerations. This can be more clearly indicated in Diagram 2 below: 
 
Diagram 2: Obligations of the Various Parties and Their Interaction with Each Other 
 
 
From Diagram 2, it can be seen that at the core of the mining relationships are the 
fundamental principles (see Chapter 8).  
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At the next level, IPs,who has the most basic obligations, must bear the following 
considerations in mind: 
- Their current skills and capacities and development needs would need to be 
considered and prioritised. It should further be noted that these needs would 
have to be commensurate with the type of minerals on the land and the mining 
method required for extracting it; that is, the IPs must not have unrealistic 
expectations as regards the benefits from mining; 
- IP representatives must be competent and effective and should have the 
support of the community; and 
- Customs and traditional practices must be respected together with their 
traditional connections to land. IPs must ensure that these practices and 
perceptions are communicated to the other parties 
 
At the next level would be the company, who bear the next level of obligations, would 
have the following considerations: 
- SD initiatives should be regarded as an essential facet of the company’s 
business; 
- SLP, the MPRDA (2002) and Amended Mining Charter (2010) should be seen 
as being part of the company’s SD practices; and 
- Global and local industry standards should be adhered to such that local 
companies implement the same or similar standards of companies in other rest 
of the world. 
 
This then leads to the final level of obligations which is borne by government who 
have the following considerations: 
- Government has an active role to play in the development of mining industry; 
- In addition to regulation and monitoring, government must facilitate mining 
transactions, especially between IPs and companies; 
- Global and local regulatory standards must be respected and adhered to with 
legislation being certain but uncomplicated and not unduly restrictive; and 
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- Government must demonstrate good governance practices 
 
From Diagram 2, while the government has an all-encompassing role, the inter-
connectedness of all the parties in this relationship cannot be disregarded. If one party 
is ignored then the resultant strategy(ies) would not be effective. 
 
In light of the above, this Chapter would be divided as follows: 
- Part A – Parties to the strategies and their roles and responsibilities; and 
- Part B – The strategies 
 
PART A: PARTIES TO THE STRATEGIES 
From Chapter 1, there are three parties to a mining transaction; namely, IPs, mining 
companies and government. 
 
9.2. Government 
From previous chapters,
52
 in addition to being the regulator and custodian of the 
mineral wealth, government also facilitates the relationship between IPs and 
companies. In this role, government would need to liaise with mining companies and 
IPs to seek the best options for the affected IPs; to enable IPs to benefit from mining 
while also ensuring the company remains sustainable. This role entails that 
government take a more proactive role by monitoring and continuously assessing the 
relationship between IPs and companies. 
 
It can be stated that Government would therefore have the following roles: 
a) Developing the mineral law and policy framework; 
b) Regulating the industry; 
                                                 
52
See Chapters 3 - 7 
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c) Monitoring and enforcing compliance of the industry with the relevant rules 
and regulations; 
d) Promoting development; 
e) Promoting investment in the industry; 
f) Stimulating economic growth; 
g) Encouraging sustainable use of the countries natural resources; 
h) Ensuring consistency and constancy of its decisions; and 
i) Facilitating effective and cohesive relations between IPs and companies. 
 
While the S African government has met some of the above-mentioned roles, it is 
recommended that the S African government increase its governance capabilities (see 
Chapter 4) so that it can effectively comply with all the stated roles. As such, no 
strategy for government is warranted at this stage. 
 
9.3. Mining Company 
Being the main driver for mining developments, mining companies must ensure that 
initiatives benefitting IPs would be successful. However, any strategy considered and 
implemented should not affect the sustainability of the mining operation. If the 
mining operation becomes unprofitable, this would spell the end of any development 
program for IPs and the economy of the country. Adaptable strategies enable 
companies to be profitable while also providing for continuous IP development. 
 
At the same time, IPs must realise, and inform themselves of, the limitations of the 
operation and not have unrealistic expectations of what the operation can deliver. In 
this way, the IPs, for example, can work with the company in the drafting of the 
mandated SLP, which would ensure that the company has been proactive in ensuring 
that the operation proceeds with the consent and support of the IPs concerned. 
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9.4. IPs (Local Communities) 
By engaging proactively with the company and government, IPs can ensure that their 
rights are acknowledged, and catered for, and can thereby seek the best options for 
themselves. As such, any initiative driven by IPs would be regarded as being one of 
the most, if not the most, important scenarios to be considered. Having said that, it 
should be noted that it would not be a good option if the application for mining right 
is delayed pending the outcome of the negotiation process or the operation is halted 
pending conclusion of an agreement. Consultations and negotiations must be 
commenced early enough to be as less time-consuming as possible.  
 
IPs should be kept fully informed of developments and must be allowed the 
opportunity to provide their input. IPs would therefore need to make use of such 
opportunities to develop and retain the necessary skills to ensure they are effective 
drivers of the relevant strategies.  
 
IPs should look at the company’s current practices, their own particular needs and 
approach companies with alternate suggestions, if possible. While, from the previous 
chapters, are the weakest of the parties and do not have the expertise to deal with the 
complexities of mining, they understand their own needs and expectations which they 
can communicate to the other parties. Communication and a shared understanding 
between the parties of their respective needs and expectations is key to a successful 
mining operation.   
PART B: THE SCENARIOS AND STRATEGIES 
To determine effective strategies, relevant scenarios would first need to be 
considered. In light of the afore-going discussion in Part A, in terms of this research, 
the following scenarios would be applicable: 
1) Company Drives; 
2) IP driven; and 
3) Future Endeavours  
 
 245 
For each of these scenarios, the strategies for establishing a successful mining 
operation would be considered. 
 
9.5. Scenario 1: Company Drives 
Mining companies tend to provide fairly similar benefits to the community in which 
they operate; such as, building a hospital or a clinic, building a school or a town hall 
and erecting a sports ground. The Company Drives scenario accordingly seeks to 
expand the current practices of mining companies to include new developments or, 
alternatively, to seek new forms of development. As such, while the company is the 
main driver, it needs to engage proactively with IPs.  
 
This is illustrated in Diagram 3 below: 
Diagram 3: IP Engagement by Mining Companies 
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Diagram 3 can be described as follows: 
- Constructive Engagement – the company adopts a policy of constructively 
engaging with the IPs in the area of operation and commits itself to projects. 
In this regard, the companyrealises that it might have to negotiate with more 
than one set of IPs and therefore seeks to identify the relevant IPs and their 
unique practices and requirements. Thereafter, the company initiates contact 
with the IPs; 
- Alternatively, the company can completely ignore IPs to the extent of side-
lining or even removing IPs from the mining area. No Engagement goes 
against the basic tenets of SD and the SLP and could result in IPs resisting the 
company’s actions, perhaps even violently; and 
- The two intermediate options include Non-committal Engagement where the 
mining company engages with the IPs but do not commit itself to any or all of 
the projects; and Forced Engagement where the company only engages with 
IPs as a last resort or to meet basic legal requirements. In the former, while the 
IPs engage with companies, not all of their concerns and needs may be 
addressed; serious concerns might even be ignored. In the latter case, the IPs 
finds that the companies are not being committed to engaging with them. 
Their level of confidence in having their concerns addressed by the company 
would be extremely low, increasing the chances of conflict. 
 
The intermediate options, together with No Engagement, are not advisable because 
they fly in the face of the provisions of the MPRDA (2002), the Amended Mining 
Charter (2010) and the SLP. Due to the long lead times, and companies’ SD and SLP 
commitments, the only viable option would be Constructive Engagement. 
 
9.6. Constructive Engagement as a Strategy 
Constructive Engagement would involve the strategies as depicted in the 
“Constructive Engagement Pyramid” as depicted in Diagram 4 below: 
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Diagram 4: Pyramid Depicting the Strategies of Constructive Engagement 
 
From Diagram 4 it would appear that, in all strategies, while the company engages 
with IPs and seek benefits for both the IPs and the operation, the strategy can be 
adapted to meet the relevant obligations of the company. However, considering the 
levels of increasing importance and decreasing interaction and commitment, of the 
three strategies, SD Best Practice appears to be the most viable. This can be 
established by considering each strategy individually.  
 
 
9.6.1. Arms-length Contact 
 
This strategy is represented by the “Arms-Length Contact Cycle” in Diagram 5 
below: 
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Diagram 5: Arms-Length Contact Cycle 
 
In this Arms-Length Contact Cycle strategy of Diagram 5, the company does not 
directly involve itself with the IPs. The company delegates its role and responsibilities 
to consultants who engage with the IPs on behalf of the company. With this arms-
length contact, the IPs and the company have minimal interaction as all or most 
communications would occur via the consultants: the company drives the process via 
the consultants and provides the finances for the various projects. The IPs meet the 
company at their initial meeting(s) and thereafter interact solely with the consultants. 
Consultants determine the extent of co-operation and the manner of securing the 
commitments of IPs. 
 
While this would seem a problem-free option, the company is at the mercy of the 
consultants, who have to be given a broad mandate to negotiate on behalf of and bind 
the company. Also, the company would have to commit to long-term agreements with 
the consultants to ensure proper continuity and management of projects. If the 
consultants do not manage the relationship with IPs properly then the company would 
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not be able to, or might find it difficult to, salvage the relationship with IPs. Using 
consultants enables the company to concentrate on mining activities but also requires 
it to monitor the activities of the consultants from prior to commencement of 
operations until after mine closure. IPs, on the other hand, deal with one set of people 
and are not faced with mine management who are constrained and distracted by their 
operational priorities.However, IPs might find that the consultants do not have the 
necessary mandate to deal with certain critical issues.  
 
The effectiveness of this strategy can be assessed via a Strengths, Weaknesses, 
Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) analysis as indicated in Diagram 6 below: 
Diagram 6: SWOT Analysis of Arms-Length Contact 
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From the Diagram 6 SWOT analysis, it is evident that while dealing with consultants 
has its benefits, it is not without hazards. The Weaknesses and Threats far outweigh 
the Strengths and Opportunities. Appointing consultants may lead to less 
administration on the part of the company management; however, due to the 
sensitivities associated with dealing with IPs, the company would have to monitor the 
consultants to such an extent that it might be better for the company to administer the 
relationship themselves. Perhaps the worst issue for IPs would be that the consultants 
develop a strong speciality in managing IPs, become sought after as a result of this 
specialised skill and thereupon charge consultation fees accordingly. This would 
impact on the costs of the operation and perhaps even the kinds of programmes that 
IPs could have obtained. If the consultants are no longer affordable, then the company 
and IPs have to commence direct contact and re-build their relationship caused by the 
void left by the consultants. 
 
9.6.2. Basic SD and Engagement 
This strategy is represented by Diagram 7 as follows: 
Diagram 7: Basic SD and Engagement Cycle 
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In this “Basic SD and Engagement Cycle” strategy of Diagram 7, the company 
interacts with the IPs by continuously engaging with their advisors (such as lawyers, 
financiers and technical specialists); via periodic consultations with the advisors and 
IPs. In fact, no consultations occur without the presence of advisors. This results in 
the involvement of company advisors at every level of the company’s relationship 
with IPs and would essentially entail the company engaging in the best possible SD, 
as determined by their advisors. With the involvement of advisors, various co-
operative agreements covering the different aspects of the co-operation between IPs 
and companies would be implemented and would form the basis for the relationships 
between IPs and the company; for example, with lawyers managing and monitoring 
agreements, it is highly unlikely that either of the parties would go beyond the terms 
encapsulated therein. With the level of involvement of the company advisors, even 
IPs suggestions and recommendations would be referred for advice. In this way, the 
advisors are involved to the extent that they monitor and provide advice to the 
company until closure of operations. 
 
This would necessitate that IPs engage their own advisors as well, to ensure that they 
are not unduly prejudiced. This could well lead to both parties’ advisors, especially 
their lawyers, engaging with each other and determining the relationship between the 
parties to the exclusion of the parties themselves; that is, the lawyers determine and 
control the relationship between the company and IPs. Further, the possibility is very 
high that all disputes would be referred for judicial scrutiny, even minor ones. 
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A SWOT analysis hereof would be as per Diagram 8 below: 
Diagram 8: SWOT Analysis of Basics SD and Engagement 
 
From the SWOT analysis in Diagram 8, apart from the significant cost implications, 
the administration of advisors becomes a major consideration as there would be more 
contracts to deal with and it would be very easy to find one-self dealing with a lot of 
paper-work. While the IPs would be so engaged with the advisors, it might not 
necessarily lead to major, or even quick, development. Resources (time and money) 
would be devoted to getting paper-work sorted out that there might not be enough 
resources to engage in the significant development of IPs. The weaknesses and threats 
indicate that the “Basic SD and Engagement” strategy would not be as effective as 
one might expect.  
 253 
9.6.3. SD Best Practice 
This strategy is represented in Diagram 9 as follows: 
Diagram 9: SD Best Practice Cycle 
 
 
 
In this strategy, the company is fully conversant with the SD requirements of the 
MPRDA (2002), SLP and the Amended Mining Charter (2010) as well as 
international best practice. The company is required to invest a lot of time, effort and 
resources to ensure that it works. The model is applicable from the beginning; that is, 
at the initiation of the relationship between IPs and the company and involves the 
company undertaking a study to determine the IPs affected by the operation and their 
location on the mining property. This would also entail the company considering the 
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impacts, and possible impacts, of the mining operation on the IPs concerned, 
especially if they are not located on the company property but would be affected by 
the operation; for example, the mine’s tailings dam rests on part of the IPs grazing 
lands. 
 
Once the IPs have been identified and located, the company would then initiate 
contact and discussions with them and engage proactively with them. With this 
interaction, the company attempts to identify and implement mutually beneficial 
activities. The basic premise is for the company and the IPs to work together to 
develop the area and to ensure a successful operation. Where there are many IP 
communities, the company would be engaged in activities that would be unique to the 
needs of the particular IP grouping concerned. Further, the company can encourage 
discussions and co-operation between the various IPs, if possible, to co-ordinate 
mutually beneficial development opportunities. 
 
The various development initiatives can be formalised in co-operative agreements and 
other mechanisms. These agreements would usually set out the expectations of the IPs 
and the commitments of the company and vice versa. With such clear setting of the 
various prerogatives, there would be no need for any disputes arising; however, in the 
event of a dispute then the agreements would provide for resolution mechanism that 
should take account of the traditional dispute resolution practices of the IPs. 
 
The best way for the company to integrate IPs into the operation is for the company to 
employ IPs in the operation. This would form part of their SD and SLP commitments 
to skills development. In addition, this would lead to the IPs developing mining 
related and other skills which would enable them to become self-sufficient upon 
closure of the operation. 
 
While this strategy would require the company to pro-actively and actively engage 
with and manage various resources and to devote lots of time to ensure its success; 
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this represents the best case scenario when engaging with IPs and would lead to an 
expansion of the SD principle as it would lead to IPs becoming more independent. 
 
A SWOT analysis of this option is as per Diagram 10 below: 
Diagram 10: SWOT Analysis of SD Best Practice 
 
In considering Diagram 10, the company and IPs have a lot of interaction with each 
other and there is an allowance for a greater participation of IPs in the operation itself. 
This interaction would ensure that the company and IPs get better acquainted with 
each other, which has significant implications for the building of trust. This “SD Best 
Practice” strategy also provides for a greater recognition of IPs and allows them to 
share their culture and traditional practices with the company, which in turn shares 
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their corporate culture with the IPs. While dispute would be inevitable, with the 
interaction and acceptance of cultural differences and similarities, the resolution of 
such disputes would be much quicker and easier to solve. This strategy ensures a 
longer operation but also ensures an enduring relationship between the company and 
IPs. While there are serious threats and weaknesses from the current practices of 
mining companies with regard to SD, it is clear that these would not be 
insurmountable and would in fact enhance the relationship between IPs and 
companies. As such, the SD Best Practice strategy is preferred over the Arms-
Length Contact and Basic SD and Engagement strategies.   
 
9.7. Scenario 2: IP Driven 
In this scenario, IPs obtain the mining rights on their own; for example, due to 
successful land claims, via a successful customary claim (Native Title) or by 
obtaining the Section 104 Preferrent Right (MPRDA, 2002). They then seek to exploit 
the mining right to meet their development needs. 
This scenario can be depicted as per Diagram 11 below: 
Diagram 11: Scenarios for IP Driven 
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From the above chart in Diagram 11: 
- Choosing Partners entails the IPs developing a plan that encapsulates their 
development needs and considers the contribution of mining the mineral 
resources on their land to fulfilling that plan. They then research various 
mining companies and choose the one whose mining practice and SD 
programme most closely matches their own development programme. The IPs 
then engages in mining with the chosen company and ensures their own 
development at the same time. The best example hereof is that of the Royal 
Bafokeng Nation (RBN); 
- Agreement Controlled entails the IPs engaging with a mining company as 
per their development programme but operate strictly in terms of a fixed-term 
agreement. With the S African mineral rights regime enabling the IPs to re-
apply for mining rights after 30 years, the IPs can opt not to renew the 
agreement with the mining company at the end of the thirty years and then 
proceed to mine on their own. With this kind of arrangement, it would be 
difficult to find a mining company who would be willing to invest in such a 
transaction knowing that it would be of a temporary nature, even if there is an 
opportunity to invest in the IP’s company at a later stage; 
- Not Mining entails the IPs choosing not to have any mining in the interim and 
looks to government to provide the necessary impetus to develop the minerals. 
This could mean that the IPs run the risk of losing their mineral right at the 
end of thirty year period; or that they lose out on the benefits of mining the 
minerals by the minerals losing their attractiveness; for example, a drop in 
desire for nuclear power makes uranium mining less attractive; and 
- Multiple Agreements, the IPs cannot decide which mining company to 
choose and so engage in multiple agreements with different companies. While 
this would seem a good option, IPs would have to be able to manage the 
different contractual relationships it is engaging with. IPs must ensure that 
they do not become lackadaisical in monitoring the various agreements and 
with that losing major benefits or IPs themselves failing to meet necessary 
obligations – this could lead to contract lapsing or being cancelled to the 
detriment of IPs. 
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Of these, Choosing Partners appears to be the best scenario and would require IPs to 
engage more effectively with the mining company.  
 
9.8. Choosing Partners as a Strategy 
It is depicted in the following “Choosing Partners Pyramid” as per Diagram 12: 
Diagram 12: Pyramid on the Strategy of Choosing Partners 
 
 
From Diagram 12 it can be seen that Choosing Partners would involve a lot of 
personal contribution from the IPs themselves – they are placed firmly in the driving 
seat of the relevant strategy. In considering the decreasing interaction and 
commitments and the increasing importance, it is clear that Mutual Co-operation 
would be the preferred strategy. However, one needs to consider all the strategies 
individually. 
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9.8.1. Independent Institutions 
This strategy is depicted by Diagram 13 below: 
Diagram 13: Independent Institutions Cycle 
 
 
In “Independent Institutions Cycle” strategy of Diagram 13, the IPs, either via their 
traditional leadership or their chosen representative, approach an independent 
institution, such as an NGO, for advice. The independent institution would then 
undertake the research on two aspects; namely, the mineral and the best mining 
method to exploit that mineral, together with a list of appropriate mining companies to 
engage. The second aspect would be an assessment of the development needs of the 
IPs. The traditional authority would, based on the report from the institution, obtain a 
mining right, choose an appropriate mining company and then arrange for the 
commencement of operations. On commencement of operations, the IPs then retain 
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the services of the independent institutions, to monitor the operation and report to 
them periodically. 
 
A SWOT analysis hereof would be as per Diagram 14 below: 
Diagram 14: SWOT Analysis of Independent Institution 
 
From this SWOT analysis of Diagram 14, the greatest threat is that the traditional 
authority might not be able to choose the right independent institution. Apart from not 
being able to perform that expected functions, the IPs might either find themselves 
being unduly influenced by the independent institution concerned and might find 
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themselves being the victims of collusion between the independent institution and the 
company or might find themselves the victims of fraudulent activities where the 
independent institution negotiates, for whatever reason, for its own accord instead of 
working on behalf of IPs. 
 
9.8.2. Traditional Authority 
This strategy is depicted in Diagram 15 below: 
 
Diagram 15: Traditional Authority Cycle 
 
In this “Traditional Authority Cycle” strategy in Diagram 15, the traditional authority 
of the IPs controls the process. As the traditional authority, they carry the support and 
confidence of the IPs and are able to effectively lead the IPs to further and appropriate 
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development. In this strategy, the traditional authority undertakes two simultaneous 
studies. The first involves selecting a group of their people to undertake research into 
the minerals on their land, the best method to mine the minerals effectively and 
profitably, the mining companies with expertise in mining the relevant minerals and 
also consider the revenues that can be expected. At the same time, another group of 
their people undertakes research into the development needs of their people and to 
prioritise same into categories that would enable them to determine which are the 
most important.  These inclusive studies ensure that the traditional leadership, and 
their people, are fully aware of the minerals on their land, how best to mine same and 
how to maximise the revenue received from the operation.  
 
The traditional leadership then evaluate the suggested companies to determine which 
of them would best deliver on their peoples’ needs, both for revenue and 
development. At the same time, the traditional authority applies for a mining right 
over their land. Once a company has been chosen, the traditional leadership engages 
with the company. Upon agreement being reached, mining operations commence. The 
two studies mentioned would provide the traditional authority and the community 
with realistic expectations from the operation. It would also ensure that the IPs devote 
enough resources for the further development of the operation so that the operation is 
not prejudiced by unrealistic development prerogatives of the IPs. 
 
 
A SWOT analysis hereof is as per Diagram 16 below: 
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Diagram 16: SWOT Analysis of Traditional Authority 
 
While the “Traditional Authority Cycle” strategy of Diagram 15 recognises the role of 
the traditional authority and places them at the head of the development, the SWOT 
analysis of Diagram 16 indicates that the weaknesses and threats outweigh the 
strengths and opportunities to the extent that the strategy of Diagram 15 cannot be 
said to be the definitive strategy.  
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9.8.3. Mutual Co-operation 
This strategy can be depicted by Diagram 17 below: 
 
Diagram 17: Mutual Co-operation Cycle 
 
In this “Mutual Co-operation Cycle” strategy of Diagram 17, the IPs approach other 
IPs who have experience in mining for advice. They then enter into a partnership with 
such IPs to develop the mineral resources. Once the partnership agreement is 
concluded, the development prerogatives determined; then the mining operation 
commences. 
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A SWOT analysis hereof would be as per Diagram 18 below: 
Diagram 18: SWOT Analysis of Mutual Co-operation 
 
From the SWOT analysis of Diagram 18, it would seem that a co-operative 
relationship with another group of IPs would be of benefit to the IPs. However, as 
with all transactions, the IPs must ensure that they are engaging with the correct IPs; 
that is, IPs that would be able to help them and guide them effectively. Unfortunately, 
in SA there is a distinct lack of IPs with such expertise, with the exception of the 
RBN. However, while the experience of the RBN is in platinum, their diversification 
into other areas of investment could help in determining long term plans and goals.  
 
From the discussions of the above strategies, Choosing Partners indicates that the 
strategies thereunder require the IPs to take the relevant decisions as seriously as 
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possible and not be diverted or distracted by any preconceptions of the benefits that 
could arise. Of the above strategies, Mutual Co-operation is the preferred option as 
it gives IPs, even with limited resources, the ability to form partnerships with IPs who 
meet their criteria for success. In assessing IP partners they empower themselves in 
that they assess for themselves the actions that lead to success, failure or missed 
opportunities of the other IPs and thereby develop their own plans. 
 
9.9. Scenario 3: Future Endeavours 
The previous scenarios were aimed at developing IPs to enable them to uplift 
themselves from their current circumstances whatever that might be. However, once 
the development prerogatives have been attained or exceeded, the IPs would need to 
consider the “next step” of their development. This scenario considers options 
available to IPs once their development prerogatives have been met, as depicted in 
Diagram 19 below: 
 
Diagram 19: Scenarios for Future Endeavours 
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Diagram 19 can be explained as follows: 
- Longevity – here the long-term plans for further improvement and 
development are considered. Improvement can include an improvement in the 
business of the company where the company considers expansion into other 
areas in the country or even other countries or commodities. It could also 
include a diversification in the kind of business where the company develops a 
portfolio in various kinds of businesses and companies regardless of their core 
business. Development would include expanding the current development 
prerogatives; for example, building a university or a training or technical 
college or even building a specialised unit in the local hospital; 
- Losing Interest – here the IPs do nothing as they are no longer interested in 
future projects financed by mining. This could be that development in other 
sectors of the economy makes the IPs less interested in mining as a source of 
income or that the actual benefits received fell short of the envisaged benefits, 
even with the introduction of corrective measures. In the former case, mining 
is seen as a hindrance to the future of the IPs while the latter is seen as an 
unnecessary drain on the available resources. In either case, the IPs no longer 
wish to pursue mining and lose interest. Demise of the operation becomes a 
certainty; 
- Need Lacking – here the IPs get used to the improvement and development 
provided by the company and completely place themselves in the hands of the 
company. As such, the company, of its own prerogative, would terminate a 
development programme once the need for it evaporates. The company would 
also maintain the infrastructure until no longer required or is taken over by 
government. As such, the continuation of the development programme would 
be based on the company’s perceived need therefor; and 
- IPs Abandon –The company engages in the basic tenets of the development 
agreement with the IPs and only actively engages in further development 
when requested thereto by the IPs. There is an improvement in the lives of the 
IPs but due to them always negotiating for further development and not 
engaging properly with the company as regards the operation, they lose sight 
of the original agreement that lead to the establishment of the operation. The 
younger members move away from the area, as a result of their education or 
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them not receiving or perceiving any benefits and seek better opportunities 
elsewhere. The older generation no longer have the drive or energy to pursue 
their development prerogatives and adopt a lackadaisical attitude, with most 
following their children away from the area.  
 
From a development perspective, the Longevity scenario appears to be the most 
preferable as it takes a long-term view and the IPs are able to derive maximum benefit 
from their mineral resource. While Longevity places the IPs in a position that would 
exploit as much of the resource as possible, Losing Interest enables IPs to derive the 
benefit they deem sufficient and sterilisation of the operation becomes a certainty. In 
either case, once the operation ceases, no further operations becomes possible 
regardless of the nature and extent of the mineral resource. With Need Lacking and 
IPs Abandon, the IPs have lost control of, or interest in, the mining operation. This 
leads to the IPs losing the ability to determine their further development which could 
either reduce them to previous, or worse, circumstances or force IPs to abandon their 
traditional areas.  
 
 
 
9.10. Longevity as a Strategy 
 
Longevity can be depicted as per the “Longevity Pyramid” in Diagram 20 below: 
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Diagram 20: Pyramid on Longevity 
 
 
In considering Diagram 20, a long-term view of the company and the industry is 
envisaged. It is aimed at taking the IPs from their current development into a new 
developmental phase. With Longevity, four components are likely: Improvement, 
Expansion, Research and Development and Diversification. Taking the decreasing 
interaction and commitment and increasing importance into account, two preferred 
options come to the fore; namely, Research and Development and Diversification. 
 
 
9.10.1. Improvement 
The “Improvement Cycle” strategy is depicted by Diagram 21 below: 
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Diagram 21: Improvement Cycle 
 
 
The “Improvement Cycle” strategy of Diagram 21 considers the existing programmes 
that the company engages in and ways to improve them. A longer term view ensures 
that the project would continue after mine closure and be controlled by the IPs. This 
can be divided into “Community Social Projects” and “Community Business 
Projects” which are interconnected. The former could include; for example, hospitals, 
schools and community parks; while the latter would include; for example, a dairy, 
poultry projects and construction projects. The interconnectedness of these projects 
means that the community social projects feed into the community business projects, 
and vice versa. This Cycle also requires a continuous evaluation of the various 
projects to identify and excise any deficiencies and also identify possible 
improvements thereon. This results in a holistic improvement for the IPs. 
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A SWOT analysis hereof is as per Diagram 22 below: 
Diagram 22: SWOT Analysis of Improvement 
 
While this “Improvement Cycle” strategy provides for a broad perspective and 
encourages innovative thought of IPs, the SWOT analysis of Diagram 22 reveals that 
it is heavily dependent on the commitment of all the IPs, which also happens to be 
part of the major weaknesses and threats. If there is no unity in the IPs for an 
improved programme then the strategy is doomed to failure. 
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9.10.2. Expansion 
A depiction of Expansion would be as per Diagram 23 below: 
Diagram 23: Depiction of Expansion 
 
 
 
While this component, as per Diagram 23, would involve the expansion of the 
company beyond the operation, it would entail the IPs developing greater corporate 
skills and expertise. The expansion would entail the company going into other areas 
of the country and/or going into other countries. As part of the expansion into other 
areas and countries, the company could engage in joint ventures with other companies 
in the area or the country concerned. The ultimate expansion would be the company 
growing beyond its modest beginnings to become a conglomerate by diversifying into 
other commodities. As per the diagram, it does not matter which option is chosen, 
expansion would be certain and successful. While engaging in all three options would 
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be ideal, choosing and implementing one of the options might entail a complete 
change of focus from existing operations. 
 
A SWOT analysis would be as per Diagram 24: 
Diagram 24: SWOT Analysis of Expansion 
 
While the “Expansion” strategy is able to cater for IPs taking the next step of the 
economic evolution, the SWOT analysis on Diagram 24 indicates that it is heavily 
dependent on the IPs remaining together once the envisaged development needs have 
been addressed or exceeded. In addition, business reasons might require the IPs to 
abandon their geographical area to other areas of the country or even another country; 
for example, access to financial markets of Johannesburg or London. This could also 
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happen where IPs would like to seek a different lifestyle; for example, retire to a 
coastal village. The uncertainty thereof makes this strategy questionable. 
 
9.10.3. Research and Development 
This “Research and Development” strategy is depicted by Diagram 25 below: 
Diagram 25: Research and Development Bow-tie 
 
In addition to using the proceeds from mining to improve the lives of IPs directly and 
indirectly, research and development can ensure an improvement in the industry as 
well – a central feature of which is Innovation. The research can relate to developing 
new and better mining methods, new technologies and new uses of minerals. With 
these new developments, the IPs can thus become manufacturers or even distributors 
of the innovations and ensure that they become better participants in the mining 
industry. Innovations can be divided into New Mining Technologies and Other 
Technologies – each having a similar impact but taking the IPs in different and 
opposite directions. With regard to the former, in SA, most of mining technology is 
provided by foreign owned companies such as SANDVIK, Caterpillar and Komatsu. 
However, due to the Article 2.2.requirement of the Amended Mining Charter (2010) 
requiring suppliers to mining companies to contribute financially to development and 
mining companies to source services and consumer goods from BEE entities,  this 
would be an opportunity for IPs to improve on such technology and eventually 
develop new technologies and thereby develop unique S African products. The 
greatest impact would be on the equipment used by mining companies. 
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With regard to the latter, while mining can form a major focus of development, the 
SD practices of the company might require the development of other technology that 
can become a major opportunity for IPs. Such technological developments can 
include that which deals with communication issues, Information Technology and 
machinery for various other industries; such as ethanol powered machinery and 
equipment for the agricultural sector. 
 
A SWOT analysis hereof is as per Diagram 26 below: 
Diagram 26: SWOT Analysis of Research and Development 
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While “Research and Development” strategy would mean greater investment in the 
future of the IPs, it would take a long lead time for IPs to see the benefit. From the 
SWOT analysis of Diagram 26, it would appear that this is particularly so due to the 
innovations currently available – IPs would need to play “catch-up” and then be able 
to proceed with developing innovations. The benefit of “Research and Development” 
strategy is the investment in education and would lead to an improvement in their 
current lives. As such, this strategy places the IPs on a learning curve that would lead 
them to develop themselves and enable them to eventually become leading 
innovators. 
 
9.10.4. Diversification 
This is depicted as per Diagram 27 below: 
Diagram 27: Diversification Flow Chart 
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This “Diversification” strategy involves changing the focus of the company. The 
focus could be either a change in commodity or a change in business. A change in 
commodity would entail the company changing the mineral commodity from; for 
example, coal to gold. A change in business would entail a complete change in the 
focus and perhaps even the culture of the company. For example, if a company 
converts to agriculture, this would entail different environmental considerations from 
mining, different technological requirements and different import/export 
requirements. These areas also provide the greatest opportunities to use existing 
knowledge to improve the agricultural industry. Further examples of possible ventures 
would include the finance and tourism industries.  
A SWOT analysis hereof is as per Diagram 28 below: 
Diagram 28: SWOT Analysis of Diversification 
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This SWOT analysis of Diagram 28 indicates significant benefits to IPs engaging in 
this strategy. While the threats and weaknesses have huge implications for IPs, with 
the knowledge they had obtained to this time, they would be able to make the 
necessary decisions timeously and to have the necessary contingencies in place should 
it be necessary. 
 
While all the strategies are feasible, IPs must take adequate care in ensuring that they 
do not, inadvertently, terminate their development and the opportunity to maximise 
their benefits from mining. Having such long term views would ensure that IPs are 
cognisant of the fact that mineral resources are finite and that they should use it 
optimally. Planning for such eventuality is therefore absolutely necessary. As such, in 
this “Longevity” scenario, two strategies are preferred. The first, “Research and 
Development”, ensures investment in skills development in necessary areas, 
especially technology; whereas, secondly, “Diversification” ensures the economic 
viability of the IP business and area. 
 
9.11. Conclusion 
The basic acknowledgment in mining, and the development that flows therefrom, is 
that minerals are finite and as such they are a depleting source. As such, development 
prerogatives would be subject to the kind and extent of the resource.  
 
Of the three parties to a mining transaction, Government provides the necessary 
regulatory and legislative systems with a facilitating role, IPs must be proactive as 
regards mining on their land and development programmes for themselves, and 
mining companies have the necessary skills and resources to assist IPs achieve their 
development prerogatives. It is thus incumbent on all parties to work together to 
ensure such development. However, IPs must be prepared to take the initiative and go 
beyond that which is expected. Ignoring companies would not be advisable as they 
would provide the necessary funding, especially in the initial stages. While 
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Government might prove to be a hindrance in certain circumstances, as controllers of 
the mining rights processes, they should also not be ignored or disregarded. 
 
There are many scenarios and strategies that can be employed by IPs to drive their 
own development. While the preferred strategies are indicated, it is incumbent on IPs 
to choose that which is most beneficial to them and their developmental prerogatives. 
These strategies must meet certain ground rules, which is possible if a long term view 
is taken. 
 
SWOT analyses of the various strategies indicate that IPs cannot take the strategies 
lightly, nor can they expect “quick fixes”. A long term view is essential, together with 
an appreciation for the kinds of benefits that could be achieved and the time it would 
take to achieve such benefits. Even though the development goals are reached, the IPs 
must still take a proactive role in ensuring the future sustainability of their economy 
by diversifying, where possible, even if it is away from mining. 
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Chapter Ten 
CONCLUSION 
 
In identifying relevant strategies for Indigenous Peoples (IPs) to use in the 
exploitation of their mining rights, an assessment is required as regards their identity: 
in SA, with its diverse races, which grouping can be regarded as IPs?Having endured 
discriminatory practices by the Dutch and English colonisers and the Nationalist 
government during Apartheid, it is understandable that many of Historically 
Disadvantaged Persons (HDPs) would consider themselves being IPs. However, the 
Indian, Chinese and White races have been determined as being ineligible for 
consideration as IPs; leaving the African and Coloured races being eligible for such 
classification. In defining who would be classified as IPs in SA, the following 
definition had been postulated herein: 
A group of people who have a common heritage, that share a distinct 
language and religion and who practice the same customs and traditions. 
They have a close connection to the land on which they live and have been 
prevented from practicing their customs and traditions and from enjoying a 
free and undisturbed use of their land by colonialism or any other foreign 
interference. 
 
An assessment of the various legislations during the various stages of S African 
history indicates a protracted series of actions that had eventually culminated in the 
complete subjugation of IPs and their rights. While there have been legislative 
reforms aimed at reversing these impacts since the attainment of democracy, it is 
unclear as to whether these reforms have actually impacted IPs due to their inclusion 
in the definition of HDPs. Upon the attainment of democracy, government has 
implemented BEE and transformation initiatives to redress the imbalances of the past. 
These initiatives have stimulated greater participation of Historically Disadvantaged 
South Africans (HDSAs) in the mining industry, via the Mineral Policy (1998), 
MPRDA (2002), the Mining Charter (2002), the Amended Mining Charter (2010) and 
the Social and Labour Plan (SLP). However, these instruments do not make a 
significant distinction between HDSA’s and IPs. As such, IPs would in all probability 
find their rights being made subservient to the rights of HDSA’s. However, it is with 
the judicial pronouncements occasioned by the various Richtersveld Community 
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cases and the successes of the Royal Bafokeng Nation that indicate that IPs can 
participate meaningfully in the S African mining industry. An assessment of the 
various legislations indicates that IPs can make use of various legislative remedies to 
ensure recognition of their mining rights and thereby seek their own development. 
 
As such, it is incumbent on IPs to take the necessary initiatives to ensure that they 
derive the maximum benefits they seek. In addition, a case study involving the Swazi 
nation it is clear that, although a constitutional monarchy, the Swazi experience 
indicates that it is possible for a legislative imperative to lead to greater certainty and 
reliability of process – a view shared by S African regulators. 
 
On the other hand, international case studies of various toolkits aimed at benefitting 
IPs indicate that IP involvement is vital in ensuring the success of any such 
programme. 
 
In considering the development strategies for IPs arising from the exploitation of 
mineral resources, the three important parties (government, the company and IPs) 
must be willing to work together, with each playing their respective parts and 
respecting the roles of the others in ensuring a viable and sustainable mining 
operation. Although IPs are in a weaker position in comparison to the other parties, 
being directly (or indirectly) impacted by mining, they are the best determinants of 
their development needs, which must be respected by the other parties. However, IPs 
must ensure that they do not harbour unrealistic expectations on the benefits to be 
accrued from the exploitation of the minerals. All parties would need to adhere to the 
general and fundamental principles with each party having particular considerations to 
ensure a successful mining operation.  
 
While neither a scenario nor a strategy was formulated for government, it should be 
noted that the S African government’s governance is wanting and would need to be 
improved for it to play a meaningful role in the mining industry. In addition, 
government needs to ensure that it facilitates positive and long-lasting relationships 
between companies and IPs where their rights and duties towards the other are 
respected and enforced. In this way, government plays an impartial role in ensuring 
that the relevant strategy is a success.  
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In the Company Drives scenario, it is recommended that the company would engage 
in Constructive Engagement with the IPs, with the preferred strategy being the SD 
Best Practice, which ensures maximum interaction between the company and IPs and 
ensures that the company and the IPs work together for a successful mining operation. 
 
However, it is not entirely up to the company to see to the development needs of the 
IPs. IPs would need to be proactive in ensuring that they receive the benefits they 
desire from the exploitation of the mineral resources on their land. In this regard, in 
the IP Driven scenario, it is recommended that IPs engage in Choosing Partners 
with the preferred strategy being Mutual Co-operation which promotes mutual co-
operation with other IPs involved in mining. While this strategy does not specifically 
mention the company, by the IPs taking the initiative it is envisaged they would 
choose the legal persona of the company as a business tool and therefore be the 
company as well. In this way, the company naturally fits in with the plans and 
initiatives of the IPs. 
 
It is incumbent on all parties to ensure that investment in mining is not a decision 
based solely on revenue generation but an investment in the development and future 
well-being of the IPs as well. In this vein, Future Endeavours requires the parties to 
look at the Longevity of the venture as an imperative with the preferred strategies of 
Research and Development and Diversification. These strategies consider the 
improvement in the knowledge and skills of IPs as well as the economic viability of 
the area; that is, IPs invest in the development of their own knowledge and skills as 
well as ensure that their future is secure by diversifying into other commodities or 
other businesses. 
 
In light of the above, to effectively implement all these strategies, the following 
recommendations for the various parties are made: 
a) Government should: 
1. Amend the MPRDA (2002) to ensure the rights of the companies and IPs are no 
longer impeded. The MPRDA (2002) serves as the expression of the Mineral Policy 
(1998) of the country, yet it does not provide sufficient emphasis or acknowledgment 
of the rights of IPs – IPs need greater recognition and protection. An extensive study 
had been conducted during the construction of the Mineral Policy (1998), perhaps it 
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should also be revisited in seeking an appropriate amendment, but with greater 
emphasis on the rights of IPs;  
2. Effectively facilitate the relationships between IPs and companies to ensure proper 
compliance with the relevant legislation and ensuring that long-term agreements can 
be achieved. In addition, an improvement in its governance would ensure that there is 
greater confidence in government’s abilities, especially as regards its responsibilities 
towards IPs and companies; and 
3. Appoint the CSMI to assess the various instruments relating to IPs, identify the 
relevant ones that are applicable to IPs in SA and to develop the necessary 
mechanisms to enable government and IPs to engage effectively therewith. 
 
b) Companies should: 
1. Expand the applicability of their Sustainable Development(SD) projects to 
incorporate their SLP obligations so that by complying with the SLP, companies 
would ensure that they comply with their SD prerogatives as well; 
2. Engage proactively with IPs and include IPs as an integral part of the companies 
SLP obligations; and 
3. Share information on activities and experiences, especially with companies in the 
area. It prevents duplication of projects and also enables companies to combine 
resources for the benefit of the IPs in the area. 
 
c) IPs should: 
1. Consider their future, taking account of current development needs and 
communicate effectively with companies and government as regards these needs and 
how government and companies can assist IPs in achieving their development 
prerogatives. IPs would need to be proactive to ensure that their rights are effectively 
taken care of. This would entail IPs making themselves aware of the opportunities and 
pitfalls of the relevant legislation, the minerals they have on their lands and the best 
method to mine same, having a clear indication of their development needs and 
realistic expectation of the benefits; 
2. Seek clear and concise independent advice to ensure maximum development of 
themselves and the maximum receipt of benefits from mining; 
3. Ensure that the people charged with leading this development prerogative are 
effective and capable leaders, especially the traditional leaders, who can be trusted to 
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maintain good relations with the government and the company but also ensure the 
maximum benefits for the rest of the community. Further, such leaders would have to 
be able to keep the community united and not be the source of any dissension; and 
4. A long term vision is required with no quick and easy returns being expected due to 
the long lead times required for a mine to become profitable. As such, the future 
Strategies should influence current developmental Strategies and vice versa. 
 
Further work: 
While the strategies postulated herein are wide-ranging, interlinked and have long-
term application, the following issues would need further research: 
- Improving government capacity to fulfil its responsibilities in terms of the 
strategies and how to develop or improve such capacity; 
- The manner(s) in which government can establish and/or improve its role of 
facilitator in the relationship between IPs and companies; 
- The impact of the Mining Charter (2002) and Amended Mining Charter 
(2010) on IPs and the S African mining industry; 
- The effects of BEE and transformation on IPs with regard to mining and 
mining rights; and 
- The applicability of these strategies to IPs outside of SA 
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